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Officially recognized as the largest shaoshu minzu (national minority) of the 
People‟s Republic of China, the Zhuang - a Tai-speaking people who live 
mainly in the southwestern part of China – have constructed their identities as a 
response to tremendous social and political changes initiated by the communist 
regime. 
Buluotuo is regarded as an apical ancestor of the Zhuang. The Buluotuo 
scriptures written in the old Zhuang scripts were evaluated as a precious folk 
literature which reflects the historical and socio-cultural changes of the Zhuang, 
as well as the taboos and morality that emphasizes the harmonious relationship 
between nature, man and society. The scriptures also demonstrate the 
development of Zhuang agricultural civilization and common culture with 
other Taic groups in Southeast Asia. They were thus regarded as a party-
approved expression of the Zhuang‟s ethnic cultural marker in the context of 
post-socialist economic reform. 
This dissertation examines the Buluotuo cultural tourism development of the 
Zhuang in Tianyang County of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Based 
on extensive fieldwork and textual analysis, this dissertation discusses, on the 
one hand, how different groups of Zhuang people have negotiated, interpreted 
and presented what it means to be „Zhuang‟ in the Buluotuo Cultural Festival; 
and on the other hand, it examines how „Zhuang‟ identity is shaped by the 
ethno-political rhetoric of “difference” and by the state discourse of economic 
development and modernization. 
It illustrates how the development of tourism to the Buluotuo Cultural Festival 
at Mt. Ganzhuang has been situated in contexts for the negotiation and public 
display of meanings. The discourse of „Buluotuo Culture‟ is a part of cultural 
politics in which Zhuang intellectuals have made efforts to reclaim their “lost” 
traditions due to leftist mistakes during the Cultural Revolution. They speak of 
the issues of Zhuang ethnic empowerment by expressing Zhuang uniqueness 
for national and international visibility. However, a process of selective 
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remembering and invention of usable pasts entails a fight for memory among 
local communities in Tianyang. My research demonstrates that, far from being 
passive, ritual masters, villagers and female devotees in the vicinity of 
Tianyang are “cultural strategists” and, to some degree, have the capacity to re-
negotiate power relations by contestation for their ritual spaces and insist on 
their particular versions of narratives and memories of their sacred spaces. 
Ethnographic research reveals that the struggles of marginalized peoples are 
complex, and there are various means by which the Zhuang ritual specialists, 
commoners and devotees negotiate their economic exploitation and political 
marginalization as well as appropriate the official discourse of Buluotuo 
Culture to reconstruct their ritual space and local traditions that were once 
forbidden and denied from local social and cultural landscapes. 
Moreover, the strategic position of Guangxi as a base for China-ASEAN 
economic cooperation encourages not only Zhuang elites and scholars but also 
commoners to exercise transnational mobility and to articulate the imaginary of 
Zhuang common culture with other Tai-speaking groups in Southeast Asia. It 
also demonstrates that Zhuang ethnic formation is an ongoing process of 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In the area along the current Sino-Vietnamese border, there are several 
Tai-speaking peoples distributed primarily over the Southwestern part of China 
to mainland Southeast Asia— he area James Scott called ‘Zomia.’1 Today, these 
areas are marked by boundaries separating different countries that have assigned 
different ethnic label to the peoples inhabiting within its national border.  
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
term “Zhuang”2 was first used as an official minzu name or an umbrella term 
for Tai-speaking peoples in Guangxi and for administrative area of Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region (simply referred to as ‘Guangxi’ in the remainder 
of the dissertation). Although the Zhuang assimilated into Chinese culture and 
adopted Han customs and manners during the formation of the modern Chinese 
state, they were regarded as indigenous to the area and retainied distinctive 
characteristics different from the Han. The Zhuang spoken language, their 
distinctive style of folk antiphonal singing, and the ‘Song Market’ are credited 
as their vital cultural markers.  
                                                          
1 James Scott (2009) borrows Willem van Schendel’s term ‘Zomia’ and defines it as a new name 
for all the lands at altitudes above roughly 300 meters all the way from Central Highlands of 
Vietnam to northeastern India and traversing five Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand, and Burma) and four provinces of China (Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and parts 
of Sichuan). His thesis is that Zomia is the largest remaining region of the world whose peoples 
have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states because these diverse peoples intended 
to escape from state control.  
2 The name “Zhuang” can be traced its appearance to a mid-thirteenth-century which refer to 
the zhuang ding (literally, “men who collide”) in the military operations. In the 1334 military 
campaign of Guangxi, the Yuan-dynasty official identified Zhuang ren as one category of man 
yi in the southern border region. (See Shin 2006: 155)  
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After the completion of the minzu identification in 1979, the Zhuang 
have been recognized officially as the largest of the 55 minority nationalities 
(shaoshu minzu)3 of the PRC.  Most of them are concentrated in the western 
part of Guangxi, inhabiting the area south of the five great mountain ranges. Other 
Zhuang have settled in Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou and Hunan provinces.  (See 
Map 1) 
Map 1 - Distribution of the Zhuang in southern China and Location of Guangxi  
 
Source of Map: Castro and Hansen 2010: 4. 
Guangxi has an area of 236,000 square kilometers with Vietnam 
bordering the area in the south. According to the Guangxi Bureau of Statistics 
(2006), the total population in Guangxi is 46.55 million, including 28.61 million 
(61.5%) Han, 15.18 million (32.6%) Zhuang, and 2.76 million (less than 6%) 
other ethnic minority groups. The Zhuang in Guangxi account for the majority 
(94%) of Zhuang population in China. 
                                                          
3 The Jino was the last group officially identified in 1979. (Zheng, Q. 2010: 27) 
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My research interest in the Zhuang began in 2007 when I first went to 
Guangxi with Ass. Prof. Suvanna Kriangkaipetch 4  who was invited by the 
Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences to attend an academic seminar held 
alongside the Buluotuo Cultural Tourism festival at Tianyang County of Baise 
municipality. “Buluotuo” appeared in myth, ritual scriptures, prose, and ancient 
song as characters who establish the order/civilization of Zhuang Society.  
In the seminar, the Zhuang scholars proudly presented an eight-volume 
of annotated translation of Buluotuo scriptures that were written in the old 
Zhuang script and cast in an archaic form of five-syllable verse, which had 
survived the massive destruction of Cultural Revolution and the socialist 
onslaught. Zhuang scholars devoted several years to transcribing line-by-line 
and word-by-word into a Romanized Zhuang writing system, into the 
International Phonetic Alphabet, and translating the text into Chinese. Buluotuo 
myth in the scriptures narrates the origins of the world, of rice, fire, animals, 
and human institutions. Buluotuo instructed humans how to perform cultural 
acts such as producing fire, rice cultivation, and nurturing the land. They were 
researched and evaluated as a precious literature which reflected the historical 
and socio-cultural changes of the Zhuang. Significantly, Zhuang scholars 
emphasized the importance of Buluotuo myth and some commonalities of the 
myths and rituals related to “Na culture” or wet-rice farming of the Zhuang and 
other Tai-speaking groups in Southeast Asia. 
                                                          
4 At that time she was deputy director of Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology 
Centre. She was invited because she had researched Zhuang and Yao folklore in Guangxi 
since the 1980s. 
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At that time, I was especially intrigued by the emphasis of the Tianyang 
governor that Buluotuo culture was an important means of friendly intercourse 
and communication between China and Southeast Asians. Moreover, the 
“Buluotuo culture”—a combination of Buluotuo myth, ancestor worship rituals, 
and Zhuang folksong festivals—was enlisted during the first Zhuang Intangible 
Cultural Heritage at the national level in 2006. To some extent, Zhuang 
intellectuals succeeded in expressing their ethnic pride and their place in modern 
China.  In a speech by the chairman of Zhuang Studies Association, he stated: 
Buluotuo is the human ancestor of Zhuang people. This is the ethnicity 
position… The human ancestor is an emblem of ethnic psychology and the 
sense of ethnic identity. Buluotuo is the creator-god of Zhuang people and 
the creation spirit is the backbone of spiritual world of Zhuang people since 
time immemorial. The descendants of Buluotuo should carry forward 
Buluotuo’s creation spirit to serve the nation’s socialist modernization 
effort and make Zhuang people rank among the world’s advanced ethnic 
groups.[emphasized by me] 
(Zhang Shengzhen’s speech: 22 April 2010) 
The subjects of this study are the Zhuang people who are on the 
margin/periphery, both geographically and economically, of the Chinese 
modern state.  This study examines how the Zhaung were involved in 
manufacturing discourses about their cultural identities in the context of local 
politics as well as in the larger international context of China-ASEAN economic 
development. With recent nation-state technologies of control, the Chinese state 
formulated minzu categories and discourses toward ethnic markers of the PRC 
that affected and influenced Zhuang ethno-nationalist consciousness. In the 
PRC sociopolitical context, cultural difference and minzu components were 
being produced in new ways within the politics of identity. Thus, the 
construction of the “Buluotuo culture” as the distinctiveness of the Zhuang 
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identity can be seen as the Zhuang intellectuals’ maneuvering of the past to 
negotiate with Chinese state hegemonic discourse of “socialist modernity”.  
In brief, the local pilgrimage of several villages to worship ancestor and 
deities at Mt. Ganzhuang of Tianyang County has been transformed into the 
state-sponsored Buluotuo cultural tourism festival. From my observation, state 
and academic discourses on Buluotuo culture highlight the harmonious 
relationship between humans and nature, humans and society, and among 
family members that link to the goals of socialist modernization.  At the same 
time, some sacred and supernatural aspects of the worship rituals are 
disregarded. However, local religious meanings still continue to flourish 
alongside a secularized and commoditized celebration of the Buluotuo festival. 
My research reveals that, to the worshippers and festival-goers, miraculous 
efficacy is perceived as the core of the festival as well as seeking fun in joining 
festivity activities. An adequate interpretation of the popular religious revival, 
therefore, has to take into consideration all the different social actors’ desires 
and actions. The role of local actors as agents in this process of reconstructing 
culture including recalling memory, restoring the tradition of chanting the 
worship songs, and incorporating local wisdom with modern knowledge has to 
be explored.  
To understand the complicated social process of creating a self-image 
and how differently situated Zhuang use these state formulated categories and 
discourses in redefining their own identities, it requires an overview of Zhuang 
religiosity and how their religious practices were suppressed by the Chinese 
socialist state’s fluctuating policies towards popular religion.  
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The Zhuang Religiosity under the Chinese Socialist State  
Traditionally, the Zhuang are polytheists, worshipping ancestors, deities, 
the sun, the moon, the stars, thunder and light and other things such as giant 
rocks, old trees, dragon, and totems in the shape of a frog, snake, bird, crocodile, 
dog, cow, tiger, or other animals. The huge number of bronze drums found and 
collected in Guangxi5 are crucial supporting evidence that, over 2,500 years ago, 
the Zhuang’s ancestors had made use of the bronze drum as an instrument of 
authority or worship. The figure of frogs cast in the bronze drums has been 
recognized as a totem of the Zhuang and the human figure wearing a head 
decoration has been interpreted as the practice of shamanism. Also, the ancient 
rock paintings at the Huashan Mountain in Guangxi show the figures of humans, 
bronze drums, horses, dogs, swords, the sun, and etc., which reflected the social 
activity scenes of the pre-historic Luoyue people. Scholars hypothesized that 
they developed a stratified aristocratic society with special classes of artisans 
and warriors and used bronze drum to signal high status (Weins 1954, Barlow 
1996, Higham 1996).  
Until now, some Zhuang communities in Donglan County of Guangxi 
still have the bronze drums and celebrate the Frog Festival (Maguai Jie) and 
perform sacrificial rituals to the frog, which is considered the goddess in charge 
of wind and rain, in order to pray for good weather, bumper harvests, and 
prosperity. Moreover, the Zhuang respect the symbol of a bird, which is also 
cast in the bronze drum. There are various traditions and folktales about the bird. 
                                                          
5 There are more than 300 drums in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Museum which 
was established in 1978.  
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In their view, the bird is a divinity that can transform into a woman and get 
married to a human (Wei 2003: 5-6). 
 
Figure 1 - The bronze drum exposition at the GZAR Museum, Nanning City.  
Source of photo: http://www.visitourchina.com/nanning/attraction/guangxi-ethnic-relics-
center.html 
Figure 2 - The ancient rock paining at Huashan Mountain of Guangxi 
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Zhuang people have their own indigenous ritual specialists performing 
a wide range of rituals on behalf of the living, including exorcisms, sacrifices, 
and healing rituals for people, domestic animals, and crops with many of these 
rituals involve calling lost souls. The Zhuang believe that human beings, rice, 
water buffaloes, and a number of other domestic animals have a soul and that 
these souls have been put to flight by the breaking of some taboo. The absence 
of this soul causes lack of vitality and failure to thrive. Thus, a ritual to call the 
soul back must be performed (Holm 1996: 12).  
The expansion of the Chinese state into the Zhuang’s region enabled 
Taoism to have a deep influence on the Zhuang religious practices. The Zhuang 
were eventually absorbed as subjects of the kingdom through a multitude of 
activities, including registration of the populace, collecting taxes, regulating 
religious institutions, and promoting cultural activities launched by the Chinese 
Imperial governments. The Zhuang eventually acculturated Chinese rituals and 
culture, which is the combination of ritual practices derived from Confucianism, 
Taoism, and Buddhism. They have worshipped local deities such as King Mo 
Yi6, King Cen or General Cen,7the goddess of fertility or Yahhuengz in Zhuang 
language, and Liu Sanjie—the goddess of They also worshipped many other 
deities of Taoism and Buddhism such as the Jade Emperor, Guanyin, Guandi, 
and the Maitreya Buddha, etc. However, the ritual masters and shamans have 
played major deep-rooted roles in Zhuang social life.   
                                                          
6
莫一大王 or Vuengz Mozit in Zhuang language. King Mo Yi temples are found in parts of 
central and western Guangxi (Yang, 2007). 
7 Cen Clan was the powerful tusi (native officials) in Tianzhou of western Guangxi. Xu (2011) 
explained that Cen Xunwang (岑逊王) is the legendary hero of the Red River basin who fought 
against the Chinese Dynasty. 
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In southwestern Guangxi, there are three kinds of indigenous ritual 
masters: Taoist priests (budao or daogong) who use Taoist scriptures written in 
Chinese, vernacular male ritual masters (shigong or mogong) who use their own 
scriptures written in traditional Zhuang scripts and conduct rituals in local 
Zhuang dialect, and female/male spirit mediums (wupo or mehmod/ mehgimq) 
who do not use scripture and perform their ritual totally in the oral tradition. 
Their ability to sing traditional songs is a critical part of their identity. It is 
noteworthy that mehmod/mehgimq play a more central role in Zhuang society 
than do most spirit mediums play in south China Han society since they can 
access more kinds of spirits—gods, goddesses, ancestors, souls and ghosts—
and can perform both household and communal rituals in a much more 
audience-orientated fashion (Kao, chapter 3:12-13). 
For the Zhuang male ritual masters who have scriptures, the 
characteristics of their rituals distinctively vary from place to place, which can 
be classified into two groups. One group called shigong “recite their texts from 
memory, and engage in elaborate ritual dances, often with masks, and have a 
rich repertoire of charms and mudras” (Holm 2004: 15). Another group perform 
rituals by reciting their scriptures silently called mogong or bumo. They perform 
many rituals involving sacrifices, healing rites, divination, and expulsion of 
demons. In some localities like Bama-Tianyang, one person would perform both 
the functions of bumo and Taoist priest. It is remarkable that the word ‘mo’ is 
used to call literate male ritual masters in several various ethnic groups such as 




The PRC has defined religion (zongjiao) as organized traditions that 
have their own founders, institutions, doctrine and scriptures. Thus Buddhism, 
Daoism, Islam, and Christianity are legally recognized as religions. If they lack 
full-time, ranked specialists, temples, doctrine and scriptures, such religious 
beliefs and practices are considered as illegal since they are considered  as 
“feudal superstition” (fengjian mixin) (Overmyer 2001, 105). In the 1950s, 
Chinese ethnologists labeled some religious practices of ethnic minorities as 
“primitive religions” (yuanshi zongjiao) if they possessed ritual texts written in 
a primitive script such as the Naxi script (McKhann 2010, 186). Although the 
Zhuang male ritual masters have their scriptures written in the old Zhuang script, 
it was based on Chinese writing system and unstandardized. Moreover, they 
have no shared pan-village religious organization and doctrine. Therefore, their 
religious practices were not classified as a state-recognized religion and only 
labeled as “custom” (xisu, fensu xiguan).  
The PRC government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have 
promoted scientific knowledge and techniques together with communist 
ideology.  They expected to eliminate religious practices, such as shamanism 
and divination. They condemned these religious practices as backwards, 
superstitious, and obstructions to modernity. The Zhuang ritual masters were 
also suppressed by this policy. The public rituals were the first to be suppressed. 
During the period of the land reform, “estates upon which ancestral halls and 
temples depended to finance their activities were confiscated. The buildings 
were converted to schools, factories, and administrative offices.” (Siu 1989:124) 
Later, all temples were destroyed and their bricks and stones were used to 
construct reservoirs or other public facilities. The most severe suppression was 
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during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, when ritual practices were 
forbidden. Zhuang ritual masters were all arrested or forced to submit to self-
criticism and re-education. Many of them were beaten, fined, or killed. Their 
ritual scriptures and ritual objects were seized and destroyed. For the ritual 
masters who resided in very remote areas, they hid many scriptures and related 
objects in secret places until the situation changed. 
In the reform period when state constraints on socio-religious life were 
relatively relaxed, traditional ritual practices in local villages have been reviving 
rapidly as the socio-economic condition of local people has been transformed 
since the late 1980s. Even though China’s Constitution of 1982 and the Law on 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy of 1984 promised minorities the freedom “to 
preserve and reform their own folkways and custom” and the freedom of 
religious belief, it should be noted that annual festivals and ancestor worship 
have been recognized as “a good custom which may contribute to China's 
modernization” (Overmyer 2001: 105) and the distinctive style of Zhuang song 
festival ‘Sanyuesan 三月三’, which are credited as one of cultural markers of 
the Zhuang, has also been restored.  However, the positive view did not extend 
to other rituals practices and beliefs of Zhuang people in local communities, 
which were considered to be just “feudal superstition”. The Zhuang ritual 
masters hence have no legal status.  
In the late 1980s Chinese and Zhuang scholars also received funding to 
research and collect the orally transmitted folklores and folksongs as well as the 
poetry and folk literatures. They discovered the Buluotuo scriptures that had 
been preserved by Zhuang ritual masters living in remote villages in western 
Guangxi and later evaluated the scriptures as precious Zhuang folk literature.  
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These scriptures connected with the Zhuang indigenous religion and based on 
an oral tradition and probably went back at least a millennium, a matter that I 
discuss further in Chapter 3. Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing 
number of publications from Chinese and local scholars on folk religious 
activities and beliefs of the Zhuang that have revealed more flexibility in the 
study of religion. It was the first time in over fifty years that Chinese scholars 
began discussing and studying “feudal superstition” as “popular beliefs” 
(minjian xinyang). Topics like shamanism and divination can be discussed 
under the general category of “sorcery” (wushu) (Overmyer 2001:105-6). 
Scholars tend to emphasize that belief in supernatural and superhuman powers 
developed from people who sought aid in difficulties and emphasized that 
taboos generated harmonious relationship between humans and nature, man and 
society, and among family members.   
When the Buluotuo scriptures were evaluated as precious literature, this 
was a reflection of the historical and socio-cultural changes of the Zhuang and 
the Buluotuo was regarded as the cultural ancestor of the Zhuang Nationality. 
On the contrary, the ritual masters who owned these ritual scriptures have 
largely been neglected and marginalized in official and public discourse. They 
are geographically and economically marginalized; their status are linked with 
“backwardness” and superstition. The policing of their religious practices have 
remained in the reform period and the level of restriction depends on fluctuating 
government campaigns to build up a “socialist spiritual civilization” from time 
to time. A recent severe suppression happened due to the suppression of the 
Falun gong movement since 1999. All of the temples illegally rebuilt in the 
reform period were destroyed again. However, the remnants of practices, 
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scriptures, and scrolls still survive in Zhuang villages today as I witnessed from 
my ethnographic fieldwork. 
The paradigm of hierarchy and progress in the PRC is hegemonic. 
Central government promoted scientific knowledge and techniques along with 
communist ideology, expecting “poor” ethnic minorities to give up their 
“backwardness” and identify themselves with the progressive nation-state. 
When the government allowed for the reconstruction of traditional temples 
relating to the Goddess of the Sea (Mazu), it increased tourism, attracted 
overseas Chinese investment, and contributed to the rapid economic 
development of poor rural areas in the east coastal provinces. The Guangxi 
government has also adopted a strategy of utilizing ritual places and temple 
festivals in order to develop the economy. This policy allowed local 
authorities to attribute popular religious practices of pilgrimage and 
song fairs at Mt. Ganzhuang to the notion of “traditional culture” 
(chuantong wenhua), which occupy a space outside a binary opposition of 
the progress-versus-backwardness continuum and promoted it as the state-
sponsored Buluotuo cultural tourism festival. Local villagers and ritual masters 
who voluntarily rebuilt local temples and their sacred ritual places have 
participated in the festival with the purpose of reclaiming traditions that had 
been suppressed. They did not view their action as politics of ethnicity. But state 
agents, especially Zhuang scholars, recognize a vantage point to enhance their 
“place” in Chinese societies and remold their identities to change public 





This dissertation examines the Buluotuo cultural tourism development 
of the Zhuang in Tianyang County of Guangxi. In a bid to promote tourism in 
underdeveloped regions in recent years, the Guangxi government has 
spearheaded a revival of Zhuang culture and history. The Zhuang share a long 
history with proximate ethnic groups in this region, including the Tai, Lao, 
Dong8, Tày, Thái, and Nung9 living in neighboring Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. 
Apart from generating revenue from tourism, another objective of the revival of 
the Zhuang is to foster socio-economic relations with neighboring GMS 
(Greater Mekong Sub-region) countries by capitalizing on the common 
imaginary history that encompasses these ethnic groups.  
Buluotuo Festival and vernacular ritual practices are a central focus of 
this research insofar as they are sites for local communities to build and perform 
specific social identities and historical narratives to which successive 
generations may attach their own interpretations. This research aims to examine 
the relationships and struggles between different groups of actors, including 
local communities, ritual specialists, local government officials, the central 
government, as well as Zhuang academics, in articulating and promoting 
particular versions of Zhuang cultural tourism development on different levels. 
To understand identity formation processes of the Zhuang in the context 
of the contemporary post-Mao era this dissertation traces out the variable ways 
in which the Zhuang in Guangxi position themselves as ‘nationalities’(minzu) 
                                                          
8 Dong is a name of minzu classified by PRC.  Dong language also belongs to Tai language 
family.  
9 Tày, Thái and Nung are the Tai-speaking groups living in Vietnam.  
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with respect to several minzu, the Han Chinese in the PRC, and in the context 
of the larger ASEAN community. Contemporary contexts of promoting the 
regional economic cooperation (China-ASEAN and Great Mekong Subregion 
cooperation) have constructed or reinforced identities of the Zhuang as a Taic 
group sharing common cultures with other Taic groups living across boundaries 
of nation-states which are favorable to ethnic commodification through tourism. 
By framing Buluotuo culture development in the larger context of 
China-ASEAN and Great Mekong Subregion cooperation, this thesis intends to 
examine the actors who play a dominant role in preserving the Zhuang 
intangible cultural heritage. It also aims to explore the negotiations and 
struggles between processes of globalization reified through transnational 
forces, nationalism through Beijing-based policies, and local practices in 
tourism development of the Buluotuo Festival and heritage preservation.    
Methodology 
This research is based on multi-sited ethnographic research conducted 
over  six years in Guangxi (April and November 2007, March 2008, April 2009, 
October 2010 - September 2011, June 2012). For this research, I use a 
combination of English, Chinese, and Thai documentary research sources; 
participant observations;and semi-structured interviews as research techniques.  
Limitations and Scope of Work 
Although the open and reform policy has enabled more foreign 
researchers to conduct research in the PRC, a major problems with fieldwork in 
China was official control over data collection and a general lack of autonomy. 
Many researchers attempted to cope with these problems in various ways, one 
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of which was called ‘guerrilla interviewing.’ Thomas Gold defines this term for 
‘unchaperoned, spontaneous but structured participant observation and 
interviews as opportunities present themselves,’ which means that a researcher 
used opportunities when he/she went to market places, rode taxis, and had 
his/her hair cut to strike up conversation with private shopkeepers and 
entrepreneurs to get uncensored personal opinions that official supervised 
interviews did not provide (Heimer and Thogersen 2006: 11).  
Solinger (2006) recommends four fundamental rules for doing fieldwork 
in China: “(1) arrange appropriate approval for one’s project before entering the 
country, but stay flexible once on the spot; (2) keep track of all the friendly 
people you meet” because they might later be able to introduce useful sources 
and subjects; “(3) in the course of the interview, seem to be both aware and 
uninitiated”; and the most significant concern is “(4) keep the subject’s safety 
at the center of your consciousness.” (Solinger 2006: 166-7) 
According to most foreign researchers, official permission to do 
research in China opens doors, something especially important for a non-
Chinese researcher. If the researcher has received official research permission, 
he/she can relative easily obtain useful unpublished data produced by the local 
administration like statistics, local or regional government reports, or other 
government documents. However, the unequal level of status and power 
between the people and local authorities may create uncomfortable situations 
during interviewing that makes it difficult for the researcher to get an 
interviewee’s frank opinion or sensitive information. Therefore, I intend to 
combine official and unofficial fieldwork. 
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I conducted preliminary surveys during November 2007, March 2008, 
and April 2009. I have cooperated with local institutes in Guangxi, the Center 
for the Zhuang Studies, Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, and the Thai 
language Department of Guangxi University for Nationalities. The Center for 
the Zhuang Studies has provided extensive assistance in contacting local 
government officials of the counties where I went to observe festivals and rituals. 
Due to a lack of Chinese language proficiency, I also need a student majoring 
in Thai language to accompany me as a translator.  
To do research through formal channels, the Center for the Zhuang 
Studies would instruct me ahead of time to present local officials with my 
research objective and a set of the questions I planned to ask. Since the scholars 
had to accompany the international guest, they coordinated with the county for 
our visit. The hospitality of local authorities was remarkable; they set an 
itinerary for our group and hosted hotel accommodation and every meal when 
we arrived at their place. It became a pattern that there would be a formal 
meeting with the local officers. At the meeting, we introduced ourselves and our 
objective while the officials provide us with local information. In some counties, 
they also invited the ritual specialist to the meeting so that we could interview 
him without visiting his village.  
If we attended the ritual or festival, involved local officers would 
accompany us at all times to provide information and explanation. According 
to the itinerary provided to me by the officials, I did not have much chance to 
talk to local villagers.  
The limitation of official research made me try the unofficial route. 
Unlike Western researchers, I am advantaged in that that I am Asian and my 
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appearance looks similarly. At that time, I wanted to observe ‘Hua pao’ festival 
in one village. The director of the Center for the Zhuang Studies contacted the 
local officers and set a two-day itinerary for us. But I also wanted to observe 
how villagers prepared for the festival. My translator and I then went to the 
county the day before the festival. We privately visited the village and we had 
opportunities to talk to villagers and observe their way of life. I also took photos 
and asked their name and address so that I could send them the photos. This 
helped form good relationship with the villagers since most of them are farmers 
and have no camera at home. When the director of the center arrived, we moved 
to the hotel booked by local officers and they came to welcome us. After that, 
we followed the itinerary, pretending that we had never visited the village before.     
In order to “examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and 
identities”, I conducted multi-sited fieldwork or “itinerant ethnography”. 10 
Several times, my translator and I traveled to the village nearby the border 
checkpoint to talk to people and merchants we met. Through them, I obtained a 
lot of information that official supervised visits did not provide. 
However, I found that language was still a major problem in conducting 
my surveys and interviews with local villagers in several counties. Some of the 
informants (mostly elderly women) could not speak Mandarin and my translator 
could not understand local dialects. Although I asked the Zhuang students to be 
my translator, speakers of various Zhuang dialects cannot wholly understand if 
they used other dialects. These vast differences in Zhuang dialects made me 
reconsider the areas for doing long-term fieldwork. I, therefore, decide to 
narrow my focus mainly in Tianyang County where the Buluotuo Festival is 
                                                          
10 This term is defined by Schein, 2000, p.28. 
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annually held. But I also intended to visit villages in other counties to observe 
the ritual specialists and the rituals they perform.   
Fieldwork 
My dissertation fieldwork research was mainly conducted for twelve 
months during October 2010 till September 2011. In addition, I revisited the site 
in June 2012. 
As I experienced from preliminary surveys, finding an official affiliation 
is necessary; on the other hand, it could complicate things when going through 
official channels.  This was especially true when I investigated the contested 
meaning between different actors and stakeholders. I therefore contacted a local 
university that could provide long-term academic oriented research. My 
research was conducted in collaboration with Dr. Lu Xiaoqin, a lecturer of 
Guangxi University for Nationalities who researched the Buluotuo ancient 
songs. The Center for the Zhuang Studies also provided additional support by 
introducing me to the relevant state agencies and several scholars working on 
Buluotuo Culture and Zhuang Intangible Cultural Heritage. 
During the first two months, I stayed in Nanning to research, collect 
related documents, and meet other scholars. After three years of learning 
Chinese, I was able to communicate in Chinese, but could not yet read Chinese 
academic researcher. I thus need to have a research assistant. In October 2010, 
it was during the China-ASEAN Expo11 (hereafter the CAEXPO) and a series 
of seminars on China-ASEAN economic development held annually in Nanning. 
                                                          
11 The CAEXPO is sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
and ministries of trade and commerce of the ASEAN countries. The exposition is integrated 
with commodity trade, service trade, investment and cooperation, high-level forum and 
cultural exchanges, etc. Its purpose is to strengthen economic trade relations between China 
and ASEAN countries in association with the construction of the China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (CAFTA). (see Nanning.gov.cn)  
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It was difficult to find any students majoring in Thai language to be my research 
assistant at that time because students were busy with part-time jobs as 
translator/facilitators for Thai delegations during CAEXPO.  
When I visited the Thai consulate in Nanning, the consul general 
informed me that on July 19-26, 2010, he led a delegation of Thai officials and 
people from the Chinese private sector to survey the Nanning-Bangkok 
Economic Corridor12, which will become a “new trade lane” connecting China, 
Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Thailand to bring economic growth to areas that are 
difficult to access. It seemed to me that all stakeholders in this project expected 
the bright future of China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The 
consul general also told me that Thai language had gained popularity and that 
there were 25 institutes in Guangxi that had recently launched Thai language 
teaching programs.  
Because I had a 30-day tourist visa, I went to Vietnam and came back to 
China by using a new bus route between Nanning and Hanoi. This provided me 
with a deeper insight in the Sino-Vietnam cross-border economic cooperation, 
which has developed rapidly within the framework of subregional cooperation 
in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and China-ASEAN. This route starts 
from Nanning and passes through the Friendship Gate (Youyi Guan) 13  in 
Pingxiang County of Guangxi and leads into Lang Son, Bac Giang, Bac Ninh 
provinces, and Hanoi of Vietnam.  A cross-border China-Vietnam Tour was 
developed through this route. 
                                                          
12 The “Nanning-Bangkok Economic Corridor” (南宁-曼谷经济走廊) was proposed by 
scholars of Guangxi Academy of Social Science in 2004. 
13The Friendship Gate is a historic pass that was used as supply line in the 1950s till the early 
1970s to support Vietnam’s struggle against France and USA. Recently, it is developed to be 
an international border checking-point for international tourists. 
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After my application for a long-term research visa was approved, I 
contacted some informants and stayed at the locality over a period of time in 
attempt to learn local Zhuang dialect and to establish the relationships of trust. 
Long-term stay will not only generate hard data, but also provide the researcher 
with the insight into contexts, relationships, rituals that the community’s 
practices, and events taking place at the locality. At the first phase, I stayed with 
an 80-year elderly woman, who is a mother of a English department lecturer of 
Baise College, in Na-liang hamlet of Longhe village. The village is about 2 km 
from the Tianyang county seat. Most of middle age and young people in the 
village go out to work and study in big cities like Nanning and Guangzhou. 
Mostly, there were just elderly and kids living in a village.  
During the first week in the village, a student majoring Thai language 
escorted and assisted me to adjust to the local way of life. However, the 
translator was unable to escort me tfor a long period of time. I had to go back 
and forth to Nanning and ask students to transcribe my interviews and translate 
Chinese documents.   
The opportunity to live in Tianyang for a long period of time was 
invaluable, facilitating observations and friendship with my informants. Many 
local residents grew familiar with my presence, informal conversations, and my 
photo taking. Some elderly women in the village tried to teach me local dialect 
and were concerned for my safety. Some took me around and introduced me to 
people they thought would help my research. I am grateful for the affection and 
concern local people showed me during a period of my stay.  
Later, I moved frequently and traveled to different communities of 
Tianyang and beyond to observe rituals, song fairs, and temple festivals. I also 
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experienced some travel and lodging restrictions in rural area unless there was 
an official introduction or a sponsoring government work unit. For example, 
foreigners must register with the local Public Security Bureau if lodging in a 
private house. Additionally, some hotels may refuse to check in foreigners 
because the registration system in their computer only accepted the 
identification card’s number not the passport number. 
Moreover, I traced and found the owners of Buluotuo scriptures that 
were discovered in the 1980-1990s. In reference to the 2004 edition of Buluotuo 
Scriptures— in the Annotated Translation, I went to interview the bumos in 
Baise, Tianyang, Donglan, and Bama in order to explore how they were treated 
after Buluotuo Culture was enlisted to be the Zhuang Intangible Cultural 
Heritage. Some of them had passed away and their sons or relatives did not 
know how to read the old Zhuang scripts. Most of them still used the scriptures 
when they performed the rituals, but they were not affected by the policy of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage.  
In my view, Zhuang villagers share the cultural prevalence of hospitality 
with Thai culture. I experienced the warm friendship of guests (indeed I am a 
stranger who spoke a familiar language, but came from far away from their 
remote place). No matter how poor they were, villagers often offered me a meal 
when I visited their houses. They energetically prepared food and asked me to 
eat at the same table.  The host always apologized for the lack of meat-based 
dishes on the table or made excuses for their simple village food. It was also a 
custom to welcome guest with alcohol. This practice of commensality (eating 
and drinking together) bears close resemblance to Taic speaking villagers’ way 
of hospitality.  
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In addition, I observed the similar cultural pattern of “honor and shame” 
or “gaining face and losing face”, especially among the state agencies and 
retired officials, which sometimes caused situations where I was uncomfortable 
and struggled internally. In order to save face, they tried to hide some facts and 
problems and presented only positive images of their place. Some attempted to 
utilize my status of foreign academic to gain face or require some privileges (as 
will be shown in Chapter 5). However, after repeatedly visiting the area and 
developing closer relationship with several informants, I was fortunate enough 
to see through these conflicts and gave me important insights.  
Based on extensive fieldwork and textual analysis, this dissertation 
discusses how these marginalized people constructed various meanings, values, 
agendas, motivations involved in their struggle against, and compliance with 
the initiation of Buluotuo cultural tourism. It argues that the struggles of people, 
who are geographically and economically marginalized, are complex and 
involve a plurality of actors and multiplicity of practices. Even though I realize 
that in China the state and certain urban elites are able to manipulate the politics 
of representation to “monopolize access to the means of dissemination, the 
content of their representations had the potential to become hegemonic” 
(Schein : 189), the findings from ethnographic research shows that, far from 
being passive, ritual masters, villagers and female devotees in the vicinity of 
Tianyang are “cultural strategists” and, to some degree, have the capacity to re-
negotiate power relations through contestation for their ritual space and insist 
on their particular versions of narratives and memories of their sacred space.  
This thesis also demonstrates that Zhuang ethnic formation is an 
ongoing process of dialogue of Self and Other in a rapidly changing context. 
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This process is driven by a complex array of factors. The attempt of Zhuang 
intellectuals to promote Buluotuo as the ancestor of Zhuang people and 
highlight the same origin between the Zhuang and other Tai-speaking groups in 
Southeast Asia has developed in response to the  “politics of difference” in the 
post-Mao era. Nevertheless, Zhuang ethnic consciousness has been increasingly 
stimulated by new economic policies of China-ASEAN economic cooperation. 
The transnational flows of information, cultural industry, people and capital 
encourages not only Zhuang elites and scholars, but also commoners and the 
young generation to exercise transnational mobility and to articulate the 
imaginary of Zhuang common culture with other Tai-speaking groups in 
Southeast Asia. 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter provides an overview of my research, aim and significance 
of my study and research methodology. 
Chapter Two provides a brief history which contextualizes the rise of 
the Zhuang identity, including brief cultural narratives of the Zhuang in 
Guangxi—the southern borderland, the emergence of a modern Chinese nation, 
the PRC national policy toward minorities and their regions, ethnic 
classification, and the vicissitudes of ethnic policy which has affected Zhuang 
ethnic formation. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of policy changes in the post-Mao 
era, its impacts on shaping the expression of Zhuang identities, and an overview 
of “Buluotuo Culture”. State agencies and ethnologists, especially of the urban 
elites and scholars of Zhuang origin, have played prominent roles in 
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constructing a Zhuang identity and presenting a Zhuang cultural heritage at the 
national and international levels. The emergence of the “Buluotuo Cultural 
Tourism Festival” development in 2002 illustrates the cooperation between 
local authorities, Zhuang cadres, and scholars in promoting the cultural links to 
other ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. It demonstrates how the changes in 
ideological frameworks shape the results of scholarship and its impacts on 
Zhuang cultural expressions in ethnic tourism within the broader circumstance 
of global capitalism. 
Chapter Four focuses on the processes of place-making in Tianyang 
County, in which the authorities and scholars use the theme of Zhuang cultural 
identity to add value to their ‘place-product’. It presents several cases from my 
fieldwork which question state policy and the way of promoting cultural tourism 
at Ganzhuang Mountain from the viewpoint of villagers and common people in 
the vicinity. Although the voices of ritual specialists and religious beliefs of 
commoners have been partly silenced, the ritual specialists and commoners in 
Tianyang County continue to struggle to create their own space and insist on 
their traditional ritual practices. The Buluotuo festival has been appropriated as 
a platform to express their ethnic-religious identities and cultural memories. 
Chapter Five provides further discussion of the ways local cultural 
strategists appropriate the state discourse of Buluotuo culture and compete for 
their ritual space as well as their particular versions of narratives and memories 
of their sacred spaces. As the Buluotuo festival has undergone an unprecedented 
growth in popularity, Buluotuo has become a brand image of the Tianyang 
product to be presented in domestic and international markets. This transitional 
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period in China has fostered a dramatic intersection of global-national-local 
forces, which affects Zhuang cultural tourism development and heritage 
preservation in Guangxi. The project to construct a Mt. Ganzhuang Buluotuo 
Cultural Tourism Area and “Zhuang City” are crucial examples of how the 
imaginary cultural links between the Zhuang and other Taic groups are deployed. 
Chapter Six illustrates how information technology and the media have 
played important roles in the self-representation of the Zhuang. The younger 
generation uses the Internet to create a virtual community to present what it 
means to be Zhuang. The website Rau.net and the album of “Beix nong” are 
prominent instances of Zhuang commoners exercising transnational mobility 
and articulating an imaginary Zhuang common culture with other Tai-speaking 
groups in Southeast Asia. A linguistic commonality enables this young 
generation to learn Thai by themselves through Thai movies, TV series, and 
songs that can be easily accessed on the internet. Accordingly, they have created 
a range of online communities with Thai friends and have begun to assert 






Chapter 2  
Becoming “Zhuang zu”: Notion of Ethnicity as Cultural Politics 
We know who ‘we’ are and what constitutes our sameness, precisely 
because we know who ‘we’ are not and what constitutes our difference 
from others. 
(Banks & Gingrich 2006: 9) 
 
 
Ethnic identity is complex and multilayered. Although a common 
definition of ethnicity is a group of people who have shared traits, such as 
language, cultural behavior and physical appearance (ethnic markers), a 
putative common descent, and a mechanism for the perpetuation of group 
consciousness and cohesion, when we look at an ethnic group, we typically do 
not only find members of the group themselves but also the members of other 
groups who interact with them, and the state that regulates them. The elements 
defining ethnic group are undergoing change and rearrangement in response to 
shifting historical and cultural circumstances. 
This chapter provides a historical overview that contextualizes the rise 
of the Zhuang identities. The first part focuses on the changes of narratives 
about peoples in the southern borderland from the Chinese Imperial Era to the 
current nation-state and the role of elites and intellectuals in these narratives’ 
construction. Next, I outline a growing body of ethnological knowledge in 
tandem with the changing context of wars, both civil wars in China and 
international conflicts, to demonstrate that a notion of ethnicity had been 
intentionally adopted as cultural politics within the new nation-building 
process.  The last part delineates the early PRC’s ethnic policy and the project 
of ethnic identification in the 1950s by focusing on the case of the Zhuang in 
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Guangxi. It will also illustrate the fluctuation of policies during the Mao era 
which affected the ethnologists’ work and life.  
Before we examine how the emergence of national space shapes the 
existence of people living in border zones, and how people strategically situate 
themselves as members of a local community, nation, and ethnic group in a 
national territory or between nations, I would like to provide a brief overview 
of the concepts of ethnicity, ethnic identity and the process of ethnic formation. 
Two main perspectives for the explanation of the phenomenon of group 
ethnic identity can be found in the literature. The first perspective is that a 
group’s collective identity is based upon ascriptive and primordial relationships. 
The present reality of a common culture (e.g. language, a shared religious 
belief system,), a distinct social origin (homeland, territory, and legal political 
entity), and common historical experiences are crucial factors for the formation 
of communal identity. The second perspective is that ethnic identity has 
instrumental and flexible characteristics which serve the practical needs and 
interests of the members of the community, as ethnic identity is not a closed 
system; rather, it can be modified in order to suit the changing conditions (e.g. 
security, social status, and economic benefits) of the members of such groups 
(Sahliyeh 1993: 177-9). 
In the debates on the essence of ethnicity, ethnic groups are perceived 
as historical entities with some existential reality and with definable and 
relatively fixed attributes, memberships, and boundaries. While these 
primordial elements serve to bond the members into an ethnic unity, ethnic 
groups are viewed as symbolic constructions whose attributes may be arbitrary 
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and impermanent, whose memberships may vary over time, and whose 
boundaries are evanescent and permeable. In another set of debates on ethnic 
consciousness, ethnic groups are treated either as having existed throughout 
history in all sorts of sociopolitical contexts or as a creation of the modern 
nation-state as though they could have had no existence before. In other words, 
ethnic consciousness is based on narratives which may or may not reflect 
historical facts and contemporary reality. (Abramson 2008) 
To move beyond this binary debate, Appadurai (1993) proposes that the 
modern nation-state “has often created, revitalized, or fractured ethnic 
identities that were previously fluid, negotiable or nascent” (799). According to 
Appadurai, “the new ethnicities are often no older than the nation-states which 
they have come to resist. Ethnic nationalisms are frequently reactive and 
defensive rather than spontaneous or deep-rooted, as the tribalist model would 
have us believe.” He recognizes that natural facets, such as shared ancestors 
and language, are still significant in binding group identity in the context of a 
nation-state emergence, and contends that nationalism and ethnicity 
accommodate each other because “nationalists construct ethnic categories 
which in turn drive others to construct counter-ethnicities, and then, in times of 
political crisis these others demand counter-states, based on newfound counter-
nationalisms”. In his view, minorities in many parts of the world thus are as 
artificial as the majorities they are seen to threaten, and the ethnic conflicts can 
no longer be understood in terms of exising center-periphery models. 
Appadurai’s concept of “new ethnicities” conforms to Barth’s “cultural 
discontinuity”. Barth (1994) proposes that ethnicity depends on many factors 
such as ecology, economy and politics, which vary over time. This so called 
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“cultural discontinuity” then forms the crucial boundary of an ethnic group, 
since a group’s ethnic consciousness arises through contact with others who are 
perceived as different. Appadurai contends that “the new ethno-nationalisms 
are complex, large-scale, highly coordinated acts of mobilization, reliant on 
news, logistical flows and propaganda across state borders” (Appadurai 1993: 
800).  
Nonetheless, he acknowledges the agency of ethnic minority actors who 
actively play a role in constructing or redefining their group identity from 
cultural elements that distinguishes their group from others. Appadurai 
explains that opposing factions in societies generate dif¬ferent myths that 
support political interests and that myth “debates” are cultur¬ally organized 
and structured to assert a political position (Appadurai 1981: 202). The past 
becomes a “conscious element of contemporary inter¬actions” (Appadurai 
1981: 216). In many cases (and the Zhuang as well), shared religious traditions 
and mythology were interpreted and redefined in the ongoing process of ethnic 
formation or re-formation. The contemporary interaction, mixed with new 
global cultural economic situations and evolving ethnic identities, influences 
the interpretations of the past and provides the political framework within 
which group identifications are organized. Ethnicity is, therefore, embedded 
within multidimensional relations of power. 
Inspired by this concept, I view that the ways in which people select 
cultural elements (that they perceive as an essential core that distinguishes their 
group from others) to express their cultural differences and similarities could 
be recognized as discourses of difference. In other words, ethnicity with 
reference to a traceable “past” and making use of myth can be regarded as a 
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form of cultural politics, which has enabled some groups to negotiate and 
contest with other groups for some priviledges in particular situations.  
The notion of ethnicity as cultural politics is particularly useful in 
understanding the ways in which Zhuang elites talk about their identities. My 
ethnographic research enabled me to argue that Zhuang elites select, reorganize, 
and reinterpret myths of Buluotuo, ancestor worship rituals and festivals to 
create new possibilities of unities and enhance their group’s status. A common 
origin and shared ancestor are highlighted as meaningful ethnic markers that 
legitimize the group and reaffirm its sacred links to the past. The enhancement 
of Zhuang’s status and prestige in the eyes of others, especially of the central 
government, serves to bolster the Zhuang’s own sense of pride and self-worth. 
Buluotuo myth can be regarded as Smith’s “constitutive myth of the ethnic 
polity,” which provides a powerful sense of a “common” fate among Buluotuo 
descendants, thus defining the Zhuang from others. In this continuing process 
of reconstructing the Zhuang national consciousness, the elite groups play a 
leading role in the creation of a group’s cultural ideology, but the process is not 
all one-sided, and ordinary people are equally important in reinforcing these 
boundaries by emphasizing differences. The role of the elite and the ordinary 
people in the process of ethnic formation thus allows for maximum flexibility 
in periods of rapid socio-economic change of the PRC, the point I will return to 
discuss in the following chapters. 
The concept of “new ethnicities” apparently affirms the emergence of 
fifty-six nationalities in socialist China. It was only during the late imperial 
state period in China that the notion of a “nation-state” first began to appear.  
The concepts of “minzu” had gradually developed during the establishment of 
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the Republic of China, and the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as 
a multi-ethnic state. Turning to the subject under study here, it is important to 
sketch out the broader historical context and geographical processes which 
have conditioned ethnic politics in China. First, I provide a historical overview 
of the shifts in the notion of ethnicity from the Chinese Imperial state to the 
modern nation-state which reflects the transformed geopolitical boundaries of 
centers and margins and the relations between the state and those defined as 
ethnic minorities.  
2.1 Guangxi as the Southern Borderland: A Narrative of Place and People 
at the Empire’s Margin  
Guangxi is bordered by mountains that are over 1,000 meters high and 
has many hills and basins because it is drained by the navigable Xi River and 
its many tributaries. Geographically, Guangxi offers limited areas of level land, 
most of which are found in narrow valleys along the river system running 
transversely across the province. The central and southeast parts of the 
province are below 650 feet, along with the fertile lowland.  
Traditionally, the Chinese Imperial regimes regarded Guangxi province 
as the southern borderland (Ling-Nan) where, both culturally and politically, it 
remained remote from the civilization’s center. The geographical environment, 
tropical climate, and unpredictability of the weather in this area entailed the 
image of danger, wildness, and un-civility in the perception of the Chinese 
centralized state. The court and literary elites viewed the variety of tribal 
peoples who inhabited the lowlands of South and Southeast China as 
barbarians and called them Bai Yue, meaning literally “the One Hundred Yue”. 
It is very difficult to define any reliable standards for classifying the groups 
33 
 
known to the Han Chinese as the Bai Yue14 as truly one substantially shared 
culture of any ethnic group. Han Chinese identified groups known as the Yang 
Yue, the Nan Yue, the Wai Yue, the Lu Yue, Xi Ou, Luo Yue, Ou Yue, etc., and 
among these groups they were sometimes known locally by a variety of 
terms.  For example, people who would be termed “Zhuang” in the Song 
dynasty were known earlier as Liao, Li, Lang, Nong, etc.15 
The first serious effort to expand the power of the empire into the south 
was made by the Qin Emperor’s invasion in 219 BCE. The Qin armies dug a 
canal to open a navigable river system between the Yangtze and the South 
China Sea, which facilitated the transport of both a large army and goods to 
this region. After the construction of the Ling canal the southern region was 
under Chinese rule. After partial success in subjugating the Yue people, three 
commanderies – Nanhai (Southern Seas), Guilin (Cinnamon Forest), and Xiang 
(Elephant) were set up in the southern borderland. However, the Yue were not 
passively under military control, and there were several revolts during which 
the Chinese army often suffered tremendous losses.   
Therefore, in order to promote peaceful relations with the frontier 
‘barbarians’, the Imperial court defined the term ‘bridle and halter’ as their 
border administration policy. The Tang court used a policy of “using 
barbarians to control barbarians” (yi yi zhi yi). The non-Han border people 
were governed by their native chiefs and formed subordinate relationships with 
the Chinese court for such things as trade, official titles, and imperial gifts. 
                                                          
14 Bai Yue peoples also spread into northern Vietnam. The Chinese court called this area “南越” 
(nan yue) or Nam Việt in lacal accent; the “Yue” is the name “Việt”. 
15 Barlow, The Zhuang: A Longitudinal Study of Their History and Their Culture. Chapter 1: 
Origins Of The Zhuang:  The Bai Yue. 
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This was to develop into the tusi system under the Yuan, Ming and Qing 
dynasties – exhibiting the characteristics of the mandala state. Under this tusi 
system, the Chinese court officially recognized indigenous tribal chieftains 
who had submitted to the Chinese system. The chieftains were obligated to 
deliver tribute or levy taxes for the Chinese court and be enlisted to go to war 
and suppress military uprisings led by members of their own ethnic group or 
other ethnic groups; they were in turn rewarded and permitted to continue their 
customary, autonomous rule over their people. The geographical environment 
and the specter of malaria and other tropical diseases aided the native peoples 
in maintaining a resolute independence in their mountainous heights. 
As the centralized state was particularly aware of the limits of its 
administrative and military reach in the border regions, state authorities 
established administrative units in the cities and encouraged the Han people 
from the central plains to migrate into these regions. The landscape was 
transformed tremendously by deforestation, drainage, irrigation, and levees 
(see Marks 1998). The contacts between natives and Han settlers transformed 
the border zones in terms of political and social organization, economic 
relations, and environmental configuration; it most importantly shaped the 
ways in which the populations in borderlands were imagined and categorized. 
Agents and representatives of the state were especially keen on 
distinguishing between people who were deemed subjects of the state and those 
who were not, and it was in the border areas that the political and cultural elites 
of China were particularly interested in differentiating the “non-Chinese” from 
the “Chinese”. The populations in borderlands were categorized into two main 
35 
 
groups: Min -- the registered subjects of the state (those who were tax-paying) 
and Man Yi -- people who were “beyond the pale” (Shin 2006: 124, 140-141). 
In addition, another criterion for classifying populations in the southern 
border region was whether they were “civilized.” The term “raw” (sheng) and 
“cooked” (shu) were applied to define the effect of the civilizing project. The 
“raw” were not yet assimilated Han subjects and the “cooked” referred to 
people who were becoming registered and governed by Han administrative 
norms but who were to some extent still culturally distinct (Shin 2006; Fiskesjӧ 
1999).  
Geographically, plains and basins take up one-fifth of the area of 
Guangxi, with the remaining four-fifths being occupied by hills and mountains. 
The distinction between lowland and upland Guangxi was given administrative 
recognition by the Song (960-1127), which placed the mountainous western 
part of the province under separate administration (Moseley 1973). The 
western part of Guangxi saw some of the most ferocious rebellions led by the 
Zhuang. The tales of treachery, assassinations, usurpations, and aggressive 
fighting against neighboring native prefectures occurred repeatedly and became 
endemic. The record in the General Gazetteer of Guangxi (1531) demonstrates 
the dynasty’s perception of the spatial divide between territory that was both 
accessible and inaccessible administratively, and its people:  
The northeastern part [of Guangxi] is civilized. Its air is pure 
and fine. As a result, its people are refined and cultured. The 
southwestern part is uncivilized… Its air is malarial. As a result, 





Moreover, China’s far south was the preferred location to exile 
demoted or convicted officials. Elites encountered indigenous people during 
their period of exile; they observed and recorded the cultural distinctions of 
these people. In private literary works, southern people represented a wildness 
that was associated with either danger or cosmopolitan decadence, and so they 
were often arbitrarily portrayed as violent and viewed by elites with a sense of 
insecurity (Abramson 2008: 21). 
For Ming observers, the man yi had an unruly nature and often used 
violence to resolve disputes. Some recorded that “when content they are human; 
when discontent they are beast” and “when a Zhuang kills a Zhuang, an official 
complaint would not be filed” (Zhuang sha Zhuang, bu gao zhuang). Ming 
officials also distinguished between Zhuang people who were “tractable” (shan) 
and those who were “intractable” (e) (Shin 2006: 124).   
According to the Record of Things Heard on the Torrid Frontier, Tian 
Rucheng records detailed descriptions of nineteen major categories of man yi: 
Miao, Luoluo, Gelao, Mulao, Yanghuang, Zhongjia, Songjia, Caijia, Mangjia, 
Longjia, Ranjia, Bo, Dong, Yao, Zhuang, Lao, Li, Dan, and Ma. It is unclear how 
Tian came up with his cataloging scheme, but he states that the information was 
derived from first hand observations when he was an assistant administration 
commissioner of Guangxi from 1538 to 1541 (Shin 2006: 140-141).  
In his entry on the Zhuang, he reported that Zhuang were said to like to 
eat and drink with their hands, as well as to live in two-story thatched 
dwellings in which the ground floor was reserved for household animals such 
as oxen, pigs, and dogs, and that Zhuang people were good at using poisons, 
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especially the kind known as gu. Other observers associated the use of gu 
poisons more closely with Zhuang women (Shin 2006: 182). 
Moreover, it was also recorded that it was customary for young men and 
women to gather together and sing to one another during festivals in the spring 
and in the autumn and take such occasions to find a mate. Zhuang women were 
often described as engaged in this disapproved custom of courtship and 
associated with gu poisoning. The practice of shamanism was also recorded in a 
19th century written document; Chinese officials described that: 
The Yao and Zhuang live mixed up together. They do not devote 
themselves to Poetry or to Documents...They have a crude 
understanding of rites and decorum. The local customs are to pay 
great regard for wealth, and to kill lightly. When they leave the 
house they carry knives for self-defense. The inhabitants labor in 
the rice-fields; they do not engage in trade… In the markets it is 
mainly the women who engage in trade. When sick they resort only 
to shamans and spirit mediums. (quoted from Holm, 2004: 11)  
 
 
What is noteworthy about this passage of the non-Chinese is its clear 
affirmation of the distinction between “Chinese” and “non-Chinese” in the 
border region. It was not only to reinforce the image of the southern region as a 
perilous frontier, but also to reaffirm the boundaries between “civilized/ 
Chinese” and “uncivilized/ non-Chinese” (Shin 2006: 205).  In other words, a 
contrast between Self and Other, particularly in the Sinocentric view of the 
world, was perceived and the ethnic boundaries needed to be defined. The 
Other needed to be distant, hierarchically inferior, and also exceptional relative 
to the normative Self (Abramson 2008: 23). Borrowing Barth’s term, the social 
spaces wherein cross-group interactions take place, are effective social 
boundaries between the groups. In this sense, it is “the ethnic boundary that 
defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1969: 15). 
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According to Barth, the cultural traits of an ethnic group respond to ecological 
circumstances; therefore, forms of institutionalized behavior emerge that 
represent reactions to the environment as much as they reflect a cultural 
orientation. 
In sum, the court and literary elites during the imperial state viewed 
native people in the southern borderlands as the ethnic ‘Other’. The stereotype 
of these groups was animalistic, as we can see from the Chinese characters 
utilizing the “dog” or “animal” radical in the names of minority groups.16 In the 
Imperial courts’ view, the southern borderland was at the margins of the 
geographical sites where nature could be imagined as wild and uncontrolled, as 
peripheries seen to form natural containers for people considered insufficiently 
socialized into the law. The courts attempted to transform these populations 
into lawful subjects of the state through both force and the pedagogy of 
conversion, which was equal to mark these indigenous people as 
civilizationally “other” (Das and Poole 2004: 10). 
Abramson (2008) also suggests that political imperatives had forced the 
elite social classes to highlight ethnic oppositions in order to solidify a Chinese 
self-identity (184). The stereotypes of ethnic groups, such as the non-Han 
being illiterate; non-Han drinking a lot; non-Han peoples being good at singing 
and dancing, provided a shift to a model of ethnic and cultural exclusivity and 
laid the groundwork for the emergence of the modern Chinese nation. 
                                                          
16 Barlow mentioned that in 1776 the Qianlong Emperor decreed that the use of "evil and 
degraded" characters which referred to minority peoples be changed in the volumes of the Sigu 
Quanshu. After that, the animal radical was no longer use in naming ethnic minorities in China.  
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 The term zhongguo 中国 or “Central kingdom” then connotes both the 
geographic and political concepts with which the educated Han elites identified 
the Chinese as the center of existence.  Oppositions between Han (huaren) and 
non-Han ethnicity and between Chinese and non-Chinese culture, Abramson 
(2008) argues, were central to the creation of the unified Chinese geopolity as a 
functioning state, and as an ideal that bound the unified state together (97). In 
other words, “peripheral minorities” have played a pivotal role in influencing 
and constructing Chinese society and identity. This approach challenges the 
official narratives, in which most historians tend to focus on the roles of Han 
settlers in transforming the native people and the success of Sinicization 
projects. In those narratives, Han migrants from the central plains transformed 
the landscape of the border zone with their agricultural tools and techniques, 
and disseminated throughout the region the beliefs and practices of Chinese 
culture. Such a perspective assumes the superiority of Chinese culture. But we 
know very little about the customs, beliefs and practices, and social 
organizations of these native people in the South because most of them had no 
written records of their own, and their stories were rarely mentioned in Chinese 
Imperial history.17 On the contrary, there is a bulk of information about the 
non-Han peoples in the north recorded by Chinese historians because they 
often attacked and invaded the Chinese frontier, as witnessed by the 
construction of the Great Wall. The success of the Manchu in taking control of 
the Chinese Empire during the Qing Dynasty is clear evidence of this. 
Moreover, the Qing state expanded political power and incorporated the north, 
                                                          
17 Weins (1954) addresses the problem of the lack of Chinese historical sources in providing 
the description, custom and practices of the numerous tribes and folk groups in the south. The 
so-called “barbarians” in the south were ignored in Chinese history. On the contrary, there is a 
bulk of information about alien people in the north recorded by the Chinese historians because 
of political reasons (pp.29-30).  
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south and southwest borderlands into the largest territory of the Chinese 
Empire.  
In regards to the changing global context in the eighteenth century, the 
frontier regions became the site of intense imperial rivalry and of particularly 
fluid relations between indigenous people, Han Chinese, and European 
interlopers. The Qing court had begun imposing gaitu guiliu18 policy to reform 
the tusi native chieftaincies and replace them with direct Han rule. One of the 
reasons was “to protect the territory and govern the barbarian”, another was a 
moralistic reason, which included a strong anti-slavery dimension. The structure 
of provincial administration also enabled the serfs to rid themselves of their 
enslavement and become free peasants owning their own land (see Took 2005: 
226-257). Later, these peasants became the groundwork of the revolutionary 
movements. Many Zhuang peasants became key members of the Tong Meng 
Hui, an organization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen who led the Revolution of 1911. 
2.2 Zhonghua Minzu: The Rise of the New Chinese National Identity  
During the nineteenth century, the Qing state faced several intrusions 
from all directions, the Sino-Russo wars along the northern frontier, the Anglo-
French War (1856-8) and the Sino-French War (1883-5) in the south, and the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). Regarding the disputes about territory with 
Russia in 1892, the Qing court had shaken off the view of China as unique to 
the Han people (because they were Manchu) and created a new definition of 
China as a multiethnic entity that incorporated the non-Han groups in Inner 
                                                          
18 “There were two meanings of gaitu guiliu. One was to replace the local chieftains with 
regular officials. Another means to confer Qing titles on the existing local chieftains, making 




Asia. In comparison with the lands ruled by the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming 
dynasties, the Qing conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
Qinghai vastly expanded the Chinese empire. Accordingly, in Kang Youwei’s 
1902 article, he proposed that “[The Qing government] should establish as 
[China’s] permanent national name the Chinese state (Zhonghua guo). Because 
the Manchus, Han-Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans all belong to a 
single state, they are all Chinese (Zhongghuo ren) without any distinction” 
(quoted in Zhao 2006: 16-17). 
After the modern border demarcation was established, the government 
began to disseminate its understanding of China to the Han and non-Han 
people nationwide through its new schools. According to the School regulation 
implemented in 1906, all public and private schools had to teach students the 
geography of China. The newly mandated geography curriculum was 
deliberately employed as the most direct channel to shore up Chinese national 
identity and arouse patriotism. For example, a geography textbook described 
the overarching Mongolian race or Yellow race that dominated Asia (Zarrow 
2012:159). In the last decade of the Qing dynasty, publishers throughout the 
empire produced more than 150 textbooks that focused prominently on the 
geography of China. Through these, these new perceptions of China reached a 
wide audience and were imparted to intellectuals, nationalist leaders, and the 
younger generation. Many of them had been educated abroad, and aimed to 
establish a “modern nation”. 
When Sun Yat-sen, who graduated from Japan, led the revolt that founded 
the Republic of China, this modern Chinese national identity was officially formed. 
Sun (1912) declared, "The uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan 
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territories into a single country” (quoted in Yu 2010: 53) and he established "the 
Republic of Five Groups", which was the first time for the recognition of diverse 
ethnic groups’ contributions to Chinese nation-building. 
In the early years of building the new nation-state, the newly unsettled 
regime was still threatened by colonial invaders. The government’s ceding 
German colonial possessions in China to Japan roused anti-colonial sentiment 
among the intellectuals and led to the May Fourth Movement, 19  in which 
Beijing University students led a mass street demonstration protest on May 4, 
1919. Enhancing Western nineteenth-century social evolution theory (Social 
Darwinism), China’s nationalist intellectuals had the view that China was 
overburdened by its long history and old thinking, and lacked the scientific 
spirit that was necessary for the “survival of the fittest” in the modern world 
(Yang, M. 2008:20). These young intellectuals served to alert hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese, as well as a new generation of college students, to the 
importance of democracy, mass welfare, and, more importantly, the 
establishment of the modern “Chinese nation” or Zhonghua Minzu.  
This new term minzu derives from the Japanese minzoku, meaning 
people or nation, and was used during the Republican Period (1912-49) as the 
basis of the ‘Five People Policy’: the Han, Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), 
Zang (Tibetan), and Hui (a term that included all Muslims in China) (Gladney 
1994: 98-99). For Sun Yat-sen, a minzu was constituted by natural (rather than 
coercive) forces because he contended that members of a minzu “shared blood 
ties, a common spoken and written language, a common religion, and common 
                                                          
19 The May Fourth spirit tremendously effected Chinese society in diverse ways, especially 
regarding its legacy on religious practices and folklore, which have affected ethnic minorities 
in the long run, a point I will discuss later in Chapter 3. 
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habits” (quoted in Shin 2006:192). This multi-ethnic policy and commitment to 
"the peaceful coexistence of the five zu" was created on the ground in order to 
enlist support of the nationalities in the building of a new nation-state. In the 
beginning, minzu quickly became a powerful term, frequently used to indicate 
majority peoples (i.e., the Han Chinese) rather than minority peoples (i.e., 
shaoshu minzu). Later, after the People's Republic of China was founded in 
1949, the Chinese communists inherited the term minzu from the GMD and 
simply endowed it with some Stalinist overtones, reserving it for minorities. 
The CCP removed Zhonghua Minzu, “Chinese Nation,” of the Republican and 
replaced it with Zhongguo Renmin (Chinese people) (Bulag 2003: 760). As 
Crossley (1990) explains, the Chinese minzu is closest to the Russian narod 
(people, nation), with an emphasis upon "popular" (narodni) and "nationality" 
(narodnost). Nationhood and ethnicity are thus deeply ingrained and 
intertwined in the Chinese term minzu, a point which I will return to later. 
In sum, Guomindang’s ethnic politics of “Five Peoples” allowed an 
academic space in which intellectuals were able to have discussions on minzu, 
and they advocated a multi-minzu worldview in the public sphere. Although the 
new nation recognized the existence of diverse non-Chinese people in the 
southwestern part of the territory, these minorities were excluded from the 
“Republic of Five Peoples.” When the central government was weak and 
warlords established their power in various places, the scholars eagerly debated 
the essence of the Chinese nation (minzu)20 and how to create policies that 
                                                          
20 The scholarly works such as Li Chi’s (who had studied at Harvard) Formation of the Chinese 
People (1928), Zhang Qiyun's Study of the Chinese Nation (Zhongguo min zu zhi; 1928), and 
four versions of History of the Chinese Nation (Zhongguo minzu shi) by Wang Tongling 
(1928), Lii  Simian (1934), Song Wenbing (1935), and Lin Huixiang (1936) affirm the 
essential unity of the Chinese people. (see more detail in Shin, ibid.) 
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would define a variety of ethnic groups in the borderlands. They proposed that 
the authorities should recognize the existence of diverse groups in China, and 
incorporate them into the nation building process and prevent them from being 
enticed by the Japanese, French, and British. These intellectuals wanted to 
serve the state by developing southwest China and incorporating its diverse 
peoples into a single nation-state to foster more coherent group identities. In 
other words, under the influence of nationalism in China during the war, ethnic 
minorities came to be included as part of the Chinese nation. 
2.2.1 Nation Building and Deployment of Ethnology 
In response to the necessity of forging unity among their diverse people, 
in 1928 the first division of ethnology was founded in China and Cai Yuanpei21, 
the director, set up a new discipline termed “minzuxue”. By equating minzu 
and ethnos and by using the term xue to translate the suffix “-ology,” 
(Mullaney 2011: 74) Cai intended to distinguish the new discipline from earlier, 
imperial studies of non-Chinese peoples. Cai said that Ethnology was a broad 
science encompassing raciology, archaeology, and history, and had close 
connections to linguistics, sociology, psychology, the arts and literature, 
namely, a holistic approach to human understanding (Guldin 1994: 30-31).  
Later, the term minzu was afforded widespread use by political theorists and 
authorities as a translation for “nation” and “nationality” and the new discipline 
minzuxue became central to a debate between the Guomindang and the 
Communists over the essence of Chinese nationhood. 
                                                          
21 Cai Yuanpei had joined the New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Movement. He and 
Mao Zedong, were members of the New Citizens’ Study Society - a group of nationalistic 
youth dedicated primarily to “scholarly research, personality building, and moral development.” 
See Liu 2012. 
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In addition, in 1928 Cai also established the Academia Sinica 
(Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan) in Nanjing. He was the one who first set Chinese 
ethnology on the trail of the non-Han minorities. Cai did not do much fieldwork 
himself, but every year he sent his researchers out to research the minorities, 
especially the Miao, Li, She, Yao, Yi, and Hezhe. In its language section, linguists 
such as Li Fanggui (Li Fang-kuei)22 also conducted research to create “Chinese 
linguistics.” Li conducted research in Hainan and Guangxi’s Longzhou region. His 
monograph “The Tai dialects of Lungchow” (1940) is considered to be the first 
scientific study of the Zhuang language (Guldin 1994: 32).  
Among several pieces of research on the people in the Lingnan area, 
Liu Xifan’s “Ling biao ji man” (Record of Barbarians in Lingbiao Area - 1934) 
is regarded as the first systematic study on the Zhuang involving history, 
language, customs, religion, family, culture, transportation and other aspects. 
However, the book still had prejudices and discriminated against minorities. 
Another scholar who contributed greatly to research on the Zhuang is Xu 
Songshi. He continuously conducted in-depth research on the minorities in 
Lingnan, such as his “Yan jiang xue da yao” (1929, 1935), “Yue jiang liu yu ren 
min shi” (Folklore of aboriginal along Kuangsi and Kuangtung, China-1939), 
“Tai zu Zhuang zu Yue zu kao” (1942), etc. By combining comparative language, 
place names and archeology, he proposed that ethnic groups speaking the 
Zhuang-Dong language (Zhuang, Dong, Bouyei, Li) have a historical 
relationship with Thais in Thailand, Laos and the Shan in Burma. However, 
                                                          
22 His method of using sets of regular sound correspondences (phonological system) and core 
vocabulary items have been influential as a model for Chinese and Tai linguistics. (see Luo 
2008: 11-12)  
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while he contended that the Zhuang and Thai people were very close kin, he 
maintained that there were distinct differences between the two peoples.23 
Both leaders and intellectual elites of this era struggled to construct a 
modern nation-state. The southwest borderland was considered the poorest and 
most administratively disconnected region from the Chinese government. In 
the context of foreign powers such as the French, British, and Japanese, forces 
continuously attempting to expand their spheres of influence into the 
borderlands, Nationalist scholars urged GMD authorities of the necessity to 
undertake ethnological research into the social and economic conditions of the 
southwest border provinces, and define development plans to solve the 
problems of economic disparity and sociopolitical inequality in this region. In 
other words, scholars and statesmen cooperated in enlisting the state’s power to 
study the borderland peoples and ascribe to them ethnic and national identities. 
For example, in “The Question of Southwest Ethnic Groups in Wartime” 
(1938) Jiang Yingliang alerted the authorities that the exclusion of the 
southwest minorities from the “Republic of Five Peoples” would allow the 
Japanese to seduce “our forsaken southwest ethnic groups.” In his view, these 
ethnic groups were frank, honest, hardy, and courteous but they were lacking an 
ethnic and national consciousness, which was the result of a lack of civilizing 
influences in the region. He therefore urged the Chinese state to educate them 
and "instill in them a concept of the nation-state, resolve [the difficulties] in 
their lives, add a form of military training, and guide them to the front line of 
resistance against the enemy” (quoted in Mullaney 2011: 77).  
                                                          
23 Zhuang scholars support his thesis and point out that Xu negated Western scholars’ thesis 
that advocated a pan-Thai sentiment. See Fan Honggui, The Connections of Ethnic Groups in 
South China and Southeast Asia.  Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2006.  
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Another essay by Cen Jiawu (1938), “The War of Resistance and the 
Cultural Movement of the Border Ethnic Groups," also addressed the divide-and-
conquer tactics of Japan and pointed out that foreign scholars were developing 
classificatory schema designed to "destroy minzu solidarity," and promote 
separatist sentiment among the Li and Miao which was contributing to Japan's 
invasion (Mullaney 2011: 78). Moreover, scholars pointed to the activities of 
Japanese agitators in the north who had laid the groundwork for the invasion of 
Manchuria by spreading a doctrine of Manchurian and Mongolian distinctiveness. 
In addition, Chinese ethnologists were worried that earlier studies of 
non-Chinese people at the borderlands, conducted by Westerners, could 
likewise serve the purpose of division and conquest. In the late 19th century 
there were several studies that classified the peripheral peoples, which derived 
from the observations of amateur ethnologists and linguists, like missionaries 
and other westerners, who had travelled to Southeast Asia and the southern 
provinces of China. For example, De Lacouperie’s pioneering work on Sino-
Tai genetic relationships (1883) and his later work “The Cradle of the Shan 
Race” (1885), A. R. Colquhoun’s “Amongst the Shans” (1885), Davies (1909) 
“Yun-nan: The Link Between India and the Yangtze” and Dodd (1923) “The Tai 
race, elder brother of the Chinese: results of experience, exploration and 
research of William Clifton Dodd”, etc. are good examples. These works 
concluded that the regions of southern China were occupied by non-Chinese 
indigenous groups before the intrusion of the Chinese. According to these 
studies, the Tai people who inhabited vast areas along the river valleys of 
southern China had their own kingdoms and civilization that contributed to the 
Chinese civilization before they migrated southward and westward and settled 
48 
 
in several modern national territories. These studies contribute to constructions 
of transnational bonds of the Tais beyond national boundaries or the so-called 
“Pan-Thai sentiment”.  
Therefore, Chinese authorities and scholars were very concerned that a 
cultural and ethnic commonality would be appropriated by the colonialists in 
order to allure the ethnic groups at the borderlands and affect Chinese national 
security during the intense context of war.  And their speculation seemed to 
come to pass, as we shall see. 
2.2.2  The Politics of Naming: Ethnonymic Polemics During Wartime 
A significant event which provoked a hotbed of discussions among 
authorities and ethnologists in China was the official change in the name of 
Siam to Thailand in 1939. As aforementioned, Western scholars’ research had 
affected the Pan-Thai view and originated a query on the origin of the Tai Race. 
In 1925, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab lectured about Thai history at 
Chulalongkorn University, and his lectures were later published together in a 
book entitled “History of Ancient Siam”. He mentioned that according to 
archaeological evidence, the Tai people originally lived in the area of South 
China (Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Guizhou and Sichuan) before they 
migrated westward and southward.24    
                                                          
24 Department of Fine Arts. (1999) Phraratchaphongsawadan Chabap Phraratchahatthalekha 
(The Royal Chronicle: Royal Autograph Edition), 19. The Chinese document on Zhuang 
Studies mentioned Prince Damrong’s speech and led me to trace the Thai document of Thai 
History. Furthermore, “Searching for the root” became the main discourse that Thai scholars 
discussed, thus expanding their research beyond the territory of Thailand in the 1980s. 
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After that, when Luang Wichit Wathakan 25  -- the director of the 
Department of Fine Arts -- travelled to Hanoi in 1939, which at the time was the 
capital of French Indochina, to visit the headquarters of the École Française 
d'Extrême-Orient (EFEO), he brought back a version of the EFEO-produced 
map which indicated that there are many Tai peoples, and that their ethnic names 
vary from place to place, living in the Indochina Peninsula, in southern China, 
Burma and in the Assam province of India. Wichit estimated there were up to 60 
million Thai people combined at that time. On June 24, 1939 the Thai prime 
minister Luang Phibun Songkhram changed the country's official name from 
Siam to Thailand. This new name contributed to formalizing an ethno-nationalist 
bond between the nation's majority Thai ethnic group and the territorial state. 
Inspired by the fascist ideology of integrating ethnic Germans in various 
countries into “the Great German Empire”, Luang Phibun and Luang Wichit 
wanted to forge a heightened national consciousness among the populace and 
include various Thai people in other countries into a “Greater Thai Kingdom”.26  
The attempt to establish a “Greater Thai Kingdom” was viewed by 
Chinese authorities as a part of “Greater East Asian Co-operation” - Japanese 
wartime propaganda, in which Japan would unite fellow Asians under its 
leadership to throw off Western imperialism. These international politics 
evoked GMD authorities to worry that “the Yi [barbarian] people of Yunnan 
Province”, which shared ethnonymic, cultural, linguistic, and religious 
                                                          
25 Luang Wichit played a crucial role in a state propaganda organ to arouse Thai nationalist 
sentiment. He redefined the meaning of “Thai” to accord with changing political circumstances. 
He emphasized the racial and cultural links between the Shan people (Thai Yai) of northern 
British Burma and the Siamese Thais (Thai Noi) and urged others to continue research and 
investigate possible Thai links to other inhabitants of the Southeast Asian mainland. (See more 
detail in Scot Barme. Luang wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity.) 
26 Composed from a book "Ma Vie Mouvementee" written by Pridi Phanomyong, cited in  




commonality with the Thais, would be influenced by ‘Thai ethno-nationalism’ 
and lay the groundwork for a joint Japanese-Thai invasion. Local authorities 
feared that these collaborators would “cheer on Dai chauvinism” and promote 
the formation of a large republic with Thai people living in neighboring 
territories (Mullaney 2011: 74, 78). At that time, the newspaper "Da Gong Bao” 
(大公报) had continuously published editorials to attack the Pan-Thai doctrine 
and Luang Phibun’s conspiracy of political expansionism of including the 
peoples (Zhuang, Dong, Bouyei, Sui, Lai and Dai) who spoke the Zhuang-
Dong language family in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou Province, 
northern Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and India’s Assam (Fan 2007: 24). 
Furthermore, in aiming to prevent parallel outbreaks of ethno-
nationalism among the diverse peoples of Yunnan Province in November 1939, 
Ge Sangren of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission recommended 
that “it should be forbidden to use names such as Miao, Yi, Man, Long, Luo, 
and Zhuang.” Instead of calling ethnic groups by the names of their spoken 
language, he argued that they should call them according to one’s place of birth. 
By late 1940, Yunnan Provincial Chairman Long Yun adopted Ge’s proposal, 
and outlawed the use of ethnic names in the provinces; he ordered that the 
“borderland compatriots” be referred to as “persons from such-and-such a 
place." However, ethnonyms would continue to be permitted within the 
academy, but only in the context of scholarly publications (Mullaney 2011: 74). 
Mullaney (2011) points out that the eradication of ethnic names 
reflected a deep contradiction latent within the GMD approach to the 
“nationality question”. Although the GMD refused to categorize the Chinese 
populace into multiple minzu, they implicitly recognized the symbolic power of 
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ethnic identification and were concerned about a certain psychosocial power 
that flowed through these designations (74).  
In a nutshell, the outbreak of war with Japan aroused a strong anti-
colonial sentiment and further accelerated the ethnologists’ mission to classify 
minzu in their own way and use their taxonomic framework to develop the 
southwest. During the war, a wave of Chinese academics and a group of the 
nation's most renowned social scientists from the institutes located in coastal 
cities, such as Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou went to the 
southwestern region to study the non-Han people (Mullaney 2011: 61). The 
development of a national consciousness and the context of the political 
struggle to create a nation created opportunities for cultivating a body of 
knowledge on ethnic minorities at the borderlands. In order to win their loyalty, 
ethnic categorization and the symbolic power of the ethnonym were addressed 
through dialectic interplay between external and internal political conflicts. 
2.2.3 The Communist Party’s Policy on Ethnic Minorities 
In the 1920s, while facing imperialist aggression on China's periphery, 
the GMD government actively strengthened frontier minority rule by 
implementing development projects. For instance, Guangxi established the 
“Miao compulsory service Education Center” and the “Guangxi Province 
Special Education Teachers training Institute” to educate Miao-Yao personnel. 
However, because the GMD denied the existence of ethnic minorities and 
strongly advocated Han chauvinism, in practice they implemented a series of 
mandatory ethnic assimilation policies, such as setting up “the Governing 
Council” and the "Custom improvement committee" in the ethnic areas, forcing 
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minorities to change their costumes and customs. Such policies were bound to 
arouse ethnic conflicts. 27  In 1932, for example, in a move to compel the 
assimilation of the Zhuang, the GMD sent village elders, parish police and 
others to keep watch in the market place and to compel a change of dress. 
These actions provoked much indignation, and so as a result, the villagers rose 
up in resistance (Took 2005: 274). 
In contrast to the GMD assimilation policy, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), moved into the countryside and established the Chinese Soviet 
Republic in Jiangxi. They adopted an ethnic policy of self-determination from 
the Leninist Soviet model and encouraged non-Han people to rebel against the 
GMD-controlled central government (Liu 2004). 
During the 1920s to 1940s, Guangxi province was plunged into a 
prolonged state of anarchy as petty militarists battled with each other for 
control of the province. The depredations of these soldiers forced the Zhuang 
peasants living in the hills to form self-protection associations, which soon 
expanded their functions to encompass resistance to local landlords and 
officials. Zhuang folk singing was utilized to foment insurrection by these 
Zhuang rebels. This movement thus took on a distinctly ethnic character. 
According to Diana Lary (1972), the Zhuang peasant movement could be 
considered both a movement of peasant protest and one of ethnic protest.28    
At the same time, the forces of the “Guangxi Clique” emerged under 
Wei Baqun (1894-1932), a Zhuang from Donglan County, and this clique then 
                                                          
27 Zhuangzu yanjiu gaishu  (Zhuang Research Overview) 
28  Regarding the issue of ethnic movement, Kaup disagrees with Lary and argues that a 
documentary and her interview sources all suggest that it was just the peasant movement 
without ethnical inspirations. (see more details in Kaup, 2000, pp.98-100) 
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allied itself with the communists. When Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues 
staged a military uprising in the Baise region of Guangxi, they recruited a 
number of Zhuang into the Red Army. Wei Baqun joined the Red Army and 
became a member of the Central Executive Council of the Jiangxi Soviet in the 
early 1930s.  
Wei and his followers utilized the strengths of Zhuang culture and folk 
singing to foment insurrection by Zhuang rebels. The peasant forces wrote 
songs and used them in their propaganda work. Wei also opened a local 
peasants’ training institute and taught the Zhuang peasantry of the Youjiang 
river region about political economy, the history of socialism, the history of the 
Russian revolution, and military theory and practice.29   
The increased contact with the ethnic groups in western Guangxi 
enabled the CCP to promote the statement “Unify China and recognize national 
self-determination” (Kaup 2000:67). In the First Chinese National Congress in 
November 1931, the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic was passed 
with Article 14 that declared: 
“The Soviet government in China recognizes the right of self-
determination of the national minorities in China; the Mongols, 
Moslems, Tibetans, Miao, Li, Koreans, and others inhabiting the 
territory of China enjoy the complete right to self-determination, 
that is, they may either join, or secede from, the Federation of 
Chinese Soviets, or form their own state as they may prefer.” 
(Central Data Library 1991: 775–6, quoted in He 2005) 
 
This policy of self-determination (which later was completely 
abandoned 30 ) enabled the CCP to gain broader support from borderland 
                                                          
29 Barlow, The Zhuang and the Chinese Communist Party. 
30 Mao Zedong abandoned it because Lenin's theory of self-determination was used by Japan to 
support the independence of Mongolia (He, 2005). 
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minorities during the Long March. Traveling through the minority regions 
enabled the party to appeal to more members of various ethnic groups into 
joining the Red Army along the route. They were almost exclusively from poor 
and illiterate families. Their level of political awareness was low, and for the 
most part they did not even understand Chinese. After the Long March, 
recruitment of minorities continued to be carried out by the CCP in the border 
regions. Minority youth also joined the CCP and they were trained to work for 
Chinese socialism in minority areas. Eventually, Deng Xiaoping established 
the Youjiang Revolutionary Base in Baise, and Guangxi became the first 
province in which the Communist Party announced liberation in 1949.31 
However, during the war with Japan the CCP significantly changed 
their strategy towards ethnic groups. The party determined it could not follow 
the Leninist model and abandoned the approach of seeing itself as a “soviet 
state”. Instead, the party leaders stood up for the “Chinese nation” and adjusted 
their policy toward Han-centric nationalism in which the CCP was persuaded 
to keep ethnic peoples within the Chinese state. Self-determination would be 
allowed only with regards to local affairs as witnessed in the CCP declarations 
of December 20, 1935 and May 25, 1936 to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia 
and the Muslims. Nevertheless, the CCP promised that non-Han people who 
cooperated with the CCP in resisting Japanese aggression and defeating Chiang 
Kai-shek would be accorded autonomous and equal status in the new China 
(Moseley 1973:5). 
                                                          
31 Moseley (1973) notes that the “liberation” of Guangxi meant no more than the seizure of the 
major towns and cities and control of the transportation system. (p.35) 
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To conclude, in the critical context of sovereignty, borderland ethnic 
minorities became increasingly incorporated into the process of new nation 
formation, which in turn resulted in increasing their ethnic awareness. 
Republican-era ethnopolitics was addressed drastically with the outbreak of war 
with Japan. The strategic battle to win more support from ethnic groups in the 
borderlands was not only between the GMD and CCP but also involved 
international dynamics of territory. Chinese ethnologists were cautious about the 
earlier ethno-taxonomic works of foreign scholars. They attempted to convince 
state authorities that although these foreign-born taxonomies were conducted for 
the purpose of colonialist interests and aggression, the GMD should not deny the 
existence of these diverse groups. To prevent them from being enticed by the 
colonialist powers, the Chinese state would rather recognize them and create 
their own taxonomy, which would thereby incorporate them into the nation-
building process. This commitment on behalf of Chinese ethnologists coincided 
with what the Communists designed for their socialist state. After the 
communists won the wars, the ethnic classification project became one of the 
most important foundations for state-social scientific collaboration. 
2.3 The Making of the Socialist “unified, multinational state” 
In 1949, having won a long civil war, the leaders of the new People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) faced a highly fragmented country. Warlords had 
ruled China for decades; the country was a patchwork of localities with diverse 
languages, cultures, and customs. Moreover, while the new leaders aimed to 
reclaim the land that had belonged to the last imperial dynasty, the presence of 
semi-independent ethnic minorities all around the borders posed an obstacle. 
Nonetheless, there were anti-Communist guerrillas operating inside Yunnan 
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and Guangxi who had based themselves in remote hill areas and were in 
contact with the outside world, the US as well as Taiwan (Moseley 1973: 35). 
The border areas with Vietnam were also a strong base for raids against the 
Communists (Kaup 2000: 83). Thus, in order to build a new nation and 
mobilize the support of the minorities, the CCP needed to integrate ethnic 
groups along the border into the unified administration of the Chinese state.  
To distinguish the PRC from both the GMD’s Han-chauvinism and the 
Soviet’s federation of non-Russian nationalities, the CCP promulgated a policy 
of national equality, national unity and ethnic regional autonomy. Therefore, 
ethnic minorities were invited to register the names by which they wished to be 
identified, and more than 400 different ethnic groups registered. Clarifying 
which groups should be considered separate nationalities was an extremely 
complicated problem for the Chinese administration. A new Central Institute of 
Nationalities (CIN) was set up (Guldin 1994: 101). Then Chinese ethnologists 
were given the task of conducting in-depth surveys and producing a taxonomy 
of ‘minzu’ for the developing Communist administration.  
The CCP broadly adopted Stalin’s definition of ‘nationality’ (natsia) as 
“A nation [that] is a historical formed stable community of people arising on 
the basis of common language, common territory, common economic life, and 
a typical cast of mind manifested in a common culture” (quoted in Kaup 2000: 
88). Another component of Stalin's model involved ranking groups along a 
five-stage evolutionary scale encompassing primitive communism, slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. Apart from Stalin’s definition, “ethnic 
willingness,” “historical basis,” and “proximity identification” were three 
significant principles for the PRC’s ethnic identification (Zheng 2010: 24). 
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Proper identification by which groups could officially gain minzu status 
was important because official recognition meant that a given group would be 
granted “minzu regional autonomy” (minzu quyu zizhi) at three levels: region, 
prefecture, and county. Nevertheless, the national minorities could have a 
number of deputy seats in the National People’s Congress (Moseley 1973: 7).  
After 1949, Chinese ethnologists were redeployed to support CCP rule. 
The socialist state initiated relations with scholars who were eager to take part 
in policy formation and exploited their transnational connections to academics 
abroad. Several institutes of social sciences (such as history, economics and 
philosophy) under the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) were established 
and organized to assist ‘socialist construction’ and international exchange. The 
Soviet Union also served as a model to show which disciplines should be 
supported in a socialist state and which eliminated. In October 1950, the 
Ministry of Education proposed to base teaching in the PRC on anti-
imperialism, land reform, and the ‘five loves’ (of the motherland, the people, 
labor, science, and public property) in an effort to develop a socialist 
consciousness among the young. Some disciplines, like sociology and 
anthropology, were labeled as “bourgeois social sciences” and abolished in 
1952. Anthropologists were redefined as ethnologists and given the patriotic 
task of using Soviet-style ethnological analysis to classify the non-Han 
minority populations (Guldin 1994). 
During 1950-1954 state-sponsored Nationalities Visitation Teams 
(minzu fangwentuan) were formed and dispatched to border regions throughout 
the country. These classification teams were instructed to make their final 
decisions based on the particular economic conditions, historical background, 
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and internal relations in a particular area. In practical terms, the researchers 
decided to apply it flexibly; they used Chinese folk categories and the prior 
works of scholars as frameworks in order to classify minorities (Harrell 1989:5, 
quoted from Guldin 1994).  
"Don't forget that academic research is to serve political practice. 
The work of minority research before us is certainly not purely for 
the sake of academic research. It must unite with politics, 
particularly with the problem of national security." (Quoted in 
Mullaney 2011: 84) 
 
 
The above speech that Lin Yaohua gave to remind the team of ethnic 
classification in Yunnan can represent the guidelines for the teams that were 
dispatched throughout the country. Ethnic classification was a highly 
politicized issue. Political authorities agreed that linguistic categorization was 
the most effective and economical way to proceed. Therefore, the identification 
teams were assigned to investigate the claims of various groups by using 
language-based taxonomic theories as the “primary criterion of classification”. 
The earlier works of Western and Chinese ethnologists were crucial sources 
used to adjust the groups. Namely, even prior to the fieldwork stage of the 
project, the team already had a thoroughly detailed plan about which groups it 
planned to recognize as full-fledged minzu (Mullaney 2011: 84).  
 2.3.1 In the Name of “Zhuang”: Problems of Ethnic Classification  
In 1950 Guangxi was visited by a team led by Li Dechuan. The process 
of ethnic identification was very arduous and complicated. The teams of 
ethnologists, sociologists, historians and linguists traveled to areas where 
transportation was inconvenient in order to identify the names of ethnic 
communities. There were many problems in the ethnic classification system, 
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but here I illustrate only the case of the Zhuang. In Li’s report, she observed 
that many of the Zhuang people were unwilling to be identified as Zhuang, but 
preferred to pass as Han people. Not only the Zhuang, but other lowland-
dwelling minorities were also unwilling to be identified as non-Han since they 
had been extensively Sinicized and had become indistinguishable from the Han 
(Moseley 1973:41). Another problem was that many groups had referred to 
themselves as "locals"(土- tu) in the provincial census (tujia, tujiaren, and a 
number of other similar terms); the result was a proliferation of people 
scattered throughout the region with similar names, but who shared no cultural 
or linguistic characteristics in common (Mullaney 2011: 88) 
To clarify these problems, the teams led by Fei Xiaotong and Huang 
Xianfan were dispatched to minority areas in Guangxi to research their social 
conditions. People who refused to be classified as “Zhuang” tended to trace 
their family genealogy back to allegedly Han ancestors and insisted that their 
ancestors were a part of Han military settlements. Besides, in Republican era 
chronicles, they were often known as the “former Han” (qian hanren), the "old 
Han" (jiu hanren), or “the most ancient Han” (zuigulao de hanren). These 
people also had a higher social status in most of the region (Fan and Gu 1989). 
Even Fei Xiaotong, leading the project of ethnic classification, expressed the 
difficulty in classifying them, saying that:  
Guangxi has a type of people called “local people” who are widely 
spread across the province… They rather refer to themselves as “Han 
who speak the Zhuang language.”… Since the language they speak is 
generally called Zhuang, we recommend calling them Zhuang. The 
Zhuang are a relatively large Chinese southern minority, but we still 
know little about them. I…hope that scholars with more expertise on 
nationality history will offer us their assistance, and in this way move 
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towards a better understanding of these people. (Fei 1952, quoted in 
Kaup 2000:127) 
 
Although the team used spoken language as the main criteria to classify 
them as Zhuang, many people still refused to accept their Zhuang nationality 
status. This was because many of them had lost their native language, and now 
spoke only the local Sinitic vernacular. Many of them claimed that their 
ancestors were a part of Han military settlements and they felt that being 
registered as a minority would cause lower status. Like the Manchu, however, 
“these assimilated Zhuang are classified as a minority nationality, primarily on 
the basis of family tradition and a few lingering cultural habits that set them off 
from their neighbors” (Moser 1985: 226).  The problem became more 
complicated as many of the people labeled as “Bouyei” in Guizhou were 
actually blood relatives of those labeled “Zhuang” across the border in 
Guangxi. But they got a different label because of the provincial divisions.32  
The different minzu designation in Guizhou and Guangxi occurred 
because of the principle of “ethnic willingness”. According to original surveys 
made with the aid of Soviet experts in ethnic classification, the experts visited 
Guizhou first in 1950 and named the Tai-speaking people of southwestern and 
central Guizhou “Buyi zu,” after the people’s own self-appellation. When the 
surveyors moved on to Guangxi in the middle of 1951, however, they found 
that most of the Tai-speaking people in northern Guangxi did not want to be 
called Bouyei, as that was an almost derogatory term that the more prosperous 
valley-dwellers used for referring to the poor living in the hills (Holm 2003: 7). 
                                                          
32 The problem of ethnic classification continued until the 1980s (see Kaup 2000:88-91). 
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Mullaney’s study on the minzu classification in Yunnan brings to light 
how the category of the Zhuang, Nong, and Sha was complicated by the 
ethnopolitics of neighboring provinces. Guangxi authorities had grouped the 
Nong, Sha, and Bouyei under the ethnonym "Zhuang." The Nong were 
classified as the southern branch of Zhuang (nan Zhuang) while the Sha were 
classified as the northern branch (bei Zhuang). In contrast to Guangxi, however, 
the Bouyei in Guizhou were not categorized as a subset of Zhuang, but rather 
as a full-fledged minzu. To complicate matters further, the Sha in Guizhou 
were classified as a branch of the Bouyei while the Nong were classified as a 
subset of the Zhuang (Mullaney 2011: 87). 
Moreover, the group that called themselves Budai in four counties of 
Guangxi demanded to be recognized as Dai rather than as Zhuang. The team also 
considered labeling them Dai, but the Central government and Guangxi 
government were reluctant to acknowledge another minority within its borders 
because recognizing them as Dai would allow them to establish autonomous Dai 
counties within Guangxi. The Budai in Guangxi hence were classified as a 
subset of Zhuang. Political considerations played a crucial role in defining which 
and what size groups would be considered a standalone minzu (Kaup 2000:89). 
As aforementioned, the minzu classification project was mainly 
conducted for political purposes to consolidate administrative control over the 
minority areas, especially in frontier regions having ties with the external world. 
The classification hence took place in strict accordance with provincial 
jurisdictions, and inseparably connected to political issues in that province. The 
CCP instructed the team to merge together many different ethnic groups 
(referring to themselves by over 20 names like Bu ban, Bu nong, Bu yang, Bu 
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dai, Bu min, Gaolan, Pu tho, Pu yai, Tho lao, Nong an, etc.33) under the single 
rubric of the Zhuang nationality (at first, it was 僮族 Tong zu but later it 
changed to 壮族 Zhuang zu in 1965). This led the Zhuang to become the largest 
minority in China (the population of the Zhuang in 1953 was roughly 6.5 
million), and they would certainly deserve to have their own autonomous area.  
Kaup (2000) points out that the Zhuang autonomous units did not 
emanate from the grassroot level by the Zhuang themselves, since the Zhuang 
apparently had no ethnic consciousness of being “Zhuang”. In the countryside, 
villagers still maintain a strong sense of loyalty to their separate zhixi (branch) 
among the people because of the vast differences in local dialects and the lack 
of a unified written script. The self-denigration of many people was viewed as 
a result of the racial prejudice that the majority Han Chinese had traditionally 
felt toward the Zhuang. The identification teams were assigned not only to 
investigate the claims of various groups and make their final decisions, but also 
to convince local cadres and the masses of the significance of establishing an 
autonomous area (Kaup 2000: 87). 
In 1953 the CCP established the West Guangxi Zhuang autonomous 
area (Guixi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu) in hopes that the establishment of an 
autonomous area would let the Zhuang comrades “strengthen their 
understanding of nationalities policy and energetically carry out mass 
propaganda.” This new administrative area would cover a population of over 
6.2 million which consisted of Zhuang 67%, Han 22%, and other nationalities 
11% (Moseley 1973: 50-51). The decision to create a Zhuang autonomous area 
                                                          
33 Fan, History, Culture and Language of the Zhuang Nationality (in Thai). 
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was made by the central government and promoted from the top down in spite 
of a dispute about minzu registration.  
Later, the Zhuang autonomous region was expanded to cover the whole 
Guangxi province, despite the Han being the majority of Guangxi’s population. 
Premier Zhou En Lai stated in a 1956 meeting to prepare for the establishment 
of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR), stating that:  
Some people say the Zhuang have few distinctive characteristics and 
they have left little mark on history. But it’s impossible to say that they 
are less of a minority than the Manchus. The Zhuang have their own 
language and their own culture. These are their distinctive markers. 
(quoted in Kuap 2000: 92)  
Even though many people objected to the transformation, Guangxi 
province was renamed as the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR) in 
1958.34 The CCP cadres stressed the propaganda idea that, as the minzu with 
the largest population in China, it was appropriate for the Zhuang to have a 
province-level autonomous area, as the Mongols and Uyghurs did (Moseley 
1973: 85). The Zhuang autonomous areas were granted higher budgetary 
freedom and special investment funds, which dramatically changed the social, 
cultural, and economic conditions of the Zhuang. 
To conclude, in line with Appadurai’s “new ethnicities”, the new 
Chinese socialist state assigned an ethnic label to the people and evaluated 
them according to their modes of production. Finally, over four hundred groups 
                                                          
34 Moseley (1973) believed that the establishment of the GZAR served only one vital political 
purpose, which was to smash the Han Chinese who had been against the CCP. While the 
Cantonese-speaking Chinese in Guangxi were especially resistant to Communist rule, the CCP 
had found an ally in the Zhuang who “were the main force in provincial Party apparatus” in 
making an extensive propaganda effort to reach the masses. Therefore, Moseley viewed the 




were reduced to the officially recognized fifty-five minzu by the state.35 State 
recognition led to the objectification and creation of identities because these 
labels controlled access to state affirmative-action programs and political 
representation for minorities. The state placed these new minzu on a social-
evolutionary scale; inevitably, minorities were placed on the lower rungs of the 
evolutionary hierarchy, while the majority Hans were placed on the top. The 
Han would assist the fraternal nationalities in progressing toward socialism. 
Members of the national minorities were encouraged to join the CCP, but in 
doing so they simply became agents of the Han Chinese for the transformation 
of their own people. Once established, these various autonomous areas were 
highly integrated into the socialist state (Moseley 1973: 81).  
At that time, illiteracy rates in Zhuang areas were estimated at over 80 
percent. Furthermore, few uneducated Zhuang could speak Mandarin. In the 
1950s, the government’s first priority was to train a corps of minority cadres to 
improve educational opportunities for minorities (Kaup 2000). Minorities were 
trained to be teachers, administrative cadres, veterinarians, and entertainers to 
facilitate the party’s administration and carry the pro-communist message 
(Dreyer 1993: 337). Education has been a major element in the state’s civilizing 
projects. From the State’s point of view, successful education not only creates 
patriotic citizens out of ethnic members, but also makes them ready to join the 
modernization campaigns launched from time to time by the state (Harrell 1996). 
Promising youth and others who had strong records of revolutionary 
activity were moved from their homes, enrolled in newly established minority 
                                                          
35 41 minzu were listed in the first census in 1953, the 1964 census included 53 minzu and the 
1982 census identified 56 minzu, including the Han majority (see Gladney: 14). 
65 
 
nationality institutes, and thereby introduced to the fields of ethnology, social 
history, political theory, and administration (Litzinger 2000). The CCP 
emphasized giving everyone a good grounding in historical materialism and 
Marxism-Leninism (Guldin 1994). Education enabled ethnic intellectuals, 
cadres, and youths to think more seriously about their own ethnicity. They had 
to differentiate “healthy” from “unhealthy” customs and practices; healthy ones 
were to be preserved and unhealthy ones eliminated. Namely, the official 
policies promoted only certain “traditional” cultural practices of the minorities 
as core to their identities, but the prevailing discourse of socialist state ideology 
was premised on hierarchical distinctions, encompassing narratives of socialist 
modernity, unilinear social evolutionism, and the Chinese ‘civilizing project’ 
(Harrell 2001). 
2.3.2 Creating New Zhuang Scripts 
At the beginning, language equality served as an important symbol of 
China’s ethnic policy. There was extensive research conducted on the 
languages of ethnic minorities in China.  The Institute of Linguistics was set up 
at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 1950. The Advisory Committee 
of National Language Research was established in Beijing in 1951. This 
committee proposed to devise new scripts for the minorities that have their own 
spoken languages, but no written languages or no commonly used written 
languages. The Institute of Linguistics, CAS, and State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission decided to choose the Zhuang minority for the test-run creation of 
new scripts (Zheng 2010: 96). The Zhuang language was chosen because of the 
size of the Zhuang population. 
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According to Chinese linguists, the Zhuang language is classified as a 
branch of the Zhuang-Dong group of the Sino-Tibetan family (recently called a 
Kam-Sui language)36. The varieties of Zhuang spoken languages in Guangxi 
and Yunnan are divided into two main groups: Northern and Southern, with the 
Youjiang River as the dividing line. There is a high degree of variation in the 
phonological and grammatical structure between Northern and Southern 
Zhuang. The significant difference is that Northern Zhuang lacks aspirated 
stops, while Southern Zhuang possesses them (Luo 2008: 317-318).  There are 
seven varieties (or dialects) within Northern Zhuang and five varieties within 
Southern Zhuang. Such differences have caused the problem of mutual 
intelligibility between speakers of the Northern and Southern groups. While 
Western linguists have chosen to describe these varieties as distinct languages, 
most Chinese literature refers to varieties at this level as dialects, and to the 
entire Zhuang group as a single language (Luo et al 2005). 
In fact, there had been a traditional Zhuang writing system that was in 
widespread use among literary Zhuang. This old Zhuang script was based on 
Chinese characters and borrowed semantic and phonetic components of 
Chinese characters to represent Zhuang words. In other words, Chinese 
characters were used to record Zhuang morphemes, according to the meaning 
or the pronunciation of the Chinese character. However, it was unstandardized 
and varied from place to place (Holm 2004, Bauer 1998).  
When the committee called for work on the creation of a Zhuang 
writing system (hereafter referred to as Zhuangwen), three linguists -- Yuan 
                                                          
36 This is a result of avoiding the Western taxonomy of the Tai language family. Chinese 
linguists therefore contend to use their own taxonomy.   
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Jiahua, Wei Qingwen (a native of Zhuang), and Zhuang Junru -- were sent to 
conduct the Zhuang linguistic surveys in 1952. They also set up a 15-month 
training class with over 30 Zhuang trainees on how to write down Zhuang 
dialects in the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) or Romanization.  These 
trainees were dispatched to survey the Zhuang dialects in Guangxi (Li 2004: 
240).  In 1955 a new Zhuang writing system was created. A version of the 
Northern Zhuang spoken in Wuming County was chosen as a standard form for 
the new script. The draft scheme of the Zhuangwen based on the Latin alphabet 
and incorporating several letters from the Cyrillic alphabet as well as symbols 
from the IPA for tones (Stites 1999: 113) was submitted to the central 
government.  
In December 1957, Premier Zhou Enlai presided over the 63th Plenary 
Meeting of the State Council; they approved the proposal on the Zhuangwen 
and it became the first new writing system supported and authorized for 
national use by the central government.  After that, 14 language programs for 
another nine ethnic groups were launched (Zheng 2010: 96). Zhuangwen 
became an important issue in the transmission of the central authorities’ 
ideology. At first, the Central government’s Bureau of Translation established 
its Zhuang branch office to translate Marxist-Leninist works and the works of Mao 
Zedong into Zhuang, It also translated other national political documents into 
Zhuang, such as the CCP’s National Congress, the National People’s Congress, 
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Li 2004: 245). 
From 1956 to 1957, committees for the promotion of the Zhuangwen 
were established in the prefectures of Baise, Yongning, and Yishan with a 
considerable Zhuang population. Local Zhuang language schools were set up. 
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In order to teach Zhuang cadres and the masses how to spell and write the new 
Zhuangwen, the Guixi Zhuang Language School was established to train 
Zhuang teachers for secondary schools and Zhuang language workers. Under 
the support of the CCP and local governments, Zhuangwen was used in literacy 
campaigns, education, administration, courts, cinema, broadcasting, and 
academic studies. 
However, the Great Leap Forward slowed down efforts to promote the 
new Zhuang script, and by 1964 this work completely stopped. During the 
Cultural Revolution, all Zhuang language schools were closed and publication 
in Zhuang was terminated. Those Zhuangs who had just learned to read and 
write some Zhuang earlier became illiterate again because there was nothing in 
Zhuangwen to read. (Li 2004: 247)  
Zhuangwen was revised in 1981 by the Minority Languages and Scripts 
Commission of Guangxi, and is now an entirely Romanized script which 
requires no special characters (Holm 2003: 223). However, Zhuangwen has not 
been well-received by some Zhuang speakers because it is based on the 
Northern dialect of Wuming and thus causes difficulties in understanding for 
speakers of the Southern dialects (Bauer 2000). 
2.3.3 The Zhuang Social History Surveys 
In addition to the promotion of minorities’ languages, the CCP also 
sponsored a major project to investigate and record the social histories of all 
officially recognized minorities. Since reform in minority areas was slow and 
progress was spotty, there was a perceived need to know much more about the 
minorities’ situation in order to determine the proper policy to apply.  
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According to the CCP’s aim of assisting all the minzu in progressing 
towards socialism, the communist government has devoted great attention to 
China’s southern minority peoples who were ignored by previous governments. 
The Minority Nationality Social History Surveys were begun in 1956. Many of 
the scholars who had contributed to the earlier development of Chinese 
ethnology before 1949, along with younger scholars coming of age since the 
Communist takeover, were sent out to conduct large-scale, systematic field 
studies on the minorities’ society, history, and languages.  
In Guangxi, Huang Xianfan was vice group leader and head of the 
Zhuang ethnic group. He led 'work teams’ (gongzuo dui) comprised of 
academics and students from Guangxi University to investigate the ethnic 
history and traditional culture in Guangxi. It was the largest and deepest 
investigation on ethnic history and traditional culture in Guangxi history (see 
Chen 2008). This resulted in the compilation of internal reports submitted to 
the GZAR government. The investigations were conducted both to determine 
which level their society was at on the social evolution ladder, and to provide 
information that would be useful in various aspects of rule and promotion of 
economic and cultural development. The Zhuang regions were classified to a 
varying degree as functioning as a semi-feudal society (Pan 1991: 5). 
The field-workers of the social history teams were instructed by Mao’s 
call to “Rescue the Backward” (see Guldin 1994: 138-140). They had collected 
a lot of valuable information on agricultural technology, customs and beliefs, 
on marriage ceremonies and funerals, on religious ideas about the cosmos, and 
on the morality of people and the supernatural, which laid a foundation for 
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further research on Zhuang studies. 37  Afterwards, the Guangxi government 
established the Guangxi Institute of Ethnic Studies in 1957 (Chen 2008).   
This data collection effort led to a strengthening of ethnic identities. 
Cultural essentialism and the identification of nationalism with ethnicity were 
directly implicated in academic discourses. A Huang’s book, “A Brief History 
of the Zhuang”, was published in 1957. “An Outline History of Guangxi’s 
Zhuang Literature Figures and Literature” was published in 1959 (Kuap 2000: 
127). To increase Zhuang ethnic pride and their understanding of their heritage, 
a number of historical and legendary figures such as Wei Baqun, Nong Zhigao, 
Madame Wa and Liu Sanjie were glorified. Their biographies were rewritten to 
emphasize their Zhuang ethnicity and to address them as symbols of the “great 
contribution” that the “Zhuang nationality” had made to the “motherland” 
(Kaup 2000: 94). 
In addition to supporting the collection of Zhuang heroes/heroines, the 
CCP has presented their pivotal role in protecting the minorities’ right to 
celebrate their traditional holidays. The party has selectively promoted 
traditional Zhuang customs and festivals that do not directly challenge socialist 
principles, and have skillfully manipulated these festivals. Zhuang Song 
festivals that were once carried out at the village level were promoted to be 
performed on a national scale. For example, ‘San yue san’ (the third day of the 
third lunar month) Song Festival has been held in Beijing every year. The party 
                                                          
37  Took (2005) views that these reports are of unique historical value in recording local 
information gathered from within the old Zhuang tusi domains after the end of Imperial China, 
and before the modernization and social transformation of the PRC which had been effected in 
those areas. They contain first-hand oral accounts from villagers who had living memory of 
conditions under the tusi administration (p. 9).  
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has been quick to utilize this traditional festival to spread its political message 
to the Zhuang. Traditional Zhuang rhythms were given political lyrics, 
including praise of land reform in the early 1950s (Kaup 2000: 100-101). This 
cultural marker of Zhuang is also widespread throughout the media. In other 
words, the CCP brought in “ethnicity” as one of the key categories in its 
socialist nation-building project.  
2.3.4 Maoization: The Anti-Intellectual Propaganda 
The late 1950s was a time that state scholars devoted to producing a 
local history of the Zhuang that would complement the Marxist framework of 
historiography, known as the Hundred Flowers movement. It was a period 
during which intellectuals openly discussed and criticized politics, art, religion, 
literature, science, and academic research. However, some criticisms on CCP 
errors, such as an overreliance on the Soviet model, shocked the Party 
leadership. As a result, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was launched in 1957. 
Intellectuals became a highly visible population and an everyday concern of 
the political authorities. The party’s anti-intellectualism and use of mass 
mobilization during the campaign altered how individuals regarded each other 
and impacted their interactions with others. It was a period when “everyone 
had to find something to criticize”, and younger scholars and students criticized 
the older generation and their teachers (See Guldin 1994: 147-172). 
The reports of large-scale investigations on the Zhuang’ society, history, 
and language were criticized for their insufficient Marxist content. Many of the 
senior scholars involved in their compilations, such as Fei Xiaotong and Huang 
Xianfan (recently recognized as the "father of Zhuang studies"), were labeled 
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‘rightists’ in the Anti-rightist campaign and were removed from membership of 
the Ethnic Committee of the NPC in 1958 (Harrell 2001, Guldin 1994; Chen 
2008). At that time, more than half a million were caught up in the campaign 
and suffered punishments ranging from social ostracism to demotions and 
salary cuts, to exile to labor camps (Guldin 1994: 151).  
During the Great Leap Forward, Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives 
were combined into large-scale communes in which commune members ate in 
communal kitchens and shared their commune’s production equally. A bitter 
famine beginning in 1959, combined with mismanagement and inflated claims 
of success by the commune leaders, led to severe grain shortages and starvation.  
To counter this, the party initiated a mass campaign to collect folk songs, 
folktales, and folk poetry not only to praise the peasants’ and workers’ hard 
work and aptitude, but also to legitimize the Leap’s anti-intellectual approach 
to production. Liu sanjie (Third Sister Liu)’s legend as a “singing immortal” of 
folk songs in Guangxi was selected as the plot for a musical film production in 
order to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the PRC and to be used in the Leap’s 
propaganda campaign.38 The film tells the story of a peasant heroine of Zhuang 
origin using her ingenuity in singing and improvising mountain folksongs 
(shange) to unite poor villagers in a struggle against predatory landlords and 
their hangers-on. With its picturesque scenery of Guilin and its melodious folk 
songs, Liu sanjie was very popular and praised as exemplifying the 
achievements of the “national style” (minzu fengge) (Zhang 1997: 79).  
                                                          
38 After the musical was proposed, cadres and cultural workers traveled across the province to 
meet peasants and folksingers to collect stories about Third Sister Liu and her songs. They 




Cinema was an important medium through which the party deployed 
ideas, images, and language to shape popular understanding of the intellectual.  
The most famous and entertaining scene in this film is the singing competition 
(duige) between Liu and three Confucian literati (hired by the landlord), who 
came with a boatful of songbooks. With her quick wit, angelic voice, and the 
overwhelming support of nearby villagers, Liu humiliates the three middle-
aged men and exposes their utter ignorance of the simplest of agricultural 
labors. The film was praised by Chairman Mao because “Third Sister Liu 
opposes class oppression; it speaks for our proletarian revolution.” (U 2010: 63) 
Furthermore, Guangxi sponsored a festival of Third Sister Liu 
performances in Nanning which involved more than 1,200 “cultural work units,” 
almost 60,000 performers, and an audience of 12 million people. After the festival, 
the provincial government provided “instructions and guidance” on revising the 
script and established the Guangxi Folk Song and Dance Theater to take the 
musical to Beijing and around the country. In other words, the CCP authorities in 
Guangxi transformed the protagonists in the legend of Third Sister Liu into what 
the party called “model characters” in the class struggle—a peasant heroine, an 
evil landlord, and cowardly and useless intellectuals. (U 2010: 64).  
Although Premier Zhou Enlai and other party officials proclaimed that 
it was wrong to see Chinese intellectuals as “bourgeois intellectuals”, 
Chairman Mao still denunciated intellectuals as real and potential class 
enemies. He broadened the label “bourgeois intellectuals” to include scientists, 
teachers, and other white-collar workers produced under CCP sponsorship after 
1949 because these new intellectuals had been influenced by the old ones. It 
was therefore necessary to redeploy intense labor reeducation, political study, 
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and rectification campaigns against intellectuals to protect and further Chinese 
socialism (U 2010). 
In short, when GZAR and Wenshan Zhuang-Miao Autonomous 
Prefectures in Yunnan were established in 1958, Zhuang regions were 
intensively incorporated into the nationwide economic and political campaigns. 
Consequently, Lianshan Zhuang-Yao Autonomous County in Guangdong 
Province was established in 1962. The bad economic conditions of the Great 
Leap Forward and the anti-intellectual campaigns caused a slow-down of 
promoting minzu identities, but the government still supported the minzu 
institutes and surveys on minzu culture. In contrast to widespread riots and 
rebellion in Tibet and Xinjiang provinces39, there was no sign of any uprising 
among the Zhuang. In the party campaigns, the Zhuang had a “unique 
nationality with a long and glorious history” and they enjoyed the status of 
national equality (Pan 1991: 5).  
During 1962-1965, a Socialist Education Campaign was launched in the 
countryside throughout China. The Sino-Soviet conflict also played an 
important role in shaping Mao’s philosophical thought (Schram 2002:471). 
Mao’s interpretation of Marxist theory became a hegemonic ideology that 
reached out to minority nationalities and enveloped them within ideas about 
national identity.  
                                                          
39 Ethnic minorities in Yunnan, Tibet and Xinjiang provinces perceived the Leap as being 
imposed on them by outsiders in an attempt to destroy their culture and ways of life. They were 
disappointed by the party's promises and suffered from forced assimilation. Thus, minorities' 
resentment and resistance took place in many forms. The revolts that occurred in Tibet and 
Xinjiang provinces caused large numbers of refugees to cross over the borders into India and 
the Soviet Union. (see Dreyer 1993: 343) 
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As the political winds in China would blow first one way and then 
another, all efforts in promoting minzu autonomous areas were terminated in 
the wake of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao’s statement that “the 
nationalities question is in essence a class issue” was interpreted by the Red 
Guards to mean that class differences and nationality differences were to be 
done away with. The Red Guards thus attacked the “four olds” (Old Customs, 
Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas) in minority areas and demanded that 
they prohibit minorities' special characteristics. (Dreyer 1993: 344) Han-
language education was promoted for socialist development. The policy of 
national regional autonomy was condemned as creating “independent regions” 
and “dividing the nation”. Minority songs, dance, folk songs, and the like were 
called “feudal, capitalist, revisionist, poisonous weeds” (Herberer 1989: 26-27). 
Even the musical play of the Third Sister Liu, which Mao had applauded as 
exemplary, was denounced as part of an extensive plot to restore capitalism all 
over China. The actress Huang Wanqiu, who had played the Third Sister Liu in 
the film, was arrested, paraded, and subjected to labor reeducation (U 2010: 79).  
Educational institutions were severely disrupted and intellectuals were 
criticized and limited in their scholarly activities. By 1970, around twenty 
million academics and other professionals were labouring in Cadre Schools set 
up throughout China. Most intellectuals had to stay on for several years to 
‘obtain knowledge through labour’, and ‘learn from the peasants’ (xiaxiang) 
(Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007: 39). Universities and research institutes’ research 
collections were destroyed. Ethnological research in local cultural forms was 
marked as a bourgeois practice. Much of the research in the 1950s was never 
published. Almost all ethnological research stopped. The research topic had to 
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emphasize “class struggle”, and the study of religion, kinship and ideological 
related questions were abandoned. (Guldin 1994: 187-191)  
During Mao’s lifetime, the youths’ activities to destroy “traditional 
culture” were sudden and violent, which caused harm that was inflicted on 
cultures and people, especially on ethnic religious practices, which they 
condemned as backward and superstitious, and obstructions to modernity. 
Political conflict in the remote and poor rural regions of Guangxi caused a 
wide range of violent chaos more than one would expect. The saying “Guangxi 
is bathed in blood!” reflected the incredible news about the slaughter which 
occurred in various parts of Guangxi since 1968 (see Zheng Yi 2010, Walder 
and Yang 2003). The effects of the Cultural Revolution on religious practices 
will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
As classification reflects the system of thought, ethnic categories in the 
Chinese Imperial state put emphasis on cultural distinctions between Chinese 
and non-Chinese in order that the central state could reaffirm the boundaries 
between “civilized/ Chinese” and “uncivilized/ non-Chinese.” The historical 
backdrop provided in this chapter reveals the transformation of ethnic 
categorization at the turn of the nineteenth century when China faced the chaos 
caused by warlord conflicts and the threat of China’s dismemberment by 
foreign powers. It created an intellectual atmosphere that influenced scholars 
and students to attack Confucian tradition and sought to build a more powerful 
modern state since the May Fourth Movement. Nationalistic ideas among 
Chinese intellectuals played a central role in transmitting new ideas for 
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recognizing the ethnic peoples on the south and southwest borderlands and for 
incorporating them into a new modern nation-building process. 
In relation to broad socio-political transformations, the strategic battle, 
not only between the GMD and CCP but also with international dynamics of 
territory, was waged to win more support from ethnic groups in the borderlands. 
It conditioned the knowledge production on ethnic minorities, namely 
ethnology.  Chinese intellectuals acted as agents of social and political change 
and played an important role in factional and ideological battles between the 
GMD and the CCP.  
Besides, the CCP’s rhetoric of national equality aiming to enhance the 
“Voice” of the ethnic “Other” previously oppressed by the ruling classes 
attracted ethnic peoples and scholars. After the CCP took power, however, all 
intellectuals advocated participating in building a socialist state, and were 
forced into party-controlled organizations. Scholarly creative activities were 
conducted under the party’s sponsorship and directed by Leninist-Maoist 
policies. Intellectuals who graduated from overseas actively contributed to 
define ethnic classifications based on common language, blood lineage, and 
culture. Although there were flaws and disparity in the minzu identification 
project, it was the first time in Chinese history that large-scale research on 
ethnic minorities was conducted by using the “scientific method.”  
In consequence of the official recognition of 55 minzu, many different 
Tai-speaking groups become recognized under the single rubric of “Zhuang zu” 
- the largest minority nationality of the PRC. Regarding the pride of being the 
first province in which the Communist Party announced liberation, their 
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collaboration with the Communists enabled the granting of their own 
autonomous area. However, they were prejudiced as the most Sinicized minzu, 
and were without unity and a unique collective identity. The remaining 
differences of spoken language and folk singing traditions varying from place 
to place were unable to construct an imagined community. This resulted in the 
invention of the Zhuang writing system and scholarly endeavors to research 
and to discover the Zhuang history and cultural identity that would “serve the 
nation’s socialist modernization effort” in the 1950s. 
In this regard, being minzu is congruent to Rey Chow’s argument. She 
contends that instead of viewing ethnicity as the demarcated boundaries of 
language, culture, and identity and its inventories of heritage, we rather view 
ethnicity as cultural politics and focus on the conditions that allow some groups 
to claim positions to speak and be heard while others are denied voice and 
refused any kind of recognition (Chow 1998: 8). According to Chow (1998), the 
meanings of intellectual work in China are multiple and that different subjects 
have been struggling to undo histories of marginalization. In other words, we 
may consider that the early multi-national policy of a new socialist state had 
provided a space for the politics of marginality to write their histories which 
never appeared before in the formal versions of Chinese history. The non-
Chinese barbarians became the non-Han Chinese whose history of struggling 
against the Imperial states contributed to building a new Chinese nation. 
However, the repression of ethnic cultures during the Cultural 
Revolution hindered all efforts in promoting minority identity. China's closed-
door policy also obstructed international researchers to enter China. What the 
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impacts are on the relationships between state-intellectuals in the changing 




Buluotuo Culture:  Making the Self in the Zhuang Scholarship 
 
 
The previous chapter provided a brief history of the Zhuang Nationality 
that emerged, developed, and changed under the precise historical 
circumstances of the Japanese invasion, the struggles for independence and the 
emergence of a new Chinese socialist nation-state. The early multi-national 
policy of this new socialist state had provided a space for the politics of 
marginality to write their histories. Minority research was in extreme demand 
to serve political-ideological movements in the early Mao regime, but it was 
reversely reprimanded and suppressed for over a decade. 
This chapter will first explore issues of a resumption of minority research 
and the minority cultural revivals in the post-Mao era. “Traditional culture” has 
been endorsed as an alternative to “politics” to promote stability and dispel the 
ruptures and repressed memories of the Cultural Revolution. The CCP has 
promoted ethnic diversity as an emblem of Chinese national unity. Next, this 
chapter provides a brief review of the revival of Zhuang scholarship and the 
discovery of Buluotuo myths and scriptures. This section illustrates the 
individual agency of Zhuang Studies scholars and how they have negotiated, 
interpreted and presented what it means to be ‘Zhuang’. The increased research 
collaboration with international scholars has created a body of interdisciplinary 
literature focused on the place of “Tai origin” which has contributed to the 
formation of an alternative narrative as the old siblings of Tai-speaking peoples 
in Southeast Asia.  
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The last part deals with the development of the Buluotuo Cultural 
Tourism Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang of Tianyang County. It demonstrates that 
some Zhuang individuals today are achieving a new public voice and are 
actively participating in the construction and reconstruction of Zhuang identity 
in the larger public sphere. “Buluotuo Culture” became a point of engagement 
between Zhuang ethnic dialogues for identifying its own unique identity and 
the promotion of China-ASEAN economic collaboration.  
3.1 Post-Mao period: Revival of Minority Cultures 
After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of 
Communist Party of China in 1978, there were major changes in political and 
socioeconomic aspects of the PRC. The government under Deng Xiaoping 
began to re-assess and reform policies prominent in the late 1960s. China 
ended its closed-door policy and emphasized the first priority to economic 
development.  
National research and academic groups were re-established. The work 
of minzu identification was resumed and some reclassifications were made. It 
took over 20 years, from 1953 to 1979, to complete. Finally, the Nationalities 
Affairs Commission (NAC) officially announced the entire 56 minzu 
(including the majority Han). There has been a movement within Chinese 
academic and political circles to revive the notion of a “Chinese Nation” and  
call it the “multicultural unity of the Chinese Nation” (Bulag 2003).  
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China’s Constitution of 1982 and the Law on Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy of 1984 promised the right to self-government in minority regions40, 
the freedom of minorities to use and develop their own languages, and freedom 
“to preserve and reform their own folkways and custom” (Article 10). As a 
result, the government contributed to the rebuilding of mosques, temples, and 
other religious institutions that had been destroyed during the Cultural 
Revolution. Minorities were allowed to study in their own languages, at least at 
the elementary level, and could also attend religious schools (Dreyer 1993: 
348). However, it states that freedom of religious belief should be guaranteed 
as long as the believers love the country, support CCP rule, and observe the 
socialist laws (Yang 2005: 45). 
The government announced a “New Era of Minority Work” that 
focused on re-establishing the nationalities’ autonomous rights and stressed on 
moving toward “modernizing socialism” in which the Han and non-Han would 
both have political and economic equality. Minority autonomous areas were 
granted higher budgetary freedom and special investment funds to compensate 
them for years of exploitation by the Han. Many programs such as special 
programs in education and cadre training, a huge publication project, and 
economic development projects were launched (see Kaup 2000: 111-6).  
In addition, minority citizens have been entitled to certain benefits. 
Preferential policies for minorities directly influence major aspects of their 
                                                          
40 According to the Constitution, minorities are allowed to establish their ethnic autonomous 




lives41, including “preferential policies for family planning (exemption from 
minimum age for marriage and one-child strictures), education  (preferential 
admissions, lowered school fees, boarding schools, remedial programs), 
employment (extra consideration in hiring and promotion of cadres), business 
development (special loans and grants, exemptions from some taxes) and 
political representation” (Sautman 1999: 174) . 
The main aim of giving entitlements has been to narrow the social and 
economic gap between Han and minority areas and help prevent ethnic conflict. 
On the other side of the coin, it insists on a conviction that the people 
belonging to ethnic minorities are backward and need special help from the 
Han, who are in a higher evolutional stage (Hansen 1999: 112).  The Han have 
to assist in their development and lead them to socialist market modernization. 
In the mid-1980s, the discovery that China, in comparative global terms, 
was economically backward was a heavy blow to national pride. The fact that 
Newly Industrialized Countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan, which have been influenced by Confucianism, were able to develop 
their economies very fast caused the so-called “Culture Fever” (wenhua re) 
debates in the PRC. Confucian values and formerly banned works on national 
tradition were reappraised. Chinese traditions were diversely interpreted, as 
well as the symbolism of the nation and the meaning of socialism (Sleeboom-
Faulkner 2007: 196). As Confucianism emphasizes the ‘Great Way’, the 
harmony of minorities with the majority, the idea that diverse minorities should 
                                                          
41  As a result of these entitlements, the total minority population in China increased 
tremendously, from 67 million to 91 million in just eight short years (1982-1990). Gladney 
(1998) contends that this incident reflects “category-shifting” or reclassification where people 
redefine their nationality, either from Han to minority or from one minority to another (p.172). 
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merge into a unified harmony, coexisting peacefully in mutual respect and 
interdependence was addressed publicly (Heberer 1989: 18). 
However, there were two events of the late 1980s that exerted a 
significant impact on subsequent intellectual development in the 1990s. The 
first one was the government crackdown on dissident activity in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 which caused an identity crisis in intellectual cultural circles. 
Another was the phenomenon of the Soviet Union collapsing into several 
separate nations. The world witnessed a remarkable efflorescence of ethnic 
feeling and nationalist aspirations. In China, ethnic movements demanding 
much greater autonomy, or even independence, sprang up. In the late 1980s, 
the Chinese government also faced frequent lama-led anti-government 
demonstrations to demand for Tibet independence. 
In the meantime, there were a number of scholarly publications 
attempting to define and redefine China's “quest for a national identity” (see 
Gladney 2004). President Jiang Zemin thus delivered a speech in 1989 to 
guarantee that the government would make more effort to improve the 
minorities’ standard of living (Kaup: 149). And again in 1990, he delivered 
speeches to emphasize the role of intellectuals as patriotic educators and their 
mission of national self-strengthening (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007: 196). As a 
consequence, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was created and 
formulated by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) intellectuals.  
In the 1990s, intellectuals started to reappraise Chinese culture in a 
framework that re-identified patriotism with Party loyalty and socialist 
modernization. The policy of ‘construction of material civilization and spiritual 
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civilization’ was launched. Communist, cultural, philosophical, and scientific 
traditions formed important sources for the design of a successful modern 
China with socialist characteristics. In attempting to restore their political 
power and increase their national and international reputation, in 1992 and 1993 
Prime Minister Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin made commemorations to the 
Yellow Emperor42- a progenitor of China’s civilizational development. (See Liu 
1999). This shows that the political leadership intentionally used the 
traditionalists’ works in official propaganda and made a fresh effort to integrate a 
whole spectrum of useful aspects of China’s ‘excellent ancient legacy of science 
and culture’ with Chinese socialist views on China’s civilizational 
development.  (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007: 231-232) 
Meanwhile, in order to cope with an increased sense of ethno-nationalism, 
the central government has been trying to construct national unity within the 
framework of a multi-ethnic nation. While it is still assumed that modernization 
will lead to the transformation of all society, the state has supported the idea that 
cultural distinctiveness, at least on a symbolic level, should be maintained 
among the different non-Han groups (Oakes 1997). In promoting cultural 
diversity, the state hopes to minimize minority discontent and establish an 
environment conducive to national economic integration, geopolitical security, 
and patriotism.  
The post-Mao era has thus seen a significant change in minority 
representation. Minority groups have been represented as ‘constitutive 
                                                          
42 The Yellow Emperor has been promoted as the “first ancestor of the Chinese people”, since 
the1900s. In Chinese history textbooks, the Yellow Emperor amalgamated the Chinese tribes to 
establish a kingdom that stretched from north of the Yellow River to south of the Yangzi. 
Hence, the Yellow Emperor was not only a conqueror but also a progenitor who 
institutionalized the bureaucratic system and “improved the lives of the people through civil 
rule” (Zarrow 2012: 179-180). 
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members of the Chinese family’ in several kinds of visual media like billboards, 
posters, stamps, and currency.  The images of minority peoples in distinctive 
costumes were printed on the face of Chinese paper currency (See Schien 2000: 
114, 147-150). In order to introduce the fifty-six nationalities of China, the 
State Commission for Nationality Affairs published books and sets of photo 
cards (minzu kapian heji) and distributed them widely to school children, 
foreign students and tourists. (Gladney 1994: 97)  
Figure 3 - A set of stamps representing minzu 
Source of photos: http://www.visitourchina.com/blog/detail-182.html 
Consequently, images of China as one big happy multicultural family 
have been displayed in TV programs for special events, in which minorities in 
colourful costumes appear to sing and dance. “Fifty-six nationalities are fifty-
six flowers, forming a large family of fifty-six sisters and brothers. We are 
singing in fifty-six languages: love our China”43 was chorused in unison.  
Shifting policy to a market economy, minorities were also encouraged 
to produce for the market. Ethnic tourism has come to China in a big way and 
it is often promoted in minority regions as a way to create income for 
                                                          
43 This is the beginning part of the song “Love Our China”, translated by Jessica Anderson 
Turner (2010: 289) 
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development. 44  Images of smiling young minority women in the receptive 
posture of greeting guest were represented in various kinds of media. In an 
attempt to promote ethnic tourism boutiques, open markets, tourist stores, and 
“cultural stations” (wenhua zhan) have been set up. Minority artefacts and 
costumes were collected, displayed, and modelled as temporary exhibitions in 
minority areas. The identities of minzu groups came to be associated with very 
specific cultural markers approved by the state. This policy has been called 
“selective cultural preservation” in which the expression of ethnic material 
cultures such as house architecture, clothing, dance and music are being 
allowed to persist (Michaud 2006). 
However, the state can no longer absolutely control how minority 
identities are defined and publicly represented. Some minority narratives and 
practices relating to their identity sometimes even resist the state’s 
constructions. Traditional ritual practices in local villages, which were labelled 
as “feudal-superstition” and suppressed throughout the Mao era, have been 
vividly reviving. In minority regions, the resurgence of popular rituals and the 
religious practices of minorities have attracted academic and public attention. 
The photographs of an ethnic populace engaged in esoteric rituals have 
contributed to the exoticization of minorities, and these images of exoticized 
ethnic minorities have thus been published in academic publications and popular 
magazines that report on minority affairs since the 1980s (Litzinger 2000: 193).  
In brief, the ethnic subject that was denied visibility and recognition 
during the Cultural Revolution came back to life. The representation of 
                                                          
44 The number of international tourists visiting China rose from 5.7 million in 1980 to 17.83 
million in 1985, which made earnings grow enormously from  $617 million in 1980 to $1.25 
billion in 1985 (Mackerras 2003: 15). 
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minorities in the post-Mao era have appeared with new forms of capitalist 
development and, at the same time, embraced the other ethnicities as the most 
marketable sign of China’s multicultural diversity. Schein adopts the phrase 
“internal orientalism” to describe a relationship between image and 
cultural/political domination that takes place inter-ethnically within China. The 
portrayal of minorities as exotic, erotic or infantilized “Others” is an effective 
discursive means toward the establishment of Han cultural hegemony and the 
formulation of the Chinese ‘nation’ itself. (See Schein 1997 and Gladney 1998) 
However, it’s noteworthy that the images of multi-colored, feminized, 
and primitivized minorities were produced not only by agents and institutions 
of the state, but also by local actors, both elites and non-elites. Schein (2000) 
proposes that instead of assuming the state to be a source of control from which 
individuals and groups are striving for autonomy, it is also possible to envision 
the state working in tandem with cultural producers who are not formally state 
functionaries, but who share certain ideological stances with the state.  
This chapter focuses on the role of minority scholars who are among 
these cultural producers of significance. Traumatized by the Cultural 
Revolution, they no longer speak through the rhetoric of class struggle but 
instead have turned to gather the indigenous knowledge and traditions that 
were destroyed during the Mao era, such as popular rituals, traditional practices 
of medicine and healing, and other “traditional” modes of social morality. They 
believe that these traditional practices could be utilized in the project of 
bringing development to minorities. As Litzinger contends, discourses of 
tradition in the late 1980s were not only about the ‘internal others’, but also 
‘about the capacity of ethnic subjects to overcome the traumas of the past and 
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to participate in the forging of new modes of governmentality, modes of local 
rule that would require the recovery of indigenous knowledge and traditional 
cultural practices.’ (Litzinger 2000: 191-192) 
With this motivation, minority scholars actively created their fields of 
study, such as Zangxue (Tibetology), Yaoxue (Yao Studies), Zhuangxue 
(Zhuang Studies), Yixue (Yi Studies), and many others. They carried out 
research on a scientific basis into the correct relationship between “traditional 
culture” and “socialist modernization (Litzinger 1998: 227). They increasingly 
emphasize their ethnicity and simultaneously participate in debates from the 
legal positions of the nationalities to their territorial and other rights associated 
with autonomy. These movements have revealed that official ethnonyms took 
on social lives of their own and contestation took place primarily within the 
parameters of already established minzu (Harrell 1990: 519). In other words, 
the state designations have contributed to a growing awareness of ethno-
nationalism45 among intellectuals.  
In the case of the Zhuang, expansion of education and promotion of the 
Zhuang language since the 1950s has had an effect on increasing Zhuang 
ethnic consciousness. Kuap remarked that Zhuang who have a high educational 
level seem to have greater Zhuang ethnic nationalism than those who have a 
lower level and uneducated peasants because they have contact with other 
nationalities and become more concerned about Zhuang history and culture 
(Kaup: 133-138).  In what follows, I will show that a revival of Zhuang 
                                                          
45 “The core of the ethno-nationalist idea is that nations are defined by a shared heritage, which 
usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry” and I 
use this term in a broad sense as “a movement which has not achieved statehood” (Marcus 
Banks 1996: 141) 
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scholarship in the post-Mao era has taken a new turn in their partaking to 
construct narratives of the Zhuang identity.  
3.2 Zhuang Studies in the Reform Era 
 
The revival of Zhuang scholarship at the beginning of the Post-Mao 
period began with the re-establishment of research and academic institutions in 
Guangxi. For instance, the Guangxi Nationalities Affairs Research Institutes was 
founded in 1979; Guangxi University for Nationalities and Guangxi Normal 
University established Departments of Chinese folk literature in 1978 and 1980; 
a Language Committee of Guangxi Zhuang language laboratory was established 
in 1980. In addition to establishing organizations, the Guangxi government sent 
classification teams to complete a minzu identification process for those who 
refused to accept the label given them in the 1950s (Kuap: 115).   Furthermore, 
all efforts to promote Zhuang language, social history and culture, which were 
terminated during the previous decade, were resumed and expanded.  
In May 1980 the Guangxi Regional Party Committee decided to resume 
promotion of the new Zhuang script. The Zhuang writing system was revised 
by removing all non-Latin letters and fully used for publications. Zhuang 
Language Schools were reopened in the communities with a higher percentage 
of Zhuangs, and Zhuang government officials who graduated from college 
were sent there for training. From 1981-1990, the Guangxi government 
adopted experimental Zhuang-Chinese bilingual education in primary schools 
where the Zhuang was the majority. By 1989, experimental bilingual 
instruction had spread to 306 primary schools in 45 counties in Guangxi (Stites 
1999, Li & Huang 2004).  
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Zhuang language has been promoted in publications, radio and 
television. Guangxi Minzu Publishing House has published a periodical in 
Zhuangwen entitled Sam Nyied Sam (the third day of the third month) since 
1986. The Guangxi People's Broadcasting Station set up 75 minutes of 
programs using standard Zhuang language in broadcasting: thirty minutes for 
news, thirty minutes for entertainment and arts, and fifteen minutes for popular 
science. Guangxi Television Station also broadcasts 15 minutes of News in 
Zhuang. Moreover, all government offices and organizations are legally 
requested to use Zhuang-Chinese bilingual signs, seals, and stationary (Li & 
Huang 2004: 247-249).  
 
Figure 4 - Bilingual signs of the official website of the People's Government of GZAR 
presenting twelve nationalities 
However, a Romanised Zhuang writing system is not widespread. It is 
hardly known and used among the Zhuang public even though it is the official 
writing system promoted by the government.  The commoners and religious 
practitioners still prefer to use old Zhuang characters to record their folksong 
lyrics, traditional opera, and history, as well as traditional religious writings, 
such as incantations and fortune-telling books. Although these character 
systems are not standardized across Zhuang dialects, the usage of these 
characters is more widespread (Bodomo 2007). 
Let us turn now to consider the political climate in China that affected 
Guangxi. There was a leadership transition in China in the 1980s, with old 
revolutionary cadres being replaced by a generation of young, better educated 
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Communist officials. Between 1982 and 1988, 2,870,000 senior cadres 
recruited during the pre-1949 struggle for power were retired under a program 
of leadership reform46 devised by Deng Xiaoping (Li and Bachman 1989: 65). 
In Guangxi many senior minority cadres, including Jin Yusheng (the Yao) and 
Zhang Shenzhen (the Zhuang) the former Vice-chairmen of GZAR, also retired. 
In 1983 the Guangxi communist party announced the formation of a “Minority 
Works Party Core Group (minzu gongzuo lingdao xiaozu)”, consisting of 
retired cadres who showed enthusiasm for minority work. Jin Yusheng was 
named chairman of the Core Group and Zhang Shengzhen (hereafter referred 
to as Mr Zhang) was named the vice chairman. The Core Group remained until 
1992. (Kaup 2000: 114, 122) 
Another international political circumstance that affected Guangxi was 
the 1979 border war between China and Vietnam, and the subsequent official 
border closure. Hostility between the two socialist states obstructed cross-
border trade, farming and the movement of people. Because of military 
activities, people in the border regions were forced to leave their homes and 
seek more secure places throughout the first half of the 1980s (Hensengerth 
2010). In 1984 Guangxi's poverty reached a peak, with 15 million people living 
below the poverty line.47 Therefore, Guangxi cadres highlighted their pride of 
being a revolutionary base and an advocate of the CCP in order to demand 
preferential rights for their disadvantage areas, as witnessed in the regulation to 
give preferential enrolments benefits for “anyone living within the thirty-six 
                                                          
46 The vast majority of party members in the Mao era were drawn from peasant, worker, and 
soldier backgrounds. They were recruited because of their political activism, not their 
capability and educational background.  
47 Retrieved from http://www.tcx-gmbh.com/main1209709.htm 
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counties labelled as original revolutionary base areas, mountainous counties, 
border areas, and poverty-stricken counties” (Kuap 2000: 137).  
During the first decade of Deng’s reforms China witnessed an 
increasing degree of agency among Zhuang ethnic actors. They actively played 
a role in constructing or redefining their group identity from cultural elements 
or ethnic markers that they perceived as an essential core (see Horowitz 1985). 
In an attempt to bind the Zhuang together as a group for maximum economic, 
social, or political advantage, scholars tend to construct a “long and glorious” 
history of the Zhuang to bolster the Zhuang’s own sense of pride and self-
worth.  Therefore, research on Zhuang social history was revived.  
The Guangxi authorities allocated funds for a publication project on 
Zhuang history.  The first-hand materials obtained from large-scale 
investigations on history and traditional culture in Guangxi in the late-1950s 
were revised and published in a seven-volume collection of investigations on 
society and history of the Zhuang in Guangxi (Guangxi Zhuangzu shehui lishi 
diaocha). As Took contends, this collection offers a very valuable research 
resource since they never were recorded in the dynastic histories, gazetteers, 
statutes, imperial memorials or any other standard Chinese records. The 
material derived from interviews with local people contains details on 
agriculture and land use as well as records of epigraphy, contracts, clan 
registers, shamanistic and Daoist scriptures, poems, songs, proverbs and 
traditional stories. (See Took 2005: 10) 
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In addition, several works produced in the 1960s by Huang Xianfan, 
who was rehabilitated from a false accusation48, were published. His works 
were substantially destroyed during the Cultural Revolution; Huang began to 
rewrite them until he passed away in 1982. His disciples continued his 
unfinished works and got them published; for example, Nong Zhigao was 
published in 1983 and A General History of the Zhuang was published in 1988. 
Research works of other scholars were also published, such as Xu Songshi’s 
Guangxi Zhuang Place Names Anthology (1982). (See Fan 2004; Chen 2008)  
These revisions and publications brought back three main topics of 
discussion during the 1950s-1970s for further research. The first problem 
concerns the ethnic origins of the Zhuang. Scholars agree that Zhuang people 
are the descendants of Xi Ou and Luo Yue (subgroups of Baiyue) people and 
thus they have a long history. Secondly is whether the Zhuang society passed 
through a stage of slavery. There are three different points of view on this issue: 
1) the Zhuang evolved from a clan society into a slave society and thence to a 
feudal one; 2) the Zhuang were never a slave society; and 3) the Zhuang in 
western Guangxi were in a slavery society but the Zhuang in Eastern Guangxi 
was never a slavery society. The third problem concerns a character of Nong 
Zhigao’s revolt against the Song Dynasty, was it progressive or reactionary? 
(see Fan 2004) 
                                                          
48 Huang Xianfan, a native of Guangxi who graduated from Japan, had devotedly partaken in a 
minzu identification and Zhuang history survey.  In 1958 Huang was blamed for encouraging 
Zhuang separatism with the idea of setting up an “independent kingdom” in western Guangxi. 
Moreover, his book “A Short History of the Guangxi Zhuang People” was criticized for 
minimizing the role of the CCP in the Zhuang uprisings of the late 1920s (Moseley 1973: 88). 
Although he suffered grievously for almost 20 years, he still devotedly committed his life to 
teach and produce works on Zhuang history. Recently, he has been recognized as the father of 
Zhuang Studies. (Chen 2008) 
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At that time, debates attracted the public’s attention towards the special 
nature of Zhuang culture and interest arose in the Zhuang’s unique culture. In 
1985 Mr Zhang was assigned by the Guangxi government to be an editor-in-
chief charged with publishing a series of books on Zhuang history and tradition.  
The reason why Mr Zhang was assigned is unknown. Mr Zhang was of the 
revolutionary generation49 who had partaken in establishing Zhuang political 
autonomy. The Party trusted his political allegiance and assigned him to take 
charge of the publication of a Zhuang studies series. Since then, he has become 
attached to Zhuang Studies; his major role will be discussed later. 
In Mr Zhang’s “I and twenty years of Zhuang studies research” (2006), 
he wrote that he was firstly impressed by an academic conference on the 
ancient cliff paintings along the Zuojiang (Left River).  At that time, he met 
Professor Shi Zhongjian from the Department of History and got to have a 
more in-depth and specific understanding on Zhuang and their historical 
origins from Baiyue (Zhang 2006).  
Archaeological evidence contributed to a ‘scientific’ study of social 
history of the Zhuang. The Zuojiang ancient cliff paintings, featuring human 
figures, animals, bronze drums and boats, etc., were assessed by a relevant 
scientific investigation and it was estimated that the paintings were produced 
over a period extending from the Warring States to the late Han (475 B.C.E.-
220 A.C.E.). The paintings depict a variety of shamanistic ceremonies which 
have contributed to the study of Luo Yue culture (Barlow 1996).   Also, 
                                                          
49 According to his biography, he was born in 1924 and participated in the War of Resistance 
against Japan in 1939. In 1941, he became a member of the communist party and fought 
together with the party. After establishing the PRC, he became a cadre trained by the CCP and 
achieved a very high-rank in the Guangxi government. 
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archaeologists have suggested that the figures of frogs or toads may be 
interpreted as a totem of the indigenous peoples of Guangdong and Guangxi, 
since the inhabitants of the old state of Nanyue were referred to as frogs in an 
entry in the Chinese court annals from the year 112 B.C. (Weins 1954: 33).  
Moreover, the first stone artefacts found in the Bose basin 50  by a 
petroleum Survey team in 1973 led Paleolithic researchers to conduct field 
research in the Bose basin in the 1980s and found more than 20 Paleolithic 
sites with several thousand stone artefacts (see Xu et al. 2012). This evidence 
secured the conviction that the Zhuang were original inhabitants of the Pearl 
River basin area.  
Furthermore, the tomb of Zhao Mei - the second king of Nanyue who 
held power in Lingnan after the end of the Qin - was discovered in Guangdong 
in 1983. The treasures found in the tomb are extraordinary. The design of many 
elegant and distinctive objects is considered proof of a glorious past when it was 
autonomous and detached from the centre of the Middle Kingdom. The problem 
that scholars earnestly debated for nearly three decades was solved because the 
discoveries of tomb and other Nanyue sites in Guangdong and Guangxi prove 
that the Zhuang people of Guangxi had descended from the Nanyue peoples, and 
Zhuang society had passed through a slave society. (See Lary 1996) 
Regarding the issue of a Nong Zhigao’ revolt, Nong Zhigao was a 
chieftain of the Nong clan, which had settled along the Sino-Vietnamese border. 
He made three ambitious attempts (in 1042, 1048, and 1052) to establish an 
independent Great South Country. Finally, Nong Zhigao was defeated by Song 
                                                          
50 In the past “Bose” was the name of Baise Prefecture, which is used by Westerner scholars.  
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military troops and fled to the nearest Tai-speaking society, the Dali kingdom. 
But the Dali ruler executed him to please Chinese authorities (Anderson 2007). 
The Sino-Vietnamese border war during the 1980s caused a dilemma in 
scholarly debates on Nong Zhigao. Zhuang scholars avoided claiming an 
independence movement, but interpreted that Nong Zhigao fought for the 
establishment of a local ethnic unified political power, and that his uprisings 
should be regarded as resistance against ethnic oppression and ‘its basic nature 
is anti-feudal’ (Pan 2010: 5).  
From the above historical debates, we can see the attempts of Zhuang 
Studies scholars to rewrite Zhuang history which “has been misinterpreted by 
centuries of Han historiography” (Kaup 2000). In line with Litzinger’s argument 
of Post-Socialist Historiography (2002), Zhuang intellectuals put their efforts 
towards publishing popular histories of the Zhuang, which often contained 
narratives of how the Zhuang’s antecedents had risen up against the ‘‘feudal’’ 
regimes of the past and advanced the social development of the group. 
In addition, the reform era has seen increased support for the collation of 
minority folk traditions and Ancient scripts. In 1984, a huge publication project 
was launched. Folk songs, folk stories, folk proverbs, folk ballads, local opera 
music, folk dance, and folk instrumental music of all nationalities were collected 
and compiled into the “10 Collections and Annals of Chinese/Folk Literature and 
Arts”. Ancient works of ethnic minorities were valued by the State Nationalities 
Affairs Commission as a part of China’s precious cultural heritage. All local 
governments were requested to provide manpower, financial, and material 
support for ancient works collation and research. (Zheng 2010: 102, 104)  
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Collecting ancient texts and documenting oral traditions became a major 
task in Guangxi. The Department of Guangxi Teachers College changed into the 
Folk Literature Research Institute. In 1985, Guangxi founded its own association 
of minority language and literatures. In the same year the Guangxi government 
renamed the Zhuang traditional songs fair - Sanyuesan Festival - as the “Guangxi 
Nationalities Art Festival”. As well, to foster minzu unity the government also 
began hosting a major multi-provincial “Minorities Sports Festival” which 
celebrates the traditional sporting events of each minzu group. (Kaup 2000: 101) 
Within this particular context, myth, ancient songs and prose tales about 
Buluotuo were collected, as well as Buluotuo ritual scriptures which were 
discovered. The discovery of the Buluotuo scriptures was of significant 
importance to the Zhuang Studies, which I discuss further below. 
3.2.1 Discovering Buluotuo Scriptures 
 
Inspired by the spirit of the May Fourth Folklore movement, the CCP 
and scholars determined that ‘the folk were oppressed by the ruling classes and 
their voices excised from the annals of official historiography’. Folksong and 
other folk genres, therefore, were perceived as the ‘Voices’ of the populace and 
minorities that were against Confucianism and the feudal state. (Lee 2005: 37-
39) Moreover, Mao viewed that collecting folklore and oral traditions before 
they die out served as a basis for the construction of a new, better socialist 
culture (Pieke 2005: 62).  During the 1950s and 1960s, scholars and cultural 
workers in Guangxi were assigned to collect the orally transmitted folklores 
and folksongs as well as the poetry and stories that had been written down and 
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preserved by Taoists, ritual masters, and vernacular priests, as part of a broader 
effort to study and document the literary culture of the common people.  
 On fieldwork visits to the countryside, cultural workers began hearing 
stories, prose tales and ‘ancient songs’(gu ge) about Buluotuo. He was 
regarded as an apical ancestor of the Zhuang and a well-known trickster figure. 
The exact meaning of ‘Buluotuo’ is far from enjoying academic consensus 
because his name is pronounced differently according to Zhuang sub-dialects, 
such as Bouq Luagh daeuz, Baeuq Loegdoh, Baeuq Roxdoh in Tianyang; and 
Bouslaoxdauz in Dejing dialect51. There are probably four meanings: 1) the 
mountains headman, 2) the elderly of the mountains, 3) birds’ leader, and 4), 
the omniscient and omnipotent elderly or ‘the old man who knew everything’ 
(Liu D. 2009).  
There are plenty of folk stories about Buluotuo in the Hongshui River 
region and the Youjiang River region in the western part of Guangxi. Among 
these stories, the most famous one is of how he outwitted his three brothers. 
According to the prose tales, Buluotuo had three elder brothers: the eldest was 
the King of Thunder; the second was the Serpent; the third was the Tiger; 
Buluotuo was the youngest brother. In order to divide their inheritance, they 
decided on a contest of their special powers by letting the three brothers stay 
inside a hut while each brother in turn would show his powers to frighten the 
others into surrendering. The three elder brothers had special powers and they 
agreed secretly that they would eat Buluotuo and seize his share of the 
inheritance. But Buluotuo used his wit and tricked the others by locking them 
                                                          
51 I quoted these three names written in Zhuangwen from Holm (2004) and from the song 
composed by Liao Hanbo. The Dejing Zhuang dialect area occupies three counties—Napo, 
Jingxi, and Debao Counties, all within the Baise Municipality (Zhang et al 1999).   
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in the hut and setting fire to it. The three brothers were scorched and blackened, 
but then they escaped separately. The King of Thunder fled to the sky，the 
Serpent fled to the sea, the Tiger fled to the forest. Hence Buluotuo became the 
king of the human realm. (Holm 2004: 20) 
Buluotuo was not treated as a god, but rather as an ancestral figure. 
Among the vernacular ritual masters, Buluotuo was worshipped before reciting 
the ritual scriptures but he was never depicted on sacred scrolls, unlike Chinese 
deities. Due to the limits on public discussion of religion, the materials 
transmitted by vernacular priests that related to Buluotuo were represented 
indirectly as folk songs and popular literature. A myth “Lutuo Gonggong52” 
was published in Literary History of Zhuang zu (1958) and in Guangxi Zhuang 
Literature (draft) in 1961. (see Lu 2012; Huang 2006; Shi 2006; Wei 2011) 
After the halt during the Cultural Revolution, academic works to collect 
minority folklores were resumed. In 1978 the Guangxi Folk Literature and Art 
Association collected folk songs “Calling Valley Soul”, “Calling cattle soul”, 
etc. from libretto and the ritual scripture of vernacular priests. In 1980 two 
more complete librettos were collected.  These materials were studies by 
several scholars in terms of folk literature and folk beliefs, for example, Liang 
Tingwang’s “the Study of Zhuang totem” (1982), Zhou Zuoqiu’s “On the 
Zhuang Creation Epic <Buluotuo>” (1984), Jiang Yongxing’s “Zhuang Holy 
Ancestors Worship” (1985), and Bao Luo Tuo in Ouyang et al.’s “Zhuang 
literary history” (1986). (See Shi 2006)  
                                                          
52 The word ‘Pu’ปู่  or ‘Pao’เป๊า in Zhuang is used to refer to a grandfather or an old man, 
therefore, it was translated into ‘gonggong’ in Chinese.  
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In the realm of academia, the discoveries of librettos and the ritual 
scriptures about Buluotuo, written in old Zhuang script, or sawndip (literally 
means “uncooked script”), were very exciting because the content of the texts 
seemed to be very ancient. Although it mentioned many deities influenced by 
Taoism or Buddhism, it apparently connected with the Zhuang indigenous 
religion. For this reason, the Guangxi Minority Ancient Manuscripts Editing 
Office determined the “Buluotuo Scriptures” as Guangxi Zhuang ancient books.   
After obtained approval from the Ethnic Affairs Commission in Beijing, 
the work of systematically collecting Buluotuo scriptures began in 1986. A 
coordinating group53 that included Yu Dajia, Qin Yaoting，Lan Hong'en，Lan 
Huaichang，and Nong Guanpin under the leadership of Zhang Shengzhen was 
set up (Holm 2004: 35). The group formulated a plan for the collection and 
publication of Buluotuo scriptures. Firstly, a large-scale survey and extensive 
collection of materials in Guangxi was launched from 1986 until 1988. The 
collection teams initially encountered considerable mistrust from villagers and 
religious practitioners who owned the scriptures because of severe harassment 
during the Mao regime. Finally, a total of 22 ritual scriptures were collected 
from the western highlands of Guangxi. (See Appendix 1 and Map 2) 
                                                          
53The full name of this group is ‘Leadership group with the program for arranging the 
publication of ancient books of ethnic minorities of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’ 
(translated by Bauer 2000).  
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Remark: Tianyang County is under Baise Municipality. Bama and Donglan 
counties are under Hechi Municipality. (Source of Map: Wikipedia.com) 
Mainly, the scriptures came from two quite different areas. One was 
located along the border between Bama and Tianyang counties in the eastern 
part of Baise. Tianyang is connected with Bama by a motor road over the 
mountains. The other area was located on the Hongshui River in the 
southeastern part of Donglan County. These two areas had marked differences 
in local dialect and ritual traditions. The scriptures of the Bama-Tianyang 
belong to Mogong or bumo in Zhuang, but those from Donglan belong to 
Shigong or busae in Zhuang. (Holm 2004) 
In general, these scriptures are written in the ‘old Zhuang script’, cast in 
an archaic form of five-syllable verse, and “The Three Realms were established 
by the Three Kings, The Four Realms were created by the Four Kings,” appear 
in the opening formula of each scripture. According to folkloric evidence, 
Map 2 - Location of Counties in Guangxi where discovered Buluotuo scriptures 
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Zhuang scholars interpreted that ‘the Four Kings’ refer to the King of Thunder, 
the Serpent, the Tiger and Buluotuo. The content of texts appeared to be 
connected with Buluotuo and Muliujia54, the apical ancestors of the Zhuang, as 
the phrase ‘they went to ask Baeu Rodo, they went to ask Mo Loekgyap. Baeu 
Rodo then spoke, Mo Loekgyap then said’ often appeared in the scriptures.  
In subsequence, these scriptures were inspected by a group of specialists 
in Nanning. Individual scholars were assigned to translate the scriptures which 
they themselves had collected. Preliminary translations of 22 scriptures were 
selected by the group for the next step of editing and translation. The old 
Zhuang scripts were transcribed line-by-line and word-by-word into 
Zhuangwen and into the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA), and translated 
into Chinese with ethnographic notes. (See figure 5)   
 
Figure 5 - The Buluotuo scriptures with an example of translation from the 1991 edition 
Finally, Buluotuo jingshi yizhu (The Buluotuo Scriptures – an Annotated 
Translation), edited by Mr Zhang, was published in 1991 within the parameters 
of a national-level five-year plan of collating the textual heritage of China’s 
national minorities. Thus, it was regarded as a party-approved expression of the 
                                                          
54 I quoted the English translation of scriptures from David Holm (2004). Holm uses “Baeu 
Rodo” and “Mo Loekgyap” in his English translation. In Bama area it calls Baulegdo, 
Molegjaap. Scholars suggested that they are husband and wife.  According to the myth, 
Muliujia is known as the mother of wisdom, the founding mother of mankind. 
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Zhuang’s ethnic cultural marker. This edition printed photographs of the 
original pages of scriptures that were derived from a large collection of 27 
ritual texts without any mention of where they had come from.  
The introduction of this edition still saw the rhetoric of Marxist historical 
materialism as the analysis framework, but it revealed more flexibility in the 
study of religion. Ritual practices like shamanism and divination were discussed 
under the general category of "sorcery" (wushu) and as “popular beliefs” 
(minjian xinyang).  Religious belief in many gods was secularized in portrayals 
that suggested its moral value as “folk-religious thought” and its eligibility for 
conservation as “folk customs”, as mentioned in the English abstract:  
The “Bu Luotuo Jing” is the great canon of scripture for the shaman 
religion of the Zhuang people. It contains a prelude, a creation account 
and treatises on ethics and religion… 
The treatise on ethics discusses the establishment of feudal lords and 
emperors, as well as the development of writing and the origins of the 
almanacs. It gives counsel on resolving the enmity between mothers-in-
law and daughters-in-law, between fathers and sons, and between 
mothers and daughters, and includes instructions for offering libations 
and for other rites. …  
The section on religion is a collection of Zhuang folk-religious 
thought and customs presented in the form of a sermon. The hardships 
and calamities commonly encountered in farming, hunting, warfare and 
daily life result from a failure to pray to the gods. Only by praying and 
fulfilling one’s vows can these be averted. The early Zhuang people 
believed in many gods. In the “Bu Luotuo Jing” the number of deities 
exceeds one hundred, and the variety of religious thought and practice 
represented there has developed into a great diversity of taboos and folk 
customs. [Emphasis added] (Zhang 1991: 39-40) 
In brief, Buluotuo myth in the scriptures is a cosmogonic myth that 
describes the origins of the world, how the earth and sky were separated at the 
beginning of the world. It is accompanied by a sequence of myths describing 
how human beings found water and learned to harness it, how fire was tamed, 
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how rice was domesticated, how domestic animals were first created. At the 
same time, the myths recounted how the earliest ancestors of the Zhuang, 
acting on the advice of Buluotuo, had established human institutions such as 
writing, chieftaincy, and family relations, and religious practices. Hence, 
scholars considered and interpreted Buluotuo as the cultural ancestor of the 
Zhuang Nationality, who “not only created everything, but also conquered the 
tough natural conditions and strong social forces with the Zhuang people who 
had become a civilized ethnic group”. (See Holm 2004) 
Interestingly, I found that the way that scholars address the importance 
of Buluotuo coincides with the ‘root-seeking’ (xungen) movement, which the 
Yellow Emperor had promoted again as the founding ancestor of Han Chinese 
civilization. (Benovitch 2001: 375-376) As mentioned earlier, the revival of 
tradition in the Post-Mao era is most obviously evident in the Confucian 
revival. In order to raise the modern nationalism sentiment of overseas Chinese 
(so that they come back to invest in the PRC), the myth of the Yellow Emperor 
as the historical ancestor of the Chinese people was again appropriated to bind 
Chinese together around the world.   
Thus, it is not surprising that the idea of the first ancestor and a 
harmonious society provided the groundwork for the Zhuang intellectuals to 
interpret Buluotuo as a progenitor of the Zhuang Nationality, who led the 
Zhuang people to become a civilized ethnic group. Zhuang Studies scholars 
were arguing that Buluotuo scriptures contained moralities and modes of 
behaviour consistent with the ideological demands of socialist modernization.  
Moreover, in response to the increased interest of international academia on 
Zhuang language and culture, the preface of this book was also translated into 
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three foreign languages - English, Japanese, and Thai.  I will further discuss 
this issue in the next section. 
After the 1991 publication, famous ethnologists such as Lin Yaohua, 
Song Shu-hua, and Chen Jin wrote several articles analysing the values of 
Buluotuo scriptures; for example, Lin Yaohua et al.’s “Encyclopedia” of 
Zhuang Traditional Culture ─ Reading <Buluotuo Scriptures Annotation> 
(1992) and many others. (See Shi 2006). In general, the Buluotuo scriptures 
were evaluated as precious literature which reflects the historical and socio-
cultural changes of the Zhuang. Scholars highlighted the taboos and morality in 
the scriptures and emphasized harmony in the relationship between humans 
and nature, man and society, and among family members, while discarding 
some supernatural aspects that did not match with modern society.  The 
publication of the Buluotuo scriptures was thus regarded as a source of great 
pride for Zhuang scholars and officials. Borrowing Holm’s words, it “served as 
a kind of historicised origin-myth for a newly-resurgent sense of Zhuang 
identity” (Holm 2004).  
As noted by Tapper (1989), ethnographers, historians, and political 
scientists have played a crucial role as “creators” and “manipulators” of 
identities. Zhuang studies scholars had to convert from a Marxist ethnology, 
which focused on social evolution and class struggles, to one of “staging to a 
nativist ethnography of ethnic assertion” (Harrell 2001). Since the 1980s we 
have seen that Zhuang intellectuals have been expressing their heritage through 
their publications. Zhuang scholars tried to write Zhuang culture and their 
long-glorious history back into the time and space of the Chinese nation.  
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 Nonetheless, decentralizing political and economic power within post-
Mao reforms allowed the emergence of social organizations that were 
relatively free from state control and made alternative political and cultural 
activities of state resistance feasible. Among various minority groups, we 
witnessed the emergence of associations with members from multi-minzu 
conducting academic meetings, exchange research experiences, and visiting 
other minority territories. For example, the China Southwest Minzu Research 
Association55, which includes members from 13 minzu groups from Sichuan, 
Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi (Zhang 2005); and the Guangxi 
Association of Minority Language and Literatures, which has conducted 
academic conferences and made visits to Yunnan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner 
Mongolia, and other minority communities. These associations have also been 
active in international exchanges. (Li & Huang 2004) These activities have 
contributed to an increased sense of ethno-nationalism within China. 
In the case of the Zhuang, as Kaup remarked, only weeks after the 
Tiananmen incident there was an article, co-authored by Qin Naichang, the 
director of the Guangxi Nationalities Research Institute, arguing that 
“economic and cultural inequalities still exist” and called on the Zhuang to 
“wake up” and “take charge of the leadership in Guangxi”. Only a few Zhuang 
activists argued for independence and summoned the resurgence of The 
Greater Tai Federation, while most of them were willing to accept state 
controls and the official depiction of their ethnic groups. What the Zhuang 
intellectuals and cadres demanded was for greater effective autonomy and 
control over their cultural identities. (Kaup 2000: 172)   




The 1990s saw an increase in grassroots activity among Zhuang elites. In 
1991, 270 Zhuang intellectuals and government officials in Guangxi announced 
the formation of the Zhuang Studies Association (Zhuangxuehui) – the first non-
governmental organization aiming “to promote the Zhuang culture, economics, 
and politics.” Mr Zhang has served as the honorary president of the Association 
and played a significant role to petition the Guangxi government for research and 
publication funds. Two year later the Yunnan Zhuang Studies Association was 
separately established, with more than 500 members (Kaup 2000: 2, 128).  
The year 1991 also marked the advent of re-establishing cross-border 
economic cooperation between China and Vietnam as a summit was held in 
Beijing which normalized bilateral relations (Hensengerth 2010: 65). During 
the same year, the Center for Zhuang Studies was established under the 
Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences (GASS) in Nanning. In 1991-1992 the 
Guangxi Research Institute conducted a frontier economic survey to prepare 
for the implementation of the border opening. 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited many provinces during his ‘Southern 
Tour’. After that, the Chinese government launched its frontier opening-up 
strategy, designating 13 open cities and 241 first-grade open ports, and 
establishing 14 border economic and technological cooperation zones, most of 
which are in ethnic autonomous areas. During the same year, the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) was formed and included Yunnan and Lao Cai 
provinces on the Sino-Vietnamese border (Hensengerth 2010). Since 1992, 
Guangxi has also signed a series of cooperation agreements with Thailand, 
Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia (Huang 2008: 318). 
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As a result, the Sino-Vietnam border areas became peaceful and more 
stable for international scholars to investigate the place of “Tai origin”. The 
following section demonstrates that the cultural awareness of the Zhuang was 
being heightened by foreign professional archaeologists, ethnologists, 
historians and linguists from Thailand and other countries like America, 
Australia, Japan, etc. This academic attention from foreign academia provided 
the Zhuang with a more positive attitude toward their own group and gave new 
meaning to Zhuang culture and their way to express their identity on a national 
and international level. 
3.2.2 In Search of Origin: the Discourse of Tai-Sibling 
As mentioned earlier, there are extraordinary amounts of linguistic, 
ethnological, archaeological and historical research about peoples subsumed 
under the rubric of “Tai.” International and Thai scholars have discussed 
theories about the place of “Tai origin”, most of which point to several areas in 
China. For instance, a prominent linguist, William J. Gedney, proposed a 
hypothesis that the area of greatest diversity of the Tai languages is the original 
homeland of the Tai peoples. In his influential article “Linguistic Diversity 
among Tai Dialects in Southern Kwangsi” (1966), he contended that:  
…the point of origin for the Thai languages and dialects in this country 
[i.e. Thailand] and indeed for all the languages and dialects of the Tai 
family, is … perhaps along the border between North Vietnam and 
Kwangsi or on one side or the other of this border. (p. 805) 
However, it is important to note that Gedney collected his data and 
arrived at his hypothesis when the circumstances of the Cold War prevented 
foreign scholars to do field research in the PRC.  
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In the meantime, when the communist party won the war, Chinese 
scholars who conducted research in the Lingnan area during World War II, like 
Li Fanggui/Li Fang Kuei and Xu Songshi/ Hsu Sung-shih (as mentioned in 
Chapter 2), emigrated to the U.S. and Hong Kong. Li Fang Kuei classified the 
Tai language family and pointed out that the Northern Zhuang dialects belong 
to the Northern Tai language and the Southern Zhuang dialects belong to the 
Central Tai. His theory of Tai language is widespread among linguist circles. 
By combining comparative language, place names and archaeology, Xu 
Songshi made the hypothesis that the peoples of Southeast Asia were all 
descendants from “the ancient inhabitants of the south of China” (Xu 1947:1 
qouted in Lary 1996). Furthermore, he continuously researched the Zhuang and 
the Thai. He was known as Princeton S. Hsu when he visited Thailand. Chin 
Yudee, a professor at Silpakorn University, met Princeton S. Hsu and was 
inspired by his papers. Chin translated Hsu’s two papers into Thai in 1968: 
“The Origin of the Chuang (Zhuang)” and “The Origin of Thai people”. Chin 
researched the bronze drum and conducted ethno-archaeological comparative 
studies of the bronze drum culture in various ethnic groups. He was venerated 
as the first Thai archaeologist who began to study ethnological data to search 
out “Tai origin”.  However, under the pressure of the Cold War, as well as due 
to American influence in Thailand, diplomatic connections to the PRC were 
discouraged. Chin just kept his research interests to himself, and then 
transmitted it to his students at Silpakorn University to further conduct research 
on the Zhuang whenever it was possible (Shoosongdej 2012). 
When the PRC launched its open-up policy, diplomatic relations between 
the PRC and Thailand were inaugurated. Deng Xiaoping was the first Chinese 
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leader to visit Thailand in November 1978. Consequently, Premier Zhao Ziyang 
visited Thailand in 1981, followed by President Li Xiannian in 1985, and 
Premier Li Peng in 1988 and 1990. 56  In this context, Thai linguists from 
Chulalongkorn University became the pioneering group of Thai scholars who 
were permitted to research in Guangxi. Pranee Kullavanijya is a former student 
of Li Fang Kuei. Moreover, influenced by Gedney’s theory of the Tai language 
origin, Pranee led a group to conduct a research project, “The Relationship 
between the Zhuang and the Thai” (1987-1990) in Guangxi. (Kullavanijya 1999) 
In a personal interview, Pranee recalled that when she asked for 
permission to conduct linguistic investigations in Guangxi, the government still 
had some suspicion about the pan-Tai movement but finally approved her 
project. At that time, travelling to rural areas in Guangxi was difficult because 
of poor infrastructure and transportation. Moreover, when the research team 
went to conduct fieldwork at villages, they were welcomed by local cadres and 
heads of the villages who gave long speeches of inviting foreign investment 
into their area. In retrospect, she felt a bit upset because the team had limited 
time to do their field work and they had to waste time for unrelated matters.      
Consequently, scholars from Khonkaen University, Payap University, 
Silpakorn University, Thammasat University and several other institutes went 
to Guangxi (see Fan 2004). In the 1990s there were a number of research 
projects investigating the roots of “Tai origin” by using multidisciplinary 
approaches like historical linguistics, anthropology, archaeology, folklore, and 
genetics, most of which were short-term surveys to the sites that scholars in 
Guangxi had suggested. Zhuang culture in several areas centres on the unlikely 
                                                          
56Retrieved from http://www.dailynews.co.th/royal/168180. 
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figure of the frog and rice cultivation. Thai scholars consider them as un-
Indianized peoples of Thai culture (Wongthes, S. 1994). As a result, the 
Zhuang have been seen as “the oldest of the Tai sibling groups” because the 
Zhuang are Tai-speaking people who were never penetrated by Indic language 
and religion (Vallibhotama & Wongthes 1993).  
Among these projects, Silpakorn University cooperated with the 
Guangxi Research Institute for Nationalities to conduct a multi-disciplinary 
research project on the comparison of the Thai and the Zhuang cultures from 
1992–2002. The topics studied were anthropology, archaeology, architecture, 
education, economics, social science, and languages (Phromsuthirak 2004). 
According to informal interviews with Zhuang scholars, it was the first time 
they had a chance to go overseas. There was an agreement that Silpakorn 
University would host accommodation and other research expenses when a 
team from Guangxi arrived to Thailand, and the Guangxi Research Institute for 
Nationalities hosted similarly for a Thai team. They needed translators to 
communicate with each other.  
In retrospect, Qin Shengmin recalled with a laugh that he felt uneasy at 
first when he came to Bangkok, because there was only one Taiwanese translator 
for a whole team and there were some difficulties in communication. During the 
meal, however, he recognized that he understood some Thai words that Thai 
scholars spoke, such as nang (to sit), khaau (rice), lao (alcohol), neu mou (pork), 
neu kai (chicken), etc. After that, the Zhuang scholars felt encouraged to speak 
Zhuang with the Thai scholars and they felt happier that they could communicate 
with each other within a particular set of vocabulary, such as the names of 
domestic animals like khwaai (buffalo), ped (duck), and ma (dog).  
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Using a comparative method, the research findings show some 
linguistic and cultural commonalities between the Thais and Zhuangs. For 
example, both the Thais and Zhuangs in Guangxi have the same methods in 
naming places57  after geographical characteristics of the places; settlements 
and occupations of the landowners; animals and plants commonly found in the 
regions; local legends or folktales; and beliefs (Kullavanijya 1996; 
Phromsuthirak 2004). As shown in Figure 6 the words of head nouns named 
after geographical characteristics of the Thai and the Zhuang are similar. 
Figure 6 - Head nouns commonly used by Thai and Zhuang people 
 
Source: Phromsuthirak 2004: 4 (Thai words added) 
As the Thai and Zhuang farmers were specialized in growing rice in 
irrigated fields, they lived primarily in the lowlands close to rivers and streams 
so that they could divert water into their rice fields. Hence, the traditional 
houses of the Thai and the Zhuang were similar. The Zhuang called the stilted 
houses made of wood or bamboo where people live on the second floor high 
above the ground, whereas the ground floor houses animals and equipment, as 
‘Ganlan’ house. The lan in ‘Ganlan’58 came from the proto-Tai word rɯan 
                                                          
57 However, place names in Zhuang gradually disappeared and were replaced with Chinese 
names, whereas Thai place names denoting geographical characteristics of the place were 
gradually replaced by Pali and Sanskrit words. 
58 From my observation, I think the gan in ‘ganlan’ means ‘ชาน’. In Thai we have the word ‘เรอืน
ชาน’ to refer to a house that has an outside space for drying agricultural products and clothes. 
114 
 
(house). This style of house is found today mainly in Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangdong and Guangxi, as well as in Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. 
(Edmondson 2007) Nonetheless, rituals associated with rice cultivation such as 
‘calling rice soul’ and ‘calling cattle soul’ are common in this region. 
Besides, another prominent shared culture is the traditional marriage 
custom. Recorded by the old Zhuang script, “欧贵” can be translated literally in 
Thai as ao-kheoy and means that a man/son-in-law often went to live 
with/serve his wife’s family. This custom reveals that marriages were free 
choices for the partners and traces back to the matriarchal society of the 
Zhuang before it was replaced by the patriarchal society of Chinese 
Confucianism. The result of this comparison between Thai and Zhuang 
cultures indicated many more elements of shared beliefs and of artistic styles, 
but it lies outside the focus of this chapter. The reports of this project were 
published in Thai language in 1996. Later in 2003, it was published as the five-
volume set of A Comprehensive Comparative Study on Zhuang and Thai 
Nationalities’ Traditional Culture in Chinese language..  
Generally speaking, linguists identified that sharing a basic agrarian 
vocabulary and naming tradition proved that the Thai and the Zhuang, who live 
far apart today and have little sense of commonality, must have lived together 
in times long ago. Scholars agreed that they are the descendants of Baiyue. 
Historical records indicate that the ancestors of Zhuang people settled in 
Guangxi more than 2500 years ago (e.g. Xu 1990). Moreover, Fan Honggui 
speculated about the time that the Thai and the Zhuang had separated by 
pointing out that Thai and Zhuang have the same exonym, kaew for 
Vietnamese. This word is taken from the early Chinese name Jiaozhi for the 
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Vietnamese territory under Chinese control about 112 BC. Therefore, the time 
of separation should be after this period (Fan 1989 quoted in Edmondson 2007).  
In conjunction with an increasing amount of archaeological evidence, 
scholars summarize that several centuries prior to Han Chinese expansion, the 
Tai settled in southern China and had developed centralized societies which were 
based on wet-rice cultivation, a stratified aristocratic society with special classes 
of artisans and warriors, as it can be seen that these people had made use of the 
bronze drum as an instrument of authority or worship and other artefacts. With 
the hypothesis of Tai language origin, the number of linguistics, historians and 
archaeologists conducting research in Guangxi have been increasing.    
More specifically, David Holm, an Australian scholar who first came to 
conduct research on folk dance and folk plays in China in 1982, was attracted 
by the 1991 publication of Buluotuo scriptures. In retrospect, he went to 
interview Zhang Shengzhen and Lan Hong’en in 1993 and then was entrusted 
to produce an international English edition of the Buluotuo jingshi. For him, it 
was not just a simple translation of the original Chinese glosses and notes into 
English, as Mr. Zhang expected. Since the scriptures were collected from 
different areas, they then belonged to different dialects and ritual traditions. To 
meet the standard of international academic work, Holm discussed with Mr. 
Zhang that he must select the scriptures from the same area and transcribe them 
based on that local dialect.  
In 1995, he also conducted field investigations at villages in Bama, 
Tianyang and Baise from which the scriptures were collected to explore the 
ritual aspects of the scriptures and to confirm the pronunciation and meaning of 
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each morpheme in the text. Nonetheless, he researched the history of the 
localities in which the scriptures were found and did cross-checking with other 
sources of information on Zhuang and comparative Tai lexicography. These 
meticulous processes took much longer than the period of the formal 
agreement he made with the Guangxi Province Office for Ancient Manuscripts.  
(See Preface of Holm 2004)  
Finally, Holm’s work entitled Recalling Lost Souls: the Baeu Rodo 
Scriptures, Tai Cosmogonic Texts from Guangxi in Southern China was 
published in 2004 by White Lotus, a publishing house in Thailand. In addition, 
he separately published the annotated translation of ritual scriptures collected 
from Donglan County because of the differences in local dialects and ritual 
traditions. His work Killing a Buffalo for the Ancestors: A Zhuang 
Cosmological Text from Southwest China was published in 2003 by the Center 
for Southeast Asian Studies of Northern Illinois University. Interestingly, these 
books addressed the commonalities of language and ritual traditions related to 
wet-rice cultivation between the Tai-speaking peoples in Southeast Asia and in 
the south of China. 
In summary, research collaboration with Thai academia and Western 
scholars created a body of literature focused on tracing the roots of “Tai origin”, 
which contributed to a new Zhuang ethno-consciousness. Zhuang scholars 
were conscious of being an integral part of an emerging transnational entity. 
These scholars strove to make sense of their newly opened-up world at a time 
when foreign interest in Zhuang culture and history was growing. They were in 
the novel position of defining what it meant to be Zhuang. Zhuang studies are 
moving towards recognition of much more extensive relations with the Tai than 
117 
 
in the past. Therefore, borrowing Keyes’ term, the Zhuang are no longer only a 
minzu within the borders of China; they are also a Tai people with transborder 
connections to other Tai peoples in Southeast Asia (Keyes 2002: 1188-9). 
As Li (1999) summarized, Zhuang Studies in the reform era have been 
moving toward institutionalization and internationalization. Scholars of Zhuang 
Studies in the reform era “shoulder great responsibilities in building the 
Zhuang’s own cultural consciousness, where there remains a long way to go”, 
and at the same time, “shoulder a heavy responsibility of using research of 
Zhuang ethnicity as a bridge to deepen the mutual understanding between the 
ethnic Zhuang people and other Southeast Asian ethnicities, as well as to 
propel the opening up of Guangxi” (p. 57). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the discourse of cultural roots and cultural commonality between the Zhuang 
and other Tais in Southeast Asia is deployed to serve the promotion of the 
Buluotuo Cultural Tourism Festival, which is the subject of the next section.  
3.3 The Development of “Buluotuo Culture”  
 
What is “Buluotuo Culture”? It is a new term invented in 2002 for the 
purpose of economic and tourism development, encouraged by the policy of 
“promoting economic development on the cultural stage”. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1991 publication of Buluotuo scripture was 
regarded as a source of great pride for Zhuang intellectuals. It embodied the 
endeavour of Zhuang scholars in searching for Zhuang “cultural uniqueness”, 
and Buluotuo was recognized as the apical ancestor and God of creation of the 
Zhuang Nationality. Continuously, there were a large number of articles 
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analyzing the cultural implications and philosophical values of the Buluotuo 
scriptures, such as harmonious and peaceful relations between humans and 
nature, humans and society. The ritual practices and the owners of these ritual 
scriptures have largely been neglected and marginalized in most academic 
works. In other words, Buluotuo was scholarly represented as the origin of 
Zhuang ethnic roots in order to enhance the Zhuang’s self-pride, without any 
purpose to commercialize it. 
 From informal interviews, Xie Shouqiu (henceforth Mr. Xie) - the 
former deputy editor of Nanning Daily told me that he himself initiated a drive 
to search for the Buluotuo site. In March 2000, he began to interview Pan Qixu 
and Zhao Minglong from the Center for Zhuang Studies, GASS and other 
experts on this issue. Some scholars said that it might be the old Zhuang temple 
in Nanning which had been destroyed two decades previously. But the 
archaeological discovery of more than 50 Paleolithic sites with several 
thousand stone tools in the Bose basin convinced him that the Buluotuo site 
should be in this area of ancient civilization. Anyway, where the Buluotuo site 
is exactly located remains unknown and a mystery. 
Probably, curiosity about the Buluotuo site was in the minds of urban-
based Zhuang intellectual elites. In June 2002 Gudi59, a famous Guangxi artist 
who composed songs for the most popular minority films Liu sanjie in 1960, 
went to Tianyang to judge the folk song contest and heard about a folk tradition 
of paying homage to ancestors at the Zugong and Muniang shrines on the 
                                                          
59 Gudi is the penname of Shi Xuegui. “Gu” in Zhuang means “I” and “Di” in Zhuang means 
“a man”. It means กูลูกผูช้าย in Thai. Gudi was a Zhuang nationalism writer who grew up 
personally experiencing the People's Liberation War in Guangxi. He was familiar with Zhuang 




mountain and the local legends of Buluotuo from Huang Mingbiao – the 
Director of Tianyang Museum. Regarding one Buluotuo epic that he heard 
since he was young, it said that Buluotuo had his home in Andong. In history, 
Tianzhou Town, where Tianyang is now located, was called Anxu. Then, he 
came up with the idea that this mountain was the former home of Buluotuo. 
After he came back to Nanning, Gudi met Peng Yang – Dean of the 
Nanning International Folk Song Arts Institute. Mr. Xie and Nong Chao of the 
Nanning Daily told them his supposition of Buluotuo’s ancient home. They 
discussed the possibility and decided to go to Tianyang to find more evidence. 
Mr. Xie also invited Youjiang daily newspaper to send reporters to go to 
Tianyang and interview them together.  
On July 6, the expedition went to Tianyang and interviewed the elders 
living near the mountain referred to in Buluotuo legends, Song Fair activities 
and ritual activities. At that time, the mountain was officially known as Chun 
Xiao Yan (Spring down mountain) but local people call it ‘gamj’ (cave) in the 
Zhuang language. Huang Mingbiao thus proposed to call it ‘Ganzhuang’ (Gan 
imitates ‘gamj’). Traditionally, on the 19th of the second lunar month local 
people went to three big caves on the mountain to worship their ancestors and 
deities. It also said that from the seventh to the ninth day of the third lunar 
month, tens of thousands of people from a dozen counties would participate in 
a singing festival on the mountain. Moreover, there are plenty of legends 
relating Buluotuo with many of the surrounded village names.  
After that, Mr. Xie came back to do more documentary research. A lot 
of archaeological evidence that Youjiang Basin was the center of ancient 
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human and rice cultivation coincides with the ancestor worship at the cave, 
local legends and the largest song fair in Tianyang, which made him confirm 
that this mountain is the Buluotuo ruins. After a discussion with Peng Yang 
and Nong Chao about the title, Mr. Xie and Nong Chao wrote the editorial 
message “The primogenitor of Zhuang nationality site found in Tianyang. 
Experts say could reveal the source of the eternal mystery of Zhuang 
Nationality” in Nanning daily newspaper on July 13. It reported that a famous 
Zhuang artist Gudi discovered the home of the Zhuang ancestor Buluotuo. Its 
ruin is at the Zugong miao on the “Ganzhuang” mountain in Tianyang County 
of Baise Municipality. Regarding one Buluotuo epic, it said that “ancestor’s 
home is in Andong”. In history, Tianzhou Town, where Tianyang now is, was 
called Anxu. Gudi then interpreted that Andong referred to the Ganzhuang 
Mountain in Tianyang that is located to the east of Anxu. 
Later, he sent this news to three main media outlets in Guangxi but they 
reacted coolly. He then sent the news to the mainstream national media and 
websites, and unexpectedly attracted a strong response: The People's website 
published this news (see Figure 7), followed by People's Daily and South 
China News on July 31. The Central People's Broadcasting Station, CCTV, and 
Guangxi people’s Broadcasting Station broadcasted the same message. In 
August 2002, this news was forwarded by the People's Daily to others major 
news websites in China and abroad. Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and many 
overseas Chinese newspapers and websites also reproduced the news that the 
site of the first Ancestor of the Zhuang was found in Tianyang. 
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 Figure 7 - The news published by People’s website and the People's Daily 
Widespread acknowledgment of this news successfully aroused strong 
repercussions at home. On August 8, in order to obtain academic and 
journalistic recognition, the Tianyang Party Committee, county government 
and the Nanning International Folk Song Arts Institute (henceforth Nanning 
Arts Institute) invited famous experts and scholars to discuss and investigate 
the Tianyang Buluotuo site. Reporters from Xinhua News Agency, Guangxi 
Daily, Guangxi Television and other news media were also invited. 
In this seminar, Gudi made a speech that aroused Zhuang ethno-
nationalist sentiment. The issues of Zhuang ethnic roots and the lack of self-
pride among the Zhuang were addressed and caught academic and media 
attention. As he mentioned: 
It has long been discovered that the three major rivers, including the 
Yellow River and Yangtze River were cradles of civilizations to the 
ancient Yellow Emperor and Yan Emperor; with the Yellow Emperor’s 
origin tracing back to the Loess Plateau of Northern Shaanxi Plateau. 
However, the vibrant Pearl River, which is the third major river of China, 
was not home to any great king or emperor. Is this not surprising? The 
Pearl River is also home to our millions of countrymen and thus there 
should be an origin to all these people. Who might this great ancestor be? 
It is none other than Buluotuo. Today I have finally found the origin of 
the people who live on both sides of the Pearl River. Buluotuo is not only 
the origin of Tianyang, nor the Zhuang; it is also the origin of all the 
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people of Baiyue. Bearing this in mind, is this not a matter of great 
historical significance? 
I knew Buluotuo when I was eight or nine years old. ... Buluotuo is the 
father of Zhuang nationality. I think that anyone all have the parents, 
water has source, tree has roots,... 
In the past, many of Guangxi people believed that their ancestors are not 
indigenous people. If asked “where are you from?”, (they would say) 
from Shandong province Baima county;  or from Guangdong province 
Chaoshan county, …  Oh our descendants of Buluotuo, why do you 
look down upon yourselves? And why do you hate your homeland? I 
don’t think this is right! (Gudi’s speech on 08/08/2002) (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, by combining the evidence of the folk traditions performing 
at the mountain (ancestor worship at Muniang (Mother's) Rock and Zugong 
(Ancestor's) Temple, the singing festival, a variety of Buluotuo legends) with 
archaeological evidence, Gudi strongly believed that the former residence of this 
Zhuang ancestor was at Ganzhuang Mountain in Tianyang County. But he 
himself invited the experts and scholars to further debate his assumption. 
The general feedback from scholars was that it was impossible to 
accurately determine the birthplace of Buluotuo because he is a legendary 
figure, not a real person who once lived somewhere. Buluotuo is only a 
personified concept.  Therefore, scholars suggested that the research should not 
focus on where Buluotuo exactly lived, but instead, the research should ‘keep 
his mythical coloring’ and study where Zhuang culture originated (Li Jinhui, 
September 11, 2002).   
Consequently, the Tianyang committee and government took overt 
steps to gain more national academic authentication to develop the Buluotuo 
cultural tourism site. Experts and scholars from several institutions in Guangxi 
and Beijing were invited to Tianyang to discuss and investigate on-site. After 
holding a series of seminars and on-site investigations, there still were many 
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controversial opinions. But all scholars agreed that Mt. Ganzhuang in Tianyang 
County was an important memorial place of Buluotuo and Muliujia, the 
Zhuang’s ancestors. Some main reasons are that among 28 epics of the 
Buluotuo Scripture, 14 were discovered in Tianyang. The other 14 were found 
in neighboring counties. Moreover, Tianyang County was built in 140 B.C. and 
it is the oldest county in the Baise Prefecture. The song fair here was recorded 
as the largest song fair in Guangxi. The cult to venerate Buluotuo and Muliujia 
by singing and burning incense is widespread. Therefore, it should be studied 
as a kind of culture.  
In addition to the cultural perspective, archaeologists have found many 
ancient human sites in the Bose basin, one of these is at the nearby Tianyang 
Ganzhuang Mountain. Stone tools at this site “exhibited symbols of lightning 
and frogs, confirming shamanistic worship of weather deities and amphibians”. 
This archaeological evidence indicates that at about 5000 BP the Zhuang 
predecessors were transitioning from hunter-gather societies to agrarian ones 
(Edmondson 2007). In 2000, the U.S.-based Science magazine published a 
cover story that the geological age of the paleontological ruins of the Bose 
Basin dates back 803,000 years, which supports the idea that the Youjiang 
Basin in this area is the birthplace of ancient Zhuang civilization (china.org.cn 
by Li Jinhui, September 11, 2002).  
As a result, this scholarly narrative was achieving a new public voice in 
the mainstream news media. Xinhua News Agency, Guangxi Daily, Guangxi 
Television, Modern Life Daily, South China Morning Post, Guangxi National 
newspaper, Guangxi Literary newspaper, Nanning daily, Bagui Metropolis, 
Youjiang daily newspaper, Baise television and other news media have 
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reported this breakthrough news in a variety of titles such as “Living Place of 
Zhuang Ancestor Found”, “Origin of China’s Largest Ethnic Minority Found”, 
“Looking for Zhuang Cultural Roots”, and many others.   
In the 21st century, ethnic customs and folk cultural heritage have 
become an invaluable resource for tourism. The China National Tourism 
Administration has encouraged the development of tourism with distinctive 
folk customs in the west provinces and autonomous regions because it can help 
not only the popularization of various ethnic cultures, but also the economic 
development of these western regions.60 Many cultural activities are developed 
into products and are commercialized. The traditional song fair, which is 
regarded as a prominent Zhuang identity marker, was turned into an economic 
booster. Nanning Arts Institute has a major role in holding the “Guangxi 
International Folksong Festival” and forging a commercial chain and 
developing a series of cultural products (Zheng 2010: 111). Enthusiasm for 
promoting the Buluotuo site initiated by artists, journalists and the Dean of the 
Nanning Arts Institute seems to be compatible with the Tianyang government’s 
attempt to develop new cultural products for tourism. 
In a personal interview, Luo Hantian, a Tianyang native and researcher 
for CASS in Beijing, told me that in 2000 Baise City planned to build itself up 
as a cultural city, it thus called on every county under its administration61 to 
have their own cultural projects. At that time, there were only two counties – 
Tianyang and Debao - that did not have cultural projects. Tianyang County was 
                                                          
60 “West China boosts tourism featuring ethnic culture” (2001-11-12) retrieved from 
peopledaily.com.cn 
61 Baise has one district (Youjiang) and 10 counties (Tianyang, Tiandong, Pingguo, Debao, 
Jingxi, Napo, Lingyun, Leye, Xilin, Tianlin) and one ethnic autonomous county (Longlin 
Various Nationalities Autonomous County). 
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trying to explore the characteristics and culture of the county, and Gudi’s 
discovery of Gan Zhuangshan in 2002 unexpectedly contributed to complete 
the Tianyang objective.  
In August 2002, the Tianyang government and Nanning Arts Institute 
launched a draft plan for the development of Baise Tianyang Buluotuo cultural 
site protection. The development principle is to construct Mt. Ganzhuang as the 
sacred land of the Zhuang, and as the ecological and cultural base of the 
Zhuang.62 There will be activities of ancestor worship, a song fair, and cultural 
shows. Nanning Arts Institute proposed to produce two music CDs: “Buluotuo 
ancient songs” and “Zhuang ancestors’ songs”, by using Buluotuo scriptures 
and legends as raw material in composing 16 new songs. 
In February 2003, a group of experts from the Guangxi Zhuang Study 
Association went to Tianyang to do ethnological field research on Buluotuo 
and its relationship with Mt. Ganzhuang. They observed the actual ceremony 
of ancestor worship and the song festival at Mt. Ganzhuang and witnessed that 
more than a hundred thousand local people actively participated in these 
activities. Qin Naichang was the first person who proposed the term “Buluotuo 
cultural system”. In his article, Buluotuo Culture is a system which includes 
Buluotuo mythology, Buluotuo epics, religious culture, ancestor worship 
culture, and the folk song fair culture of the Zhuang People. It has a rich 
connotation, important historical value, cultural and academic value (Lu 2012). 
Scholars agree that Buluotuo culture can be developed into the local 
tourist economy with Zhuang cultural characteristics. The site should be 




positioned as a sacred mountain and the spiritual homeland of the Zhuang 
people in order to show that the Zhuang have a long history, significant 
characteristics of rice culture, the culture of the song fair, pilgrimages, and a 
mysterious culture. Moreover, some have suggested that it can also be 
promoted as a famous brand via the China-ASEAN exposition to bridge 
international cultural exchange and cooperation, because Guangxi is being 
pushed by the Central Government to become a base and port for connecting 
southwest China with Southeast Asia countries. 
Accordingly, local state agencies began to reconstruct the Buluotuo 
cultural site and promoted it by using a new discourse on Zhuang culture and 
regional (Southeast Asian) identity. The Tianyang Buluotuo Travel 
Development Co., Ltd. was established to manage the Development of the 
Tianyang Ganzhuang Mountain Buluotuo Tourism Area project. It mentioned 
in the website that the Ganzhaung Mountain Buluotuo Tourism Area to be 
constructed is expected to become “the sacred land of people of Zhuang 
nationality in Southwest China and Southeast Asia”.63 
The doctrine of Buluotuo cultural tourism was gradually elaborated and 
propagated by a series of surveys and academic seminars. It has led to a new 
annual state-sponsored Buluotuo Cultural Festival on the 7th to 9th days of the 
third lunar month at Mt. Ganzhuang, held by the local government of Tianyang 
County since 2004. Moreover, it came to an agreement that an academic 
conference on Buluotuo Culture will be held annually, paralleling the Buluotuo 
                                                          




Cultural Festival, by the Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association with financial 
support from Baise Municipal People's and Tianyang County’s governments.  
According to Qin Shengmin, Mr. Zhang is a visionary who foresaw that 
the Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association should step in and take this 
opportunity to request financial support for conducting research on Buluotuo. 
He also grasped the fact that the public paid attention to news about Buluotuo, 
and saw the chance to publish a new edition of Buluotuo scriptures. In 2004 a 
total eight-volumes of Zhuangzu mojīng buluotuo yingyin yizhu (Buluotuo Mo 
Jing of the Zhuang - photocopy Annotation) was published. This edition 
presented the whole 28 scriptures and provided information of the transcribers, 
collectors, and locations where they had come from (see Appendix 1).  
What is particularly interesting in the 2004 edition is the introduction 
part. It delineated the historical origins and development of the Zhuang, 
cultural patterns and characteristics of Zhuang before receiving Chinese 
influences. By emphasizing “Na” (rice paddy field) culture as the core culture, 
the author linked together the Ganlan house style, bronze drum culture, ancient 
cliff mural, Buluotuo cultural myth, Mo religion, antiphonal singing tradition, 
and Zhuang herbal medicine. “Na” or rice culture was addressed to link the 
Zhuang with the wet-rice agricultural civilization of the Chinese Kingdom and 
of other Tai states in Southeast Asia. In other words, it became a collection of 
knowledge about the past Zhuang predecessor communities which highlighted 
the Baiyue as the same root of the Tai and the Zhuang.  
The year 2004 also marked the beginning of a new era in China-
ASEAN relations. In an attempt to develop a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 
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(CAFTA) Agreement, Nanning became the host city for the China-ASEAN 
Expo (CAEXPO) from 2004 onwards. In the same year, “Forum on Building 
CAFTA and the Development of Zhuang-Tai Ethnic Groups” was also held in 
Nanning. Since then, government officials, youth and intellectuals have been 
encouraged to “strengthen ASEAN-China understanding and cooperation” and 
“to enhance people-to-people exchanges and promote public awareness”. 
Riding the tide, the Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association convened the 
2005 international seminar on Buluotuo culture under the joint aegis of the 
Baise and Tianyang Governor and invited 26 foreign scholars from the UK, 
USA, Japan, Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the Czech Republic and other 
countries and more than 120 domestic scholars. The 2004 edition of 
Bulutuotuo scripture was publicized to both national and international 
interlocutors. Zhuang intellectuals expressed their concern to preserve their 
vanished past, rendering the Zhuang ‘knowable’ to themselves as well as to 
others, and opposing the orthodox narrative of the largest and most Sinicized 
minzu. 
In 2006, the State Department of China listed Buluotuo culture as the 
Zhuang’s intangible cultural heritage at the national level. The traditional festival 
of the Zhuang minority at Mt Ganzhuang was selected as the opening program of 
Chinese Legendary Festivals, a new program on Channel IV of CCTV. Buluotuo 
Culture became the Zhuang’s identity marker to show that they are a group that 
has distinctive characteristics within the Chinese multi-ethnic nation. They can 
publicly present a new narrative about their ethnic identity in the larger public 
sphere. To some extent Zhuang intellectuals succeeded in expressing their ethnic 
pride and their place in the ethnic politics of modern China. 
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
My purpose of this chapter is not to assess the veracity of the 
construction of Buluotuo cultural tourism, the issue I am addressing is the 
agency of Zhuang ethnic actors in constructing, defining, and representing their 
own ethnic identity. Zhuang intellectuals advocated participating in 
maintaining their language, promoting education, and articulating pride in their 
history and cultural identity. Some Zhuang individuals like Huang Xianfan, 
Mr.Zhang, and Gudi - whose lives passed through the period of Japan’s 
invasion, the revolutionary struggle, the emergence of a new socialist nation-
state, the Cultural Revolution, to the post-Mao era - were not merely shaped by 
these situations and contexts, but they actively played a role in constructing or 
redefining their group identity in the cultural politics of the PRC.  
As Brass (1985) suggested, the intellectual is the one who articulates 
grievances, formulates nationalistic sentiments, and translates popular belief 
into a coherent ideology, and it is the same person who plays a role in 
mediating ethnic and economic concerns between their group and the state. 
While Zhuang intellectuals feel the need to speak out against the widening gaps 
in wealth and social power between the Han and Zhuang, they are much more 
likely to benefit from fuller integration into the state than greater separation 
from it. Their ethno-nationalist movements appear in the negotiations for 
greater effective autonomy and control over their cultural identities in the 
mainstream representation.  
With a strong belief in the righteousness of promoting multicultural 
unity, Zhuang studies scholars have devotedly researched Zhuang language, 
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folklore, history and traditional culture with the main aim to render the Zhuang 
to know themselves and have pride to be classified as the “Zhuang Nationality”. 
But their efforts to bolster the Zhuang’s self-pride through state-sponsored 
publications seems not to be shared by the rest of the Zhuang community. 
According to the 1990 census, the majority of Zhuang were living in the 
countryside under the poverty line. The disparities of economic development in 
post-Mao China have marginalized their ethnicity. Many Zhuang viewed that 
their poverty was the result of their ethnicity and Zhuang language and social 
customs could not help their children to escape from poverty. Most Zhuang-
Chinese bilingual instruction had been terminated (Kaup 2000: 34). 
In line with the ‘root-seeking’ movement in which minority cultures are 
a part of China’s cultural heritage, the Buluotuo scriptures which survived 
destruction were discovered and promoted as a Zhuang cultural heritage. 
Buluotuo myth - a cosmogonic myth that describes the beginnings of the world 
and is accompanied by a sequence of myths that recount the origin of rice, fire, 
animals and human institutions – is interpreted to be a precious literature which 
reflects the historical and socio-cultural changes of the Zhuang. Buluotuo 
became the “first ancestor of the Zhuang Nationality” who “conquered the 
tough natural conditions and strong social forces” and led the Zhuang people to 
become “a civilized ethnic group”.   
However, it must be noted that Zhuang intellectuals and even the 
Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association, which is a non-governmental 
organization, are not state-independent agents because their activities like 
researching, publishing and holding conferences mostly rely on state 
sponsorship. The re-establishment of connections with foreign researchers have 
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provided an alternative source of research opportunities. The conjunction of 
international academic interest to search for the root of “Tai origin” and local 
academic research to uncover a long glorious Zhuang predecessor has partaken 
in creating a body of knowledge about shared linguistic and cultural 
commonalities between the Tai-speaking peoples in Southeast Asia and minority 
groups in the south China. It hence has contributed to shape a new Zhuang 
ethno-consciousness and new position of defining what it means to be Zhuang.  
The unexpected emergence of the Buluotuo Cultural Tourism Festival 
at Mt. Ganzhuang   showcases how some Zhuang individuals today are 
achieving a new public voice and are actively participating in the construction 
and reconstruction of Zhuang identity in the larger public sphere. The Buluotuo 
myth deals with the origins of rice seeds and development of rice farming and 
is linked to the archaeological findings of Palaeolithic stone tools in the Baise 
area. Buluotuo is then reinterpreted as the ancestor of Baiyue life in the Pearl 
River basin, acquiring the same status ash Huang Di and Yan Di.  
Buluotuo myth, ancestor worship rituals and folksong festivals were 
repackaged as ‘Buluotuo Culture’ – a new cultural brand of Tianyang County. 
Once it had become a tourist asset, the Zhuang intellectuals resolved to 
preserve and promote Buluotuo culture, while taking advantage of its economic 
importance in order to obtain full recognition of their ethnic identity from the 
state and to improve their position within China. It is an on-going process of 
articulating and promoting particular versions of Zhuang identity by academics 
and state authorities in the Buluotuo Cultural tourism festival. The cultural 
images and meanings of Zhuang identity are embedded and embodied in the 
Buluotuo Cultural festival.  
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As several scholars (e.g., Bai 2007, Harrell 2001, Litzinger 2000, 
Schein 2000)  have pointed out, tourism provides an arena where intellectuals 
and ordinary people have a chance to manipulate forms of ethnicity, to 
capitalize on their traditional heritage, and to dispel the aura of ‘backwardness’ 
that stigmatized the perception of their ethnicity inside and outside China. 
Similar to Bali’s case in Indonesia, Buluotuo Culture is “the outcome of a 
process of semantic borrowings and of conceptual reframings” in response to 
the root-seeking movements and socialist modernization and the touristification 
of the PRC (Picard 1997: 185). I argue that the drive to publicize and promote 
Buluotuo culture as the Zhuang’s ethnic identity and its achievement to be 
listed as the first Zhuang Intangible Cultural Heritage at the national level is 
serving to enhance Zhuang’s status and prestige in the eyes of others, 
especially those of the central government. It contributes to bolster the 
Zhuang’s own sense of pride and to some extent fulfils the quest for making 
the ‘Self’ of Zhuang scholarship.  
Tourist developments at Mt. Ganzhuang have turned a local pilgrimage 
and folk song festival into the state-sponsored Buluotuo Cultural Festival - a 
means to serve its politics and economic development. Notwithstanding, this 
tourist site has turned into a contested domain.  Although state intervention and 
its new discourses have somehow undermined the sacredness of the place and 
silenced the sacred nature of the festival, local religious meanings still continue 
to flourish alongside a secularized and commoditized celebration of the 
Buluotuo Cultural festival. In this continuing process of place-making, elite 
groups play a leading role in redefining the meaning of place, but the process is 
not all one-sided, and ordinary people are equally important in reinforcing 
133 
 
these boundaries by emphasizing differences. For their part local communities 
are not passive, and often seize upon tourism as a means of communication in 
order to display their existence and obtain benefits. Negotiation and resistance 
at the local level to claim their sacred place for the worship of their deities will 















Buluotuo Cultural Festival as Contested Domain 
In the previous chapter I highlighted the agency of Zhuang intellectuals 
in the production of discourses of Buluuotuo Culture within the thriving ethnic 
cultural tourism of the 21st century. This chapter focuses on the processes of 
place-making in Tianyang County, in which the authorities and scholars use the 
theme of Zhuang cultural identity to add value to their ‘place-product’. The 
exegesis of Buluotuo myths has been appropriated by Zhuang Studies scholars 
to authenticate the development of the geographical periphery of Mt. 
Ganzhuang into a significant “memorial place of Buluotuo Zhuang ancestors”.  
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) point out that there are the interrelations of 
culture, power, and place. By focusing on the social and political processes of 
place-making in Tianyang, it’s revealed that identity and alterity are produced 
simultaneously. This is premised on various forms of exclusion and 
constructions of otherness. Starting in 2002, the authorities took overt steps to 
transform the physical setting and socio-cultural meaning of Mt. Ganzhuang, 
which is regarded by the local folk as their sacred place for pilgrimage. 
Reframing religious sites as tourism destinations allows the local authorities to 
reconfigure a local popular belief with questionable “superstitious” attributes, 
into a “local custom” with cultural and historical value (Brook 2009: 16).   
The concept of a “politics of ritual displacement” can also be used to 
describe the contestation for worship space at Mt. Ganzhuang. The 
transformation of the local culture and the relationships between state, religious 
devotees and commercial actors in the process of constructing the “sacred land 
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of the Zhuang” presents an opportunity to unpack the ways by which folk 
religion is negotiated in Tianyang. Religious practices can endure suppression, 
lie dormant for a long time, go underground, be minimalized, and re-emerge in 
new forms in response to new historical conditions, as we will see in the case 
of worship traditions at Mt. Ganzhuang and other sites in Tianyang. The main 
argument in this chapter is that as ritual spaces such as worship sites (caves, 
temples and shrines on the mountain) become the vehicles of local memory 
that restore to local communities a sense of place marked by the singularity of 
their history and their ritual traditions, villagers continue contesting to get their 
sacred spaces recognized. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section is concerned 
with the correlation between place and memories. It provides background 
information on the geography and administration of Tianyang County and the 
shifting historical narrative of Mt. Ganzhuang. Because differences in local 
religious conditions contributed to the varying effects of religious policies and 
repression, this section also provides a brief sketch of local religious conditions 
in Tianyang prior to the year 2002. 
The second section presents the main findings from my ethnographic 
fieldwork. It illustrates how tourism development of the Buluotuo Cultural 
Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang has situated contexts for the negotiation and public 
display of its meaning. It also demonstrates that, far from being passive, ritual 
masters, villagers and devotees, of whom women form a majority, -in the 
vicinity of Tianyang are “cultural strategists” and, to some degree, have the 
capacity to re-negotiate power relations by contesting their ritual spaces and 
insisting on their particular versions of narratives and memories of Mt. Ganzhuang. 
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Ethnographic research reveals that the struggles of marginalized peoples are 
complex and involve a plurality of actors and multiplicity of practices. 
4.1 Setting the context: Places and Memories 
Baise is located in the north-western part of the GZAR, which consists 
of Napo and Jingxi counties bordering with Vietnam for 360 km. 
Geographically, Baise is a typical mountainous area, with hilly terrain 
occupying 95.4% (30.4% as rock hills and 65% as earth hills) of the total area. 
With a limited area of cultivated land, it is recognized by the State Council as 
an “old revolutionary, minority, border, mountain and poverty” area. (ADB 
Report; Shih 2008) Tianyang County is a county under the administration of 
Baise Municipality. 
4.1.1 Locating Tianyang 
In Tianyang County, the Zhuang reportedly account for 90.2% of the 
total county population of 338,300 (2010 census). Covering an area of 2,394 
km², there are ten subdivisions under Tianyang’s Jurisdiction which are 
comprised of seven towns (zhen): Tianzhou, Baiyu, Toutang, Napo, Naman, 
Pohong, and Yufeng, and three townships (xiang): Dongjin, Babie, and Wucun. 
Tianyang is a predominantly agricultural county. 
As can be seen from Map 3, Youjiang (Right River) runs through the 
middle of the county, which makes a flat river basin, while the west and east 
parts of the County are all mountainous areas. The Tianyang government and 
administrative units are located in the city bed of Tianzhou Town. 
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Map 3: Geography of Tianyang County 
 
Historically, the area of present Tianyang County had been governed by 
tusi or a native chieftaincy since the Song dynasty.  According to early Chinese 
sources, “the hills [in Tianzhou] are flat and the land is open” and it was 
densely populated with (“exceeds a hundred”) market places.  Although the 
imperial state desired to take direct control over this region, their soldiers could 
not endure the climate and terrain with subtropical jungle in the Southern 
borderlands. The Chinese imperial state hence relied on native soldiers to fight 
its wars (Shin 2006: 84-85, 99).  The Zhuang troops, called tubing (local 
soldiers) or langbing (soldiers of the lang people), were ferocious fighters and 
played a very important role in China’s border defences. During the Ming 
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dynasty the tubing army of Madame Wa64 (Washi furen) from Tianzhou was 
well-known in its battles against Japanese pirates. 
During the Ming and Qing dynasties the imperial court launched 
several campaigns to civilize the non-Chinese people, including the 
establishment of schools and the standardization of rituals and ceremonies. 
Zhuang chieftains and members of their domain did acquire at least a basic 
level of cultural literacy. Territorial sacrifice was integrated into the 
administrative control of the state, which required the local community to 
swear under oath at the god’s shrine that its members would abide by the law 
(Zhao 2002: 41-42). But it was not successful, in the nineteenth century there 
were several hundred Zhuang and Yao rebellions (Scott 2009). The Zhuang 
also played an active role in the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s. 
One of the main areas of conflict was the Youjiang valley because it 
was the main route of transiting opium from Yunnan to Baise. The relentless 
pressures of natural calamity and the violent fights between warlords to control 
territory and opium-taxation forced the Zhuang peasants living in extreme 
poverty to organize self-protection associations and to encompass resistance to 
local landlords and officials. The Zhuang area near Baise (Bose) was one of the 
earliest soviets in the 1920s. (See Barlow; Lary 1972) 
Tianyang was one of the main locations of Youjiang revolutionary 
activities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Zhuang peasants in this area supported the 
                                                          
64 Madame Wa was married to Cen Meng, the tusi official of Tianzhou who possessed the most 
military power in western Guangxi at the time. After Cen Meng’s death, she took power to 




Communists and Zhuang singing became an integral part of the insurrection. In 
the 1920s, a Tianyang native named Huang Zhifeng joined the Seventh Red 
Army and established a local peasants’ training institute and free school for the 
youth (TYG: 651). However, the CCP leaders of Guangxi were dissatisfied that 
the Zhuang “were not preceded by invocations of Marx and Lenin, but by the 
drinking of chicken’s blood and the swearing of ritual oaths” (Lary 1972: 128). 
After the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the CCP put forth 
efforts to reorganize economic and social institutions in rural China, one of 
which was the establishing of the township (xiangzhen) as the lowest legal 
administrative entity, with responsibility for coordinating and organizing 
villages. In 1958, similar to elsewhere, the countryside in Tianyang was 
reorganized in the People’s Commune movement. Townships and villages were 
regrouped into three units – the Commune, the Production Brigade, and the 
Production Team (Su and Kahrl 2011: 121). Zhuang peasants were transformed 
into members of communes and were forced to work in the collective system 
with its long and regimented work hours (Putterman 1993: 16). In other words, 
everyday life of the villagers became disciplined and coerced. 
Under the commune system and farm collectivization, the social lives 
of villagers were also interfered with and tightly controlled. Their festivals, 
song fairs and religious activities were forbidden because it was viewed as non-
productive, economically harmful, and wasteful. Religious practitioners such 
as monks, Taoist ritual masters, and shamans were all arrested or forced to 
submit to self-criticism and re-education. Ritual places like temples and shrines 
were destroyed by state agents, whether Red Guards or local activists. Three 
ritual places of worship: Zhugong temple on Mt Ganzhuang, male-genitalia-
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like rocks at Ting-huai village in Yufeng Town, and at Baidong River of 
Toutang Town (see Map 3), which I will delineate later, were also destroyed 
during this period. 
As religion, culture, and ethnicity are often tightly intertwined, Zhuang 
people in this area have maintained their polytheistic religious beliefs. 
Throughout most historical periods, they have worshipped superlative natural 
structures such as high mountains, giant rocks, and old trees. Meanwhile, they 
have also worshipped ancestors, local deities and many other deities of Taoism 
and Buddhism. Their ritual masters and shamans have played major deep-
rooted roles in Zhuang society, although their religious beliefs and practices are 
considered ‘backward’ and ‘superstitious’. 
To my knowledge, there are four kinds of ritual masters in Tianyang, 
including Buddhist monks, Taoist priests (daogong) who have Taoist scriptures 
written in Chinese, vernacular male ritual masters (bumo or mogong) who have 
their own scriptures written in traditional Zhuang scripts, and female/male 
spirit mediums (wupo).   
Since the daogong and bumo have ritual scriptures, they must first learn 
to read or memorize the religious texts before petitioning the elder ritual 
masters for formal instruction. Male ritual masters are bilingual in Chinese and 
Zhuang. In the Tianyang-Bama area the bumo have coalesced with the 
daogong and perform a wide range of rituals including divinations, driving 
away pestilence, calling up blessings and healing, as well as the Taoist 
repertoire (Holm 2004: 17). They recite scriptures (mojing) in Zhuang but they 
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also have sacred scrolls of Sanqing, or the Three pure ones65, which are the 
highest celestial gods in the Taoist pantheon, and other Taoist ritual objects 
such as seals and divination blocks. Chinese sources commonly term the 
Zhuang bumo as wushi, which means ‘spirit medium’, but Holm (2003) 
contends that there is no evidence of spirit possession in the rituals of Zhuang 
bumo. The bumo do not go into any form of trance, the primary means with 
which they perform rituals is the recitation of sacred words in the form of 
scriptures, mantras, or orally transmitted songs (p.22).  
By contrast, becoming a wupo is determined by the gods. They usually 
go through a period of mental or “spirit-induced” illness that compels them to 
take up the calling. They do not need to memorize any texts, but if they sing 
traditional mountain songs that exactly match the local mountain songs, they 
will then be recognised by local villagers as having special knowledge (Kaup 
2000: 43).  Many of them are female and elderly, illiterate and seem to speak 
only in Zhuang. They are called meh (mother) or yah (grandmother) gimq in 
the Tianyang Zhuang dialect. Wilkerson (2007) argues that the female ritual 
masters are mostly marginalized by male-privileging Taoist tradition and the 
Chinese state, but they are greatly empowered by Zhuang religious tradition, 
“particularly because of their ritual involvement with local cosmic forces” as 
defined in Zhuang mythology (p. 15). 
Since the PRC government and the CCP have promoted scientific 
knowledge and maintained the view that superstition is an obstruction to 
modernity, religion has been a target of reform or abolishment because of its 
label as a sign of lower stages or backwardness in human social evolution. 
                                                          
65 Kenneth Dean translated as “Lord of the Three in One”. 
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Zhuang ritual masters have been suppressed by this policy. During the Cultural 
Revolution many of them were beaten, fined, and imprisoned. Their ritual 
scriptures and ritual objects were forcibly seized and destroyed.  For the bumo 
who dwelled in very remote areas, they tried to hide many scriptures and 
related objects in their secret places until the situation changed. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, their ritual scriptures related to Buluotuo myth were discovered in 
the Post-Mao era and later evaluated as precious Zhuang folk literature. 
In the reform era the government promoted ethnic cultures in order to 
compensate for the earlier decade of severe suppression. “Cultural stations” 
(wenhuazhan) were set up in minority areas. From 1978-1980, Tianyang 
County's 10 communes established their own cultural stations. In 1984 all 
communes were transformed into townships (xiang), and five new townships 
also were established. In 1985-1986 every township in Tianyang established a 
cultural station with one management personnel. These cultural stations 
functioned by collecting folk songs, folk stories, folk proverbs, local opera 
music, folk dance, folk instrumental music, and organizing amateur art teams 
(TYG 1999: 687). “Buluotuo” was categorized as one of the major Zhuang 
folktales (minjian gushi), and ritual performances of daogong and shigong 
were recorded as two kinds of folk dance (TYG 1999: 696, 700). 
The end of the people's commune system in 1984 entailed an easing of 
restrictions on villagers’ life. De-collectivization of agriculture allowed a 
higher degree of personal freedom and local autonomy. More relaxed 
government restrictions on religious activity made it possible to rebuild village 
ritual places and led to the re-emergence of religion and traditional rituals in the 
public sphere of village life. Earth God (tudi gong) shrines, local deities’ temples, 
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and temples in Tianyang were built or reconstructed in succession. All of the 
sites were built by the faithful among the local populace with self-raised funds. 
However, throughout the reform era, the policing of popular religious 
practices has not disappeared completely, due to the vicissitudes of government 
policies. At the end of 1989, the Guangxi government launched a campaign to 
“extirpate the six harmful practices”. Again, all municipal and county-level 
public security offices in Guangxi searched the homes of Taoist and Buddhist 
priests and ritual specialists and confiscated ritual texts, sacred scrolls, and 
other objects to be destroyed (Holm 2004b: 34).  
Another main reason was that the Tianyang government, under the 
Baise Municipality, had positioned the county as one of the “original 
revolutionary base areas”. When the collectives were dissolved in the early 
1980s, villagers received the land and began to have some economic 
independence. At that time, the Tianyang government 66  promoted mango 
production as a key industry for reviving the economy of Tianyang County and 
set up the Youjiang Valley Mango Product Production Base in 1985. The local 
government encouraged all local farmers to develop mango production so as to 
increase their income. The successful promotion of mango production 
improved their economic development. In 1995 Tianyang became the largest 
mango producing county and was named by the Ministry of Agriculture as 
“China’s Mango Village” (Guo et al 2007: 100-1). 
                                                          
66 Since the early 1980s, the county people’s government has increased its administrative and 
fiscal autonomy to set short-term, mid-term and long-term economic development goals and 
blueprints with specific targets, such as the economic growth rate, production quotas of 
industrial as well as agricultural products, tax revenue and personal income. The county Party 
committee and its secretary are heavily involved in economic matters. All major economic 
decisions, such as mapping out a county economic plan, starting major economic projects, 
attracting foreign investment and budgeting county expenses, are decided by the county Party 
standing committee led by the county Party secretary. (See more in Yang 2006) 
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Nonetheless, Deng Xiaoping and several CCP leaders like Jiang Zemin, 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to visit Tianyang several times and promised 
to provide a special budget for the eradication of poverty because it was 
characterized as an ethnic area, a mountain area, and a poor county which 
required some special treatment (Shih 2007: 164). According to the China 
Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP), 67  the central government 
allocated a tremendous budget to support Guangxi’s infrastructure, 
construction, and development. Not only railways, but other basic 
infrastructure such as highways, electricity and TV broadcast were newly built 
throughout the region. This project was the first attempt to organize and 
support a massive moving of ethnic peoples to work in urban and coastal areas 
(see World Bank report). Many young Zhuang people in Tianyang moved to 
work in neighbouring provinces like Guangdong. 
The Tianyang government was thus encouraged by these leaders to build 
up a material and spiritual civilization. Emphasizing the building of a “socialist 
spiritual civilization”, the policy to suppress folk religious practices in 
Tianyang has continued and never completely come to an end. Tang Yunbin, a 
cultural staff member who was involved in collecting Buluotuo scriptures 
recalled the difficulty in collecting and writing about Buluotuo scriptures:   
In the eighties, I still managed to collect a few (Mo scriptures), 
but in the nineties, there was almost none in our plains region. 
(During) that campaign against the “Four Olds” (Old customs, 
                                                          
67China’s economy has developed rapidly but the inland provinces have been lagging behind 
the coastal provinces. The central government hence has input investment to western provinces. 
SWPRP was implemented in 1995–2001 in the Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunnan, covering 35 of 
China’s poorest counties. The project provided supports for: (1) social services, including 
education and health; (2) labor mobility; (3) rural infrastructure, including roads, drinking 
water systems, electrification, and other small rural works; (4) land and farmer development; (5) 




Old culture, Old thought, and Old tradition), people were arrested, 
things burnt and struggles occurred. Due to such extreme leftist 
interference, in the plains, these books (the Mo Scriptures/ Mo 
Jing) were basically all burnt. Scriptures regarding Buluotuo and 
bumo were generally burnt, with no mercy shown. So, those of us 
who dealt with Folk Literature either ended up in the hospital 
after completing our work, or ended up in court if it was not 
appropriately written. (Emphasis added)(quoted from Shi: 29) 
As mentioned earlier, in the mid-1990s villagers began to move outwards 
from the villages to the nearby townships, county towns, and other cities. As 
Croll (1994), who studied the Zhuang villages’ economic condition in the 
1990s remarked, “the movement of persons was one of the most novel features 
of the newly reformed countryside.” (p. 125) Moreover, she noted that “meat 
and incense” were the preponderance of two items for sale in the thriving 
market towns in Guangxi. She then analysed that an increase in risk, unfair 
income distribution, and a drop in social morals during the reform era made 
people feel uncertain and need “overt supplication to the gods of fortune and 
good luck” (Croll 1994: 218). This phenomenon of burning incense to worship 
gods was also revived in the city bed of Tianyang. According to some 
informants, in the late 1990s when a new governor came to Tianyang, he was 
upset at seeing burnt incense in front of houses and could not tolerate such 
superstitious practices. Hence, aggressive repression occurred in 1999 and 
2000. The Tianyang government attempted to eradicate “feudalistic religious 
grounds”. The “Records of new events” reported:  
In 1999, feudalistic religious grounds (believed to be superstitious) 
were wiped out, temples in 53 locations and 53 altars were 
destroyed, Taoist books and related tools were confiscated and 
destroyed. Learning classes were conducted with Taoist 
practitioners, female and male sorcerers for 22 weeks and there 
were 478 people who participated in these classes. 
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In 2000, the county government again sent almost 10,000 people 
including leaders to conduct legal education with 537 Taoist 
practitioners, female and male sorcerers and geomancers 
individually, 325 sets and 1198 objects and tools regarded as 
feudalistic and superstitious were seized and 525 books on religion 
as well as 977 temples were destroyed.(Quoted from Shi, 2006) 
The above statistics show that there were more than a thousand temples 
that local people reconstructed communally. I think these huge numbers may 
include the earth god temples (tudigong miao). It also indicates that ritual 
practices, which were as accused of being “feudal superstition” in the post-Mao 
political discourse, were vividly resurrected in times of economic development. 
Importantly, it should be noted that these restrictions on religious activities in 
Tianyang happened at the same time that the Chinese government persecuted 
Falun Gong and banned other qigong groups. The growth of new religious 
groups and rituals poses an inescapable dilemma for the Party's narrative of 
modernity and progress. The CCP hence recommends in a Handbook for 
ideological work that religious activities remain under surveillance “to ensure 
that bad elements do not use them for fraudulent purposes or to disturb the 
social order” (Sun 1988:156, quoted in Anagnost 1994: 236). Under this 
guideline, local suppression of folk religious practices in Tianyang can be seen 
as a struggle over local forms of authority in order to maintain social order.  
Anagnost (1994) has suggested that ritual places are “mnemonic sites” 
or the symbolic centres of local communities that carry on local memory 
marked by their history and their ritual traditions. Herzfeld (1997) also pointed 
out that an intrinsic drive of ritual places was rebuilding “structural nostalgia” 
or the aspirations for “an unspoiled and irrecoverable past,” which plays an 
important part in the present actions of local communities (p.109). In other 
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words, ritual places are major sites where power enacts its violence because the 
socialist state wants to reshape personal memory and force people to forget their 
old ways of telling, seeing, and being so that they can move toward socialist 
modernization. The villagers’ struggle to rebuild their ritual places and reclaim 
traditions that have been “lost” thus entails a fight for memory against forgetting. 
Anagnost termed the “contestation for ritual place and control over how ritual 
practice is represented” as “the politics of ritual displacement” (Anagnost 1994: 
222).  
In the following section, the case of Mt Ganzhuang in Tianyang County 
clearly illustrates “the politics of ritual displacement”. Through a process of 
selective remembering and invention of usable pasts, we will see the overlap 
between different senses of place which have caused these conflicts among 
local communities and local authorities in Tianyang. State and local deities 
compete with each other to inscribe this site with their own meanings. 
4.1.2 Ganzhuang Mountain: Different Senses of Place 
Ganzhuang Mountain is located northwest of Na-guan tun (hamlet), 
Liulian village of Baiyu town (see the blue circle in Map 3), 12 km. east of 
Tianyang County. The mountain is commonly referred to among local people 
as “Na-guan Mountain”, from the name of the village. The mountain stands at 
326.7 meters above sea level, the relative height is 198.9 meters. Viewed afar 
from the south, the whole mountain looks like a lion head (Wei 2011). There 
are limestone cliffs and three big karst caves on the mountain. There are also 
Yuanyang (Mandarin Duck) spring and Shengshui (Holy Water) Pool as main 
water resources on the mountain. 
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This mountain has been a public ritual space where local villagers have 
worshipped several deities including Zugong (Ancestor), Yuhuang (Jade 
Emperor), Maitreya, Guandi, Guanyin and Muniang (Mother Goddess) or Meh 
Nangz in local Zhuang dialect. Zugong temple was built on the top of the 
mountain and rebuilt during different periods. According to legend, it has been 
said that a famous Ming Dynasty literati, Guo Ziru, arrived here (Zhao 2011). He 
was standing in front of the temple while watching a sunrise and inscribed “Chun 
Xiao Yan” (Spring down mountain) to praise the beautiful scenery and good 
fengshui, the mountain was then named Chun Xiao Yan  in later official records. 
The mountain has been regarded by the local people as their sacred 
mountain. This belief has encouraged them to protect the trees and natural 
water resources of the mountain. According to several informants, villagers 
have safeguarded their sacred site and do not allow anyone to cut trees or to do  
second-burials of the dead’s bones on the mountain. It is said that during the 
nineteenth day of the second lunar month till the ninth day of the third lunar 
month, there were many people from nearby counties who came to this 
mountain to offer sacrifices to ancestor spirits and chant worship songs in 
Zhuang’s unique style, which is called “hun gamj pai gok fwen” (go up to 
cave 68  to sing song) in the local Zhuang dialect. Due to the lack of 
transportation in the past, people had to walk and stay overnight around the 
area. From my interviews, the elderly of surrounding villages still vividly 
remember how they voluntarily prepared food and drink to welcome those 
guests free of charge. People had to climb uphill and helped each other along 
                                                          
68 It is recorded that during “Sung times (tenth to thirteenth centuries) ‘cave’ had come simply 
to mean ‘native settlement.’” (quoted from Beauchamp 2010) 
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the way up. The beautiful image of blinking torch lights from the bottom to the 
top of the mountain is still imprinted in their memory. 
During the pilgrimage, it was also a great opportunity for young males 
and females from different villages to gather and enjoy singing. A song fair was 
thus a social space for young men and women to meet, find lovers and develop 
relationships through singing. The song fair at this mountain has been recognized 
as the largest song fair in Guangxi. According to Chinese sources, it started and 
developed during the Qin (221BC-206BC) and Han (206BC-220AD) dynasties. 
The song fair expanded during the Sui and Tang dynasties.69 
According to the 1999 edition of the Tianyang Gazetteer, Chun Xiao 
Yan was one of the main locations for Youjiang revolutionary activities. 
During the1920s and 1930s, it was the main venue where Huang Zhifeng, –the 
Red Army commander, trained Zhuang peasants. In March 1930, Guomindang 
troops attacked and set fire to the Red Army and civilian masses inside the 
cave. Twenty-two persons sacrificed their lives. 
The local pilgrimage and song fair began to wane and was suspended 
during the war, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. From the 
late 1950s to the 1970s, the authorities banned pilgrimages and song fairs in the 
name of cleaning up feudal superstitions. The Zugong temple, statues of the 
deities on the mountain, and the main gate were destroyed in 1958.  Rock, 
statues and hundreds of inscriptions from the temple were removed and used as 
building materials for Na Quxiu reservoirs (Zhao 2011). At that time, local 
people placed a rock on the location where the statues of deities used to stand, 
                                                          




and wrapped the rock with a red cloth to symbolize the deity. Few people 
visited the caves, and the number of people who joined in the song fair became 
even fewer. After the Cultural Revolution of 1966 and 1967, the number of 
people was fewer still, only around a hundred or so. These people did not sing, 
they only offered joss sticks at the locations where the statues of deities used to 
stand (Shi 2006: 117). In brief, although collective religious life had been 
disrupted by the state’s repressive policies, religious practitioners still endured 
the suppression while secretly performing and minimalizing their rituals. 
As Feuchtwang (2004) contends, senses of place are differently marked 
and referred to by different groups of people and an overlap between these 
different senses of place toward a shared territory is a cause for conflict (p. 10). 
While local villagers refer to the mountain as their sacred place, the Tianyang 
government is of the view that Chun Xiao Yan was one of the main locations of 
Youjiang revolutionary activities and should be promoted as a “patriotic 
education base”. Therefore, the government set up a stone and crafted the three 
big characters of Chun Xiao Yan to commemorate the martyrs who sacrificed 
their lives for the nation. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the song fair has been approved and 
promoted by the CCP as a major cultural marker of the Zhuang. In 1980, the 
Chun Xiao Yan song fair was revived. In the Tianyang gazetteer, it was 
mentioned regarding the song fair that every year from the seventh day to the 
ninth day of the third lunar month, tens of thousands of people from a dozen 
counties, such as Tiandong, Bama, Baise, Lingyun, and many others, would 
gather there to sing in antiphonal style for three days and nights. According to 
legend, it is said that during the Ming Dynasty period there was a young man 
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and girl who liked singing a lot. They often sang together until late in the night. 
They loved each other and hoped to get married, but their parents objected to 
them getting married. This young couple climbed up to Chun Xiao Yan on the 
eighth night of the third lunar month and, after singing, they jumped off a cliff. 
Young men and girls in that area then went there to sing mountain songs to 
commemorate this couple. (TYG 1999: 721) 
It is also recorded that, in the 1990s during the song fair, there were 
hundreds of motorcycles, bicycles and other vehicles parked at the foothill. 
There were also numerous small stalls. Young people gathered there. Some 
sang songs, others danced disco accompanied by tape recorders and cameras. 
Some stayed under a tree playing guitar, while some climbed up the mountain 
enjoying the beautiful scenery of Youjiang basin. The Chun Xiao Yan song fair 
in the reform era was thus full of modern life (TYG 1999). The changes at the 
song fair reflect how the living ways and values of young Zhuang people have 
undergone tremendous change during the process of economic development 
and modernization. Young people now regard the mountain and song fair as a 
public space for recreation. They have no longer learned to sing and listen to 
Zhuang traditional folk songs.  
Regarding the Tianyang Gazetteer as an official historical record of 
Tianyang County, it is interesting that the 1999 edition of the Tianyang 
Gazetteer (over 800 pages) did not make mention at all of the worship 
traditions or pilgrimage at this mountain. It did not refer to the song fair within 
Buluotuo legend. Buluotuo was mentioned separately in the subtopic of 
Zhuang folklore as part of the national culture (p.696). In other words, the 
memory of Buluotuo worship and pilgrimage to the mountain was not 
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recognized in the official records. This can be counted as one of the strategic 
means of “coercive forgetting to constrain and reshape personal memory” that 
Socialist states have often used (Litzinger 2000: 71). 
Despite the suppression of superstitious practices, however, the elderly 
and villagers voluntarily contributed to the rebuilding of the shrines on the 
mountain in the 1990s. Local people went there to pray for happiness, bumper 
harvests, and other wishes. At that time, the place where the Zugong shrine is 
presently located was occupied by a building named Wang Tan (King’s Shrine). 
Inside there were a few statues of deities made of clay. In the muniang cave 
people placed an altar of the mother goddess and a Guanyin statue. In the 
jiangjun cave there were statues of Guandi and other deities. Later on, these 
statues were destroyed by the police, after the police left though, the people 
made new statues to replace them – a process repeated more than once (Shi 
2006). Folk religious believers, however, still in secret continued to perform 
rituals of blessing and persistently practiced their pilgrimage to the mountain 
despite the official prohibition.  
The most severe conflict over the sense of place happened when the 
government decided to cut through the mountain in order to construct the 
Nanning–Kunming Railway.70 At that time, local people objected and did not 
allow removing any piece of stone from their sacred mountain. However, they 
could not resist the government’s power because the land of the mountain 
belonged to the government and the railway project was a part of SWPRP (as 
mentioned in the previous section). From my interviews, local villagers 
                                                          
70 The Nankun Railway was constructed from December 24, 1990 to March 18, 1997. 
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complained that the railway destroyed the sacredness of place, but their voices 
were ignored.  
The development of public transportation is linked to the goal of 
modernizing the poor countryside and “civilizing” its population. The 
government supported the mobility of ethnic minorities with its idea of a 
“domestic civilizing project”, aimed at ethnic migrants becoming more modern 
themselves and then helping modernize their poor villages when they returned 
home (Nyíri 2010). This policy encouraged the majority of Zhuang young 
people to leave the villages and seek wage labor. Those remaining in the 
villages were the old, the weak or sick and the children. Moreover, Zhuang 
children who attend school are encouraged to speak in Chinese in school and in 
everyday life; they hence do not receive the Zhuang culture passed on by their 
grandparents. Hansen (1999) found that the content of Chinese education 
influenced student opinions about ethnic customs and religious practices because 
students were taught that religion and superstition obstruct modernization. 
School emphasized that “superstition was regarded as worse than religion – as 
more backward, more obstructive toward development” (p.153). This 
phenomenon has great impact on a whole generation of transmitters of Zhuang 
Culture. Zhuang oral traditions, such as religious chanting in rituals and 
ceremonies, ancient songs, farming songs, pose tales and folk songs in rural 
areas, had almost disappeared by the 1990s (Wang & Johnson 2008). 
The interruption of local oral traditions, combined with the state practice 
of ritual displacement in Tianyang, has affected the memory and perception of 
ancestral deity worship at the mountain to a certain extent. In 2008, when I 
conducted my preliminary survey, local people in Tianyang rarely knew about 
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Buluotuo myths, ancient songs (guge or fwengeq in Zhuang) and the Buluotuo 
scriptures of bumo. In addition, the absence of historical records in Tianyang 
raised commoners’ suspicions and questions on the abrupt development of the 
Buluotuo Cultural Tourist Area project at Mt. Ganzhuang. Much of what is 
known about Buluotuo has its origins in oral traditions circulating limitedly 
among a few members of the elderly. Some famous singers who were good at 
improvising songs were respected as the “song fairy”(gexian) or “song king” 
(gewang), over some bumo - whose voices had been suppressed for several 
decades. In other words, the development of the Buluotuo Cultural tourism site 
emerged in very awkward circumstances and caused suspicions from academia 
and commoners, as I will delineate in the next section.  
4.2 The Buluotuo Festival: “Building a religious stage to sing an economic 
opera” 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, development of the Buluotuo Cultural Tourist 
Area project originated from Gudi’s roots-seeking desire and the involvement 
of media and businessmen. The decision of the Baise and Tianyang 
governments to develop Mt. Ganzhuang as a Buluotuo cultural tourism project 
was authenticated by a series of academic seminars and ethnological field 
research. Elderly memories and unrecorded histories became the new source of 
narratives and identity at the song fair. In spite of different versions of folktales 
on Buluotuo and Muliujia, one version was selected to represent the origin of 
the mountain, worship tradition, and song fair, which is totally different from 
the above mentioned legend in the 1999 Tianyang Gazetteer. Huang Mingbiao 
of Tianyang Museum presented a legend about the muniang cave and song fair 
for the 2002 seminars. Later in 2004, it was published with the title “Buluotuo 
and Ganzhuang mountain legends”. 
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It narrates how Buluotuo and Muliujia were sent down to the empty 
Earth to create a new world. They departed from Heaven in the second lunar 
month. Buluotuo shouldered two large baskets, with one carrying five children 
and the other carrying bedding and clothing. Muliujia carried a hoe and sickle. 
They came to the area of present-day Tianyang on the 19th day. On that day 
there was strong wind and rain accompanied by deafening thunder and 
exploding lightning which caused Buluotuo’s shouldered pole to break and the 
baskets to fall to the Earth. The bedding landed to the east of today’s Na-Guan 
village and formed a mountain, a hole in the bedding became the caves. The 
fallen sickle and hoe dug a large curved slit, rain fell into the ditch and all 
converged to form Youjiang (the Right River). Buluotuo and Muliujia then 
landed on the top of the mountain to look for their children, this rock was 
hence called Wangzi (Waiting-for-the-son) Rock. To the west, their five 
children became five hills; people called it “Five Children Mountain” but it 
later deviated to become “Five Fingers Mountain” because of the homophonic 
“zi”(child) and “zhi” (fingers). (See Huang 2004: 3-4) 
Later on, Buluotuo and Muliujia lived in the muniang cave and 
reproduced humankind and animals. The cave faces south and there is a wide 
plain area in front of the cave. The cave touches a good fengshui and is 
surrounded by trees and flowers. Inside the cave, there is a spacious area 
decorated by stalactites. There are holes behind the wall of the cave in which 
one hole is called “sky hole” that can connect to the north. Buluotuo gradually 
created a wide new world. When the children grew up, Buluotuo taught them 
to farm and set up villages outside the mountain. The first village was named 
“Na guan” because there must be a water wheel in order to do farming. In the 
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Zhuang dialect “guan” means “water wheel” and “na” means “field.” Other 
villages had names such as na liao, na ning which means “raise puppies”, na 
na which means “make the baby carrier” and na bi which means “raise ducks.” 
Although their descendants migrated, they never forgot muniang cave where 
they were raised up. Every year on the 19th of the second lunar month, their 
offspring come back from all directions to congratulate their ancestor’s 
birthday and express their gratitude. But because there were so many 
descendants, they had to line up from the foothills to the cave entrance. They 
could not wait, so people in the foothills lit candles and incense. Once they had 
paid homage to their ancestors and knew that Buluotuo and Muliujia would 
still be healthy, they felt happy and sang songs together for three days and 
nights. (Huang, M. 2004, Zhang 2004) 
This version, combining place name legends which relate to the 
emergence of the mountain and local villages, explains the origin of ancestor 
worship and the song fair at the mountain. Folk activities of worship (which 
suffered persecution just a few years earlier) and the song fair are instead defined 
now as having ‘historical’ and ‘cultural’ value for new tourism projects. In order 
to promote Zhuang ethnic cultural tourism the mountain name has been changed 
to “Ganzhuang”, which transliterates from “Gamjcuengh” in Zhuang, and the 
site has been designed to represent “the sacred land of Zhuang nationality”. 
Tianyang authorities, however, reconfigured the site without respecting 
local practices. Even though they recognized that the Zhuang believed in many 
gods, and the number of deities in Buluotuo scriptures exceeds one hundred (as 
mentioned in Chapter 3 - subsection 3.2.1), in aiming to highlight Zhuang 
national characteristics local authorities suddenly removed statues such as 
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Guanyin (Goddess of Mercy), Guan Di, Maitreya Buddha and the Jade 
Emperor that were placed on the mountain by commoners, and replaced them 
with tablets of Buluotuo, Muliujia, and Jiangjun in three caves. Then, the 
incident of the “stolen tablets” occurred. The local newspaper Youjiang Daily 
(October 1, 2002) reported that three pieces of the tablets were stolen on 
September 27 and a few days later they were found in the weeds.  
This incident reveals that although local worshippers were dissatisfied 
with the displacement of their deity statues, it was difficult for them to directly 
confront the power of the state authorities. Their strategy was to patiently wait 
for government personnel to leave before placing their statues back. In 2004 
when the bronze statues of Buluotuo, Muliujia and Jiangjun were made and 
firmly installed in the shrine and caves, the swapping of deity statues 
terminated. Local worshippers had to move the statues to new shrines built 
from their own raised funds, which were located about 1 kilometre from Mt. 
Ganzhuang. (Shi 2008: 116-117) However, the conflict over the figures of 
deities did not end there, and I will return to this issue later.  
In 2003, Baise authorities invited scholars to brainstorm and design an 
effective plan for a culture-oriented tourism project. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the rhetoric of “Buluotuo Culture” as being culturally and uniquely Zhuang 
was proposed. It was partly due to cultural politics, in which Zhuang 
intellectuals made an effort to reclaim the traditions that had been “lost” 
because of leftist mistakes, and speaks of the issues of Zhuang ethnic 
empowerment and partly due to the struggle for national and international 
visibility. These politics of ethnic representation should have been seen as 
“appropriating local memory to serve (the) larger political project” (Litzinger 
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1994: 239). The Baise and Tianyang governments were encouraged by scholars 
to turn local traditions of pilgrimage and song fairs into cultural capital by 
using a strategy of “building a religious stage to sing an economic opera” 
(zongjiao datai, jingji changxi), in other words, exploiting ritual places 
and temple fairs in order to develop the economy.71 To a certain extent, 
the authorities not only have to tolerate folk religious practices, but also 
have to support them. Reframing pilgrimage sites as tourism 
destinations allows the local authorities to attribute popular religious 
practices to “traditional culture” (chuangtong wenhua). 
During that year, the Baise and Tianyang governments built a temporary 
bridge to cross the railway and invited the local populace to the pilgrim and 
song fair. Ten ritual masters and a group of folk singers, most of whom were 
female ritual specialists, or yagim, who could sing chanting songs, were also 
invited. In addition, representatives of the villages were instructed to prepare 
offerings according with their villages’ names (See Shi 2006). In other words, 
it was the first time that ritual specialists, worshippers, and folk singers were 
formally supported by state authorities after the long period of aggressive state-
sponsored attempts to eliminate folk religious beliefs. In its success it was 
reported-that more than “one hundred thousand people from all circles 
participated in Zhuang ancestor Buluotuo commemorative activity”. (Xie 2003) 
(See Figure 8 – photos of Mr Xie) 
                                                          
71In fact, the commercial development of religious sites is common in the reform era. With 
greater state intervention in the management of religion in China since the 1990s, the religious 
groups that cannot achieve recognition from the state as a religion attempted to flourish as 
cultural or tourist sites under the regulation of local state agencies (Ashiwa and Wank, 2006). 
In the east coastal provinces, for example, traditional temples and temple fairs relating to the 
Goddess of the sea (Mazu) have been restored to attract tourists and overseas Chinese 
investment. Chinese folk religion with its ritual economy contributes to the rapid economic 





Figure 8 - The Song Fair in 2003  
Ritual revival then became a key attraction for tourism promotion. 
Consequently, the Ganzhuang Mountain Buluotuo Cultural Tourism Area 
project was designed. Nanning International Folk Song Research Institute, 
Guangxi Tourism Planning and Design Institute, Guangxi Nanning Bo Chi 
Planning Design Consulting Co., Ltd., and many other planning departments 
were actively involved in the planning (Luo H. 2011). According to the plan, 
folk ritual practices must be repackaged by selecting some elements suited for 
display onstage, and then combined with artistic elements designed by an arts 
institution. The Tianyang government dispersed more than 100 cultural 
workers to collect and record ritual scriptures and folk legends about Buluotuo 
from the villages.72 There are more than 20 types of folk songs and dances 
connecting to the worship, including Wu Diao(巫调)，JingDiao(经调)and 
Tang Huang Diao(唐皇调). These kinds of poetic mythical epics that praise the 
ancestor Buluotuo's creation of this universe, humans, fire, water, paddies, 
cows, dogs, etc., are sung by the male Bumo, the female shaman and the village 
                                                          




head. Its sentence lyrics and musical lyrics are mainly based on Tianyang 
PaiGe73(田阳排歌) or a solo kind of narrating. For example: 
It was Zugong Zupo (male and female ancestors) that planted wild rice    
into the fields, … 
Girl eat, then having a blush lip,  
Guy eat, then having a sturdy body.  
Having meal do not forget their holy grace,  
Worship them a token of best fragrant glutinous rice….. (Pan 2010) 
Additionally, a special team was assigned to collect ancient songs, 
ancient music and dances in order to worship and design the performances so 
as to perform them annually at Mt. Ganzhuang. Also, there were several 
meetings to frame how Buluotuo and Muliujia statues should be designed so as 
to represent the concept of the Zhuang god and goddess of Creation. 
Eventually, the committee made the decision to choose statues designed by 
Chao Cong-en from the Guangzhou Art Institute.  
 
On 31 December 2004 the bronze statues were sent from Guangzhou to 
Mt. Ganzhuang. Seven Taoist ritual masters, or daogong, and four elders were 
invited to conduct the Eye Dotting ritual, or Kai Guang, to bless and awaken the 
                                                          
73Holm (2004) explained that it is called fwenbaiz, which is characterized as ‘free verse form’ 
without a strict stanza structure and fixed length (p.27).  
Figure 9 - The Figures of Buluotuo, Muliujia and Jiangjun 
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new statues (or invite the god or goddess to enter into the statue) of Buluotuo, 
Muliujia and Jiangjun before placing them into the caves. (See Shi 2006) 
Since 2004 the state-sponsored Buluotuo Culture Tourism Festival 
(hereafter the Buluotuo Festival) has been held each year on the seventh to 
ninth days of the third lunar month. State intervention directly impacts the local 
festival in terms of representation.  On the one hand, the authorities have 
turned the folk culture into a means of serving its politics and economy. On the 
other hand, the folks are able to popularize their religious practices through the 
acceptance of the authorities, as I will delineate in the following section. 
4.2.1 In the field: Festival Scene 
April 2007 was my first chance to observe the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. 
Ganzhuang. At that time, two Lao scholars, two Thai scholars (not including 
myself) and three Vietnamese scholars were invited by the Guangxi Academy 
of Social Sciences. The hosts paid for all expenses of these invited guests and 
separately set the itinerary for the guests from Southeast Asia to have meals 
together and to travel in the same van throughout the four-day program. We 
were informed by the Zhuang scholars and one staff official from Tianyang 
County about the importance of Buluotuo and some commonalities of the 
myths and rituals related to rice farming in Southeast Asia.  
From Nanning it would normally take about two and a half hours to get 
to Tianyang by car. However, we spent more than four hours because of a truck 
accident and heavy rain. We asked the official whether the festival is 
celebrated outdoors and what would happen in case of heavy rain. This official 
told us that this is a normal matter, “Don’t worry. It always rains like this every 
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year, but it will stop before the worship ritual starts. Buluotuo is very sacred 
and powerful”, he said.  
 
 
On the next day, it rained in the early morning but stopped before we got 
to the Buluotuo festival at Mt. Ganzhuang. The official smilingly confirmed 
with us that “Buluotuo is really sacred.” When we arrived at Mt. Ganzhuang, 
from the entrance to the foothills it was very crowded with local people. In the 
morning was the opening ceremony, in which the representatives from several 
villages were invited to be in the parade. Representatives, primarily women 
wearing colourful costumes used only at festival time, were carrying several 
kinds of offerings and a banner which had been in transit since early in the 
morning.  At the auspicious time, a group of musicians played their 
Figure 10 - Parade of the village's representatives 
Figure 11 - The Buluotuo Statue, performances, and Bumo 
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musical instruments leading the parade. The parade stopped and waited at the 
main pavilion while scholars and foreign guests were seated on the main 
pavement facing toward the mountain. Two announcers announced in both the 
Chinese language and Zhuang language. There were also local cultural arts 
teams performing dragon and lion dance performances as a prelude. There 
were two male ritual specialists leading the worship during the opening 
ceremony. While the official announced the names of the villages, each of 
them followed the ritual specialists to offer their sacrifice to the gold painted 
statue of Buluotuo with a chanting worship song. The cadence of the worship 
songs was similar, but the lyrics seemed to be varied from group to group. 
After that, announcers invited honourable guests to venerate Buluotuo by 
burning incense and bowing three times. 
 
What occurred at the pavilion seemed to encompass ancestral worship 
and antiphonal singing in an entirely new context according to the format of 
the officially modernized fair. Compared to the above shown photos of the 
2003 festival, this worship activity was put on display as an ethnic identity 
expression for media attention and the onlookers, which included scholars, 
guests and other villagers wearing normal shirts and slacks who were standing 
or sitting outside the police tape fencing. (See figure 13) 




Figure 13 - The scholars at the pavilion and onlookers outside the police tape 
fencing 
 
Figure 14 - The atmosphere of the Song Fair 
 
 After the opening ceremonies, scholars and guests randomly observed 
the festival. I followed thousands of pilgrims climbing up the mountain to pay 
homage to deities. Throughout the way uphill, devotees put unburned incense 
and paper money along both sides of the stairs because the area was under 
surveillance by policemen. The route was one-way, people made their way to 
Jiangjun cave, Muniang cave and Zugong temple and then went downhill on 
the other side, where there were several fortune tellers sitting along the way to 





There were several activities during the three-day festival, such as 
motorcycles racing while carrying baskets of tomatoes, buffalo fighting, a 
men’s sport game called “Hua Pao Jie” (firecracker ball), throwing 
embroidered balls (xiuqiu) through an elevated ring, and Zhuang singing 
contests. The atmosphere of the singing contests was informal and groups of 
singers would participate in antiphonal singing under the mango trees. These 
singers were able to attract a large crowd of listeners, of which many were 
elderly. (See figure 14) There were several groups of singers with signs 
identifying the names of their villages. I asked a man wearing a colourful 
waistcoat about the folksong contest. He was one of the referees. He told me 
that there are several kinds of folk song depending on the rhythm and related 
cadence, for example Tianzhoudiao, Gumeidiao and Babiediao, the number of 
singers also varied.  
Generally, the Zhuang perform a type of group antiphonal singing. The 
singers are divided into male and female singing groups. In each group there is a 
lead vocalist and the other singers sing as the chorus. They exchange quatrains in 
conversation until one pair cannot answer. Such contests show the singers’ wit in 
debating issues, and improvising lyrics. In addition, song fairs have played a 
unique and important role in sharing experiences and generated “communitas” 
(Victor Turner’s term) or feelings of social togetherness and belonging. I 
witnessed this sense of belonging for social groups when the villagers encircled 
the singers to listen. Although I couldn't understand the meaning, I realized from 
the smiling faces of the audience that they enjoyed it very much.  
Along the sidewalk, many small peddlers sold various products such as 
toys, clothes, trinkets, lucky drawings, and games. Some villagers brought 
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home-made sweetmeats to sell along both sides of the pathway. Nevertheless, 
local businesses also arranged many booths to sell food and drink. Some 
private enterprises set up booths to introduce their vegetable seeds, especially 
tomatoes. The atmosphere around the precincts of Mt. Ganzhuang was full of 
vigour and quite noisy. Many villagers took their families to cheer the sport of 
motorcycle racing while some were enthusiastic in asking about tomato seeds; 
some enjoyed greeting their friends as well as playing the games. 
In my opinion, the festival has been a kind of seasonal festival which is 
determined by the lunar calendar and related to the agricultural seasons. I 
suggest that this festival is an intensification of everyday relations. Most of the 
Zhuang people live spread throughout the province in rural communities where 
agriculture forms the primary means of a subsistence-economy. When entering 
Tianyang County, I saw that there were a huge number of tomato fields and 
sugar cane fields along the roadsides. There were also other varieties of 
agricultural crops like maize, banana, mango, etc. I saw lots of villagers riding 
motorbikes which were carrying two big baskets which were completely filled 
with tomatoes on the back seat. They were heading to the wholesale markets to 
sell their fresh tomatoes. Doubtlessly, this is the reason why the festival 
organizer set the program of motorcycle racing, in order to entice the nearby 
villagers to attend the festival. 
In the late afternoon the officer asked our group to go back to the hotel 
for dinner and a stage performance that night. But, due to heavy traffic the bus 
for the guests was too late. The officer then asked us to get on a public bus 
together with local people. On the way, the Lao scholars began to jest with a 
local woman by asking whether she had a daughter and whether her daughter 
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was beautiful. They could communicate and make jokes without a translator, 
which made for a hilarious atmosphere on that crowded bus.  
Apart from the festival site, there was a stage performance at night at 
Tianyang’s city square. The guests were welcomed at the Zhuang embroidered 
ball (which has been recognized by the central government as a Zhuang 
cultural marker and was used as a gift to the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008) 
along with a brochure of the night’s performance, and were seated in places 
provided. The music, songs and dances were designed by the Nanning Folk 
Song Research Institute. A photo of the arch at Mt. Ganzhuang was used as the 
stage backdrop. There were twelve sets of performances performed by 
professional groups from Nanning. 
The next day, all guests and scholars went to attend the seminar which 
was held at the municipal meeting room. The governor's speech on 25 April 
2007 informed us that County annals and the government of Tianyang had 
explicitly proposed a significant strategy of “Rejuvenating the county by 
developing tourism” which brought it into the important agenda of the 
committee and government service. The reason was that “Protect and develop 
[sic] Buluotuo Culture is an effective measure to improve the nations’ cohesive 
force and the centripetal force. The Zhuangs... are the inseparable part of the 
Chinese nation.”74 (Emphasis added) Furthermore, the local government was 
expected to “make use of this opportunity to… utilize the original relation on 
historical culture between Zhuang nationality and the nationality of Tai, Lao, Dai 
                                                          
74 This probably corresponds with the current situation of ethnic tensions that are existing in 
both the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 
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and Nung in Southeast Asia to enlarge the relation and friendly intercourse with 
Southeast Asian countries…"(English translation of speech provided by the host)  
Later, the scholars presented their major findings on Buluotuo culture. 
What the scholars of Zhuang studies agreed on was that Buluoluo is an 
important component of Zhuang culture which would vanish unless protected. 
The representation of the past through myths about Buluotuo and Muliujia 
which had been circulating and handed down from generation to generation in 
a number of different forms such as folklore, ancient song, and chanting in 
worship activities, should be defined as “cultural’ rather than ‘religious’, and 
so they proposed the term “Buluotuo Culture”. These scholars believed that to 
treat Buluotuo beliefs in the perspective of an intangible cultural heritage could 
not only trace the inherent relationship between the Zhuang people and the 
national spirit of the Chinese, but would also be of great significance in 
carrying on the Zhuang spirit of harmonious relationships, enhancing national 
unity and fitting in with the new narrative of a “socialist spiritual civilization”. 
In the official language, therefore, the government and cadres promoted only 
some secularized selective aspects of the festival, while the religious aspects of 
superstition were overtly omitted. 
We were informed that the State Department of China listed Buluotuo 
culture in China’s national inventory of Intangible Cultural Heritage75 in 2006. 
The discourse of preserving Intangible Cultural Heritage fundamentally altered 
                                                          
75In August 2004, China officially joined the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage. “The scope of intangible cultural heritage covers: poems, fairy 
tales, epics, stories, legends and proverbs that have been spread orally among people for a long 
time; folk performing arts …; folk practices like rituals, festivals, sports, competitions, 
production related and life related customs; folk traditional knowledge and practices related to 
nature and the universe…” Retrieved from http://china.org.cn/e-news/news060525-3.htm 
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its position from one of folk religious beliefs opposed to socialist atheist 
ideology, to one defined as a “traditional culture” of Zhuang ancestor worship. In 
the same year, the program of Chinese Legendary Festivals, on Channel IV of 
CCTV, broadcasted the Zhuang Buluotuo festival at Mt Ganzhuang to a nation-
wide audience. It was reported that more than 300,000 visitors came to the relic 
and generated an income of 15 million RMB (Xu 2008: 26). International guests 
also received a DVD of this program and a Zhuang brocade bag.   
During the seminar, I was intrigued by the local state agencies’ strategy 
of emphasizing Buluotuo culture as a means of friendly communication 
between China and Southeast Asia (especially Thailand). As a Thai, I was also 
informed that eight volumes of “Buluotuo Mo Jing of the Zhuang - photocopy 
Annotation” were given to Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn when she went to 
Guangxi in 2006. The cultural commonality based on wet-rice cultivation 
between the Zhuang and other Tais in Southeast Asia was often addressed 
throughout the seminar and during the meals. 
As can be seen from state and scholarly discourses, the cultural image 
and meaning of Zhuang identity are embedded and embodied in the Buluotuo 
festival. The “local” religious pilgrimage to Mt. Ganzhuang has been 
transformed into a new “regional-national” narrative by Guangxi as a strategy 
to promote tourism and to serve its politics and economy within the China-
ASEAN Free trade Area. The policy of place-marketing not only encourages 
expressions of Zhuang ethnic differences to promote a national image of “unity 
in diversity”, but also capitalizes on the common imaginative history that 
encompasses the Zhuang and other Tai-speaking groups in neighbouring 
countries by advertising that the festival “can help other Zhuang and Thai 
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peoples find their roots” (Ganshouyoujiang 2008, quoted in Dun and Widman 
2012). In this respect, the discourse of a “Tai sibling” is utilized by all 
organizations of power (cadres, academics, and media) to create an expectation 
of regional compliance and conformity.  
The Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang has become well-known as a 
cultural brand of Tianyang through the development of tourism-related 
industries. (I will further discuss the issue of cultural branding in Chapter 5). It 
receives mass media acknowledgement, and the number of participants has 
increased over the years, from 50,000 before 2004 to nearly 200,000 
participants in 2009 (Zhang and Zhang 2010). As a tourist destination, the 
enterprise began charging admission fees from tourists during non-festival days. 
The fee has increased from 10 RMB per person in 2007 to 60 RMB in 2010. 
The enterprise also collects parking fees and fees from merchants and traders 
who sell things like drinks and food during the Buluotuo festival. 
The increased popularization of the Buluotuo festival can be witnessed 
from the traffic jam in the late afternoon due to the numerous cars, motorcycles, 
and busloads of people (Figure 15 – photo of Li Zonghong). For their part, the 
local communities are not passive either, and often seize upon tourism in order 
to display their existence and obtain benefits. Some villagers living near the 
site flattened their sugar cane field into a parking lot for motorcycles and they 
earned a lot of money during the festival, more than their yearly income from 




Figure 15: Traffic jam at The Buluotuo Festival 
From the years of 2007 to 2011 that I observed, the festival has changed 
over the years in terms of actors, activities and regulations. The authorities 
have taken overt steps to apply some control over the festival. For example, in 
2007 worshippers were able to put their sticks of burnt incense along the bridge, 
beside the pond area, and at the middle of the stairs along the path all the way 
up the mountain. In 2009 I recognized landscape changes and prominent 
billboards of safety regulations such as “please pay attention not to causing 
fires. Burning joss sticks, smoking and littering cigarette ends are strictly 
prohibited except designated places where tourists can.” In order to monitor 
safety, local police have been assigned to guard the site during the daytime so 
that the tourists and worshippers follow the regulations. But during the late 
evening until early morning, the enterprise hired a group of villagers from Na-
guan and Na-liao hamlets to guard and clean the site. According to my 
interviews in 2011, during the three day festival the enterprise hired 50 
villagers and gave each of them 40 RMB per day.  
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Confronted with the state’s superiority, villagers have adopted a number 
of pragmatic strategies to cope with the new rules and regulations. From the 
commoners’ perspective, the burning of incense is very crucial as a sacrificial 
offering to a god or deity. The prohibition against burning incense undermined 
the sacredness of the ritual as defined in local terms. So, instead of attending 
the Festival during the day, a huge number of worshippers would come in the 
late evening because they wanted to burn incense. The villagers who guarded 
the site would take the leftover incense and wet them. They believe that the 
incense smoke provides a link between the living and the deities in order to 
procure their blessings. Many villagers themselves earned money from selling 
joss sticks and other things to the worshippers during the night. 
However, one informant complained to me that she went to sell joss 
sticks and candles during the Festival and got only a little income because there 
were too many people selling. But the government “still collected tax from us. 
How can this be justified? Before this, when they wanted our farm land, they 
put it nicely. Yet, they collect money from us now. Is this fair to us?” 
(Interviewed August 2011) 
The transformation of Mt. Ganzhuang into a tourist site has provided new 
arenas and new opportunities for the state and the locale while transforming the 
contestants in the process. After the area development, the locales of three 
hamlets near Mt. Ganzhuang have obtained benefits from selling things to 
tourists and charging parking fees. In addition, they are satisfied with the 
infrastructure improvements. Some told me “thanks to the party, thanks to the 
government. Before the road construction, it was not convenient. ... Previously, 
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it took two hours from the outside (city bed) to be here.” (Interviewed a couple 
of elderly at Na-liao in March 2011)  
4.2.2 Cultural politics of the marginalized  
Chinese state authorities still retain a negative attitude toward folk religious 
practices. As witnessed by the Yi zu, who have tried to register the Bimo 
shamanistic religion as their religious heritage, but their applications have 
repeatedly been rejected by the government (International Religious Freedom 
Report for 2012: 16). In order to get support from the government, Zhuang 
religiosity has to be intertwined with the notion of Buluotuo Culture, which is 
safer than the problematic term of religion. Thus, scholars of Zhuang Studies 
strategically render Mo beliefs and practices into a quaint and harmless “traditional 
culture” that serves as colorful regional cultural attractions for tourists.  
The recent formal discourse of Buluotuo culture, fortified by the state 
authority and academia, is very omnipotent and far-flung through mass media. 
According to Zhuang scholars, Buluotuo is the supreme god of Mo jiao (Mo 
beliefs) and the apical ancestor of Zhuang people. Considering the public 
discourse of Buluotuo culture development, Muliujia as well as female ritual 
specialists have been ignored and marginalized by Chinese culture, which is a 
male dominant culture. 
I think it is quite interesting to consider the promotion of Buluotuo 
culture in terms of gender. The undervalued stance towards female ritual 
specialists is made obvious in the promotion of Buluotuo culture. In the formal 
discourse, Zhuang cadres and scholars emphasize the importance of Buluotuo 
scriptures written in old Zhuang language. Most literature on Buluotuo culture 
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focuses entirely on bumo scriptures and their meaning. In so doing, they 
highlight the role of male ritual specialists as the inheritors and upholders of 
Zhuang cultural heritage while the female ritual specialists are publicly denied. 
This is because women can become ritual specialists by singing ancient songs 
and gaining embodied knowledge of rituals that they received from the gods. 
This is in stark contrast to the ‘scientific knowledge’ that the CCP and 
government promotes. Therefore, many Zhuang males with Chinese schooling 
and party affiliation often adopt a more denigrating attitude towards female 
ritual specialists than towards male ritual specialists.  
Although registration as an intangible cultural heritage 76  became an 
alternative channel allowing local ritual traditions and deity worship to be 
tolerated in Tianyang, the status of ritual specialists are not legitimized. When 
“Buluotuo culture” was enlisted as the first Zhuang Intangible Cultural 
Heritage at the national level, the government provided a protection fund and 
specialized guidance to Tianyang, and the Buluotuo Cultural Research Center 
was set up in a new building in the city square. Huang Mingbiao became the 
head of the center. One person awarded as “chuancheng ren”, or the inheritor 
of Buluotuo Culture, was Huang Dajia who has been able to memorize many 
Buluotuo chantings and ancient songs. According to his words, he followed his 
father, who was a blind bumo, to perform rituals starting when he was young. 
He was therefore able to memorize the chantings and ancient songs. His father 
and his blind disciples had no ritual scriptures. Despite being both daogong and 
                                                          
76 The protection of Intangible Cultural Heritages of ethnic minorities was officially launched 
in 2003 and will last until 2020. As for those listed as an intangible cultural heritage at the 






mogong, Huang Dajia was recognized by the Guangxi authorities as a skilful 
folk singer or ‘song king’ (gewang). 
 
Figure 16 - Huang Dajia and his certificate 
In our interviews Huang Dajia told me that being awarded a 
chuangchenren did not protect him from being arrested. “The authorities close 
one eye while keeping another eye open”, he said. In recent years, the policing 
of folk ritual performances in public place (outside the designated places of 
worship) have continued in Tianyang. When a troupe of daogong, including 
Huang, was invited to conduct a ritual at the construction site, they were 
arrested by the police and charged with “making use of superstitious feudal 
activities to threaten the social order”.77    
Despite official appreciation and legitimacy of the authenticity of local 
traditions, the present situation remains complicated. Zhuang scholars complain 
that the Baise and Tianyang governments are reluctant to get involved with 
worship at Mt Ganzhuang. To the extent that Buluotuo worship represents 
ancestral worship as part of a folk custom and should not be considered 
                                                          




‘backward’ or ‘superstitious’, some local authorities are cautious to embrace that. 
Scholars explain that Buluotuo instructs a “harmonious coexistence” between 
humans and nature, humans and society, and from man to man. 
The above cases offer insight to the complexity of issues and actors 
involved with the development of Buluotuo Culture. Ethnographic research 
reveals that although the authorities have control over how the ritual practices 
of ritual specialists and commoners should be performed during state-
sponsored festivals, female ritual specialists and devotees have continued to re-
negotiate power relations, either by cooperation with the state or contestation 
over state intervention, and create their own spaces in which they are able to 
perform ritual practices in their own way. The worship place at Mt. Ganzhuang 
has become a site of struggle between the local authorities and the folk religious 
worshippers who battle over the right to worship their deities. Culture produced 
by tourism has actually become part of the essential cultural expression of local 
cultures as well as local identities and rights. It has entailed negotiation and 
resistance at the local level, as we will see in the following section.  
4.2.2.1  Persistence to worship Guanyin at Muniang cave 
 
 
Figure 17 - The name plate of Muniang Cave written in sawdip and 




Meh Nangz is the local Zhuang dialect for calling the goddess of the 
villagers living near Mt. Ganzhuang. It is transliterated into Mandarin as 
Muniang, which mean Mother Goddess. This term is vague because it does not 
identify the specific name of the goddess. Unlike popular Chinese goddesses, 
there are specific names, such as Tianmuniangniang and Wangmuniangniang- 
which refer to the wife of the Jade Emperor, Yinmuniangniang (Birthing 
Mother Goddess), and Rumuniangniang (Nursing Mother Goddess). (Dubois 
2011: 174) While the people still perform rituals to deities for solving their 
everyday problems, they may not really know the deity names and legends. 
Therefore, there is a niche for different interpretations of Muniang worship on 
Mt. Ganzhuang. 
For the scholars who research Zhuang folklore, Muniang properly refers 
to Muliujia, or Mehloeggyap in Zhuang, which is the goddess of creation and 
fertility. According to the epic, the original form of the universe was swirling air. 
As it swirled faster and faster the universe consolidated into an “egg” and it 
exploded into three parts. The top part was heaven, the bottom was water, and 
the one in the middle was earth. Later, there was a fleshy flower that grew out of 
the earth and in the blooming flower was born a goddess. She was pretty and 
wise, with long flowing hair, and she was naked. She was known as Muliujia, 
“mu” refers to mother and “liujia” is a bird that the Zhuang use to symbolize 
wisdom. Thus, Muliujia refers to the mother of wisdom. The story goes: 
Muliujia rumbled the earth in her palm to make it wrinkled 
and in so doing she matched heaven and earth. The wrinkled earth 
now had mountains, valleys, and rivers. Muliujia’s interminable 
menstrual blood became the source of life of the Zhuang—the Red 
River. 
The earth, covered though it was with mountains and rivers, 
nevertheless lacked vitality. Muliujia opened her legs and stood on 
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the peaks of two adjacent mountains. All of a sudden, a wind rose 
and Muliujia could no longer hold back her urine. The lonely 
Muliujia picked up the urine-soaked dirt and out of it, she 
moulded many mud figurines in her own image, covering them 
with grass. When, after forty-nine days, Muliujia gathered 
together a bunch of hot peppers and peaches from the forest and 
threw them to the crowd of figurines. Those who grabbed the hot 
peppers became male and those who got the peaches became 
female.  
In order to make the earth more vital, Muliujia also made a 
bunch of figurines out of mud and threw them up into the sky 
indiscriminately. Thereupon birds and beasts appeared. During a 
torrential rain, the people and the beasts lacked shelter and so 
Muliujia sat down with her legs wide apart. Her reproductive 
organ was transformed into a huge cave, which became the 
primeval home of safety for both humankind and animals. (Zheng 
Yi 1996: 137)  
 
The myth of Muliujia as the founding mother of mankind, or Mother 
Goddess, was analyzed by academics as representing Zhuang matriarchal pre-
historical society. Women gradually lost their mystery and superior position 
when a patriarchal society developed and Buluotuo appeared as a god of 
Zhuang civilization. Regarding the local legends, scholars discussed this and 
decided that Muniang refers to Muliujia (as well as Zugong referring to 
Buluotuo), although at that time local people displayed the statues of Guanyin 
and Wangmu in the cave. Hence the abovementioned “stolen tablets” incident 
occurred in 2002.  
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Later on, the authorities held several meetings to make a decision on 
the design of the Buluotuo and Muliujia statues. Artists tried to create the 
figures according to the legend which most represented Zhuang characteristics 
(see Figure 15). Finally, a Muliujia bronze statue was designed as the upper 
part of a naked woman with flowers, and solidly fixed in the Muniang cave.  
 
Figure 18 - The models of Muliujia designed by various artists (photos of Mr Xie) 
 
From my observations, there were no icons of other deities appearing at 
the worship sites on the mountain during the three-day Festival. However, 
when I visited the mountain on the other days (non-festival days) in 2008, 2009 
and 2011, I observed the existence of a Guanyin statue in the Muniang cave 
and a Guandi statue in the Jiangjun cave. This reveals that local people are 
continually persisting to worship the Guanyin statue instead of the Muliujia 
statue when not being monitored by the authorities. 
A more interesting finding from my ethnographic research occurred on 
the 19th of the second lunar month (March 2011), which is believed to be the 
birthday of Buluotuo, when the local people gathered to congratulate their 
ancestor’s birthday. I went to observe how local communities performed their 
sacrifice. Villagers of Na-guan, Na-liao, and another hamlets voluntarily 
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collected money to prepare their offerings to the Earth God shrine and 
Buluotuo. They were preparing a pig’s head and chicken at the open space in 
front of the Earth God shrine. Other offerings such as oranges, candy, biscuits, 
and paper money were also prepared and were distributed among the people 
who contributed funds.  
Some people prepared their own sacrifices. I visited one house in Na-
liao where grandma Huang was preparing vegetarian food as an offering. I 
followed her to the mountain. There were several female elders performing a 
sacrifice in front of the Buluotuo statue at the pavilion. A variety of joss papers, 
such as clothing for a god and goddess, were placed for a while before being 
burnt. Grandma Huang stopped to greet another elder and started singing with 
her friend in the Zhuang antiphonal style, which entails laughing and an 
amusing atmosphere. 
 
Figure 19 - Grandma Huang was greeting her friends at the pavilion. 
 
At the same time, many groups of villagers went uphill to perform their 
rituals. I then followed them to the Jiangjun and Muniang caves. At Jiangjun 
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cave, or Gamzdaez in Zhuang, worshippers burnt incense and went to venerate 
in front of the Guandi figures which were placed on the table to the right of the 
Jiangjun bronze statue, before moving on to the Muniang cave.   
At the open space in front of the Muniang cave worshippers burnt 
incense and asked a lady to lead the chanting for their group before burning the 
joss papers they had prepared. The lady who was leading the group in singing 
the worship song was quite short (about 140 cm.) but her voice was very 
beautiful. Later, I realized that she was the ritual specialist, or “yah gimq” in 
local Zhuang dialect. From the interview, she was born in 1952, got married 
and moved to Na-guan in 1975. When she was 25 year old, she was ‘able to 
sing folk songs’ and become a wupo. She regularly helps people perform 
rituals because “they do not know how to properly worship, I just help them.” 
She claimed that she was the main person for collecting funds (five cents per 
person) from villagers for the reconstruction of the worship sites on the 
mountain. When the government manipulated the site without performing any 
proper rituals, many obstacles occurred and they had to ask for her advice. 
Moreover, she claimed that, because of her ability to chant the hymns and 
perform the rituals, even the cadres and leaders asked her to accompany them 
whenever they come to worship at the site.    
Nonetheless, there were two fortune tellers sitting at the right and left 
side of the Muniang cave entrance where several people stopped by to check 
their luck. When I entered the cave I saw the statues of Guanyin and two 
guardians (boy and girl) displayed on the altar inside, on the left side of the 
bronze statue of Muliujia. Most of the worshippers were women who went to 
burn incense and sacrifices at the Guanyin statue inside the cave. When I asked 
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them why, they said “today is the birthday of Guanyin.” Guanyin is the Goddess 
of Mercy and the offering must be made of vegetarian food such as noodles, fruit, 
and sweet candy. The cave is not so large, hence it is able to contain only about 
50 people. When too many worshippers came at the same time, all of them could 
not stand in front of the Guangyin statue. They had to wait until the former group 
had finished and then take their turn. Some people who were in a rush prayed in 
front of the Muliujia statue and then quickly left the cave.  
 
Figure 20 -  Local people worshipping the Guanyin statue in the Muniang cave. 
At the front of Muniang cave a big group of women wearing colourful 
costumes in the same style were standing in lines, one side was wearing red 
and pink while the other was wearing green. They also carried a banner of their 
village’s name (Zhongshan cun) to show the unity of their group while they 
burnt incense and sang worship songs in the Zhuang dialect (see Figure 21). 
However, among them I recognized two women from the Na-liang hamlet of 
Longhe village where I had stayed for a long period to learn the Zhuang dialect, 
which meant that the whole group did not all come from the same village.  The 
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pattern of clothing and ritual performance of this group seemed to be distinct 
from the other worshippers, but looked similar to the formal sacrifice 
performance during the Buluotuo Festival.   
 
Figure 21 - A group of worshippers in colorful costume 
 
During the time that I was taking pictures and recording their singing, 
one man with his professional video camera and tripod arrived and started 
recording the event. Why have these female devotees resisted worshipping 
Guanyin at the Muniang cave? Why do they wear the colourful costume? They 
seemed to appreciate being recorded by the video cameraman, observers like 
me and other researchers. According to Geertz (1973), the ritual can be seen as 
a form of ‘deep play’, in which both participants and observers say something 
about themselves. Later, I fortunately learnt that a few women in red robes 
standing in the front line were ritual specialists from different places in 
Tianyang. This finding is of crucial importance because it suggests more 
complex power relations among the central and marginal players that need to 
be untangled further. 
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During two hours (10-12 a.m.) of observation at the Muniang cave, 
more than 300 worshippers spontaneously gathered at the worship site. Most of 
them were female. Furthermore, some villagers told me that during the daytime 
people have to work on the farm so more people would come later because 
there would be a song fair at night which is voluntarily held by local villagers 
without state authority involvement. A former government officer who went 
with me uttered that he never expected that there would be such a number of 
worshippers on that day. 
It seems likely that the 19th of the second lunar month is an auspicious 
day when a variety of perhaps conflicting points of view can be expressed at 
apparently shared ritual events. When I asked the devotees why they came to 
worship on that day, some told me that it is Buluotuo’s birthday and some told 
me that it is Muliujia’s birthday. This group prepared a pig’s head, chicken and 
rice-wine as their offering. Grandma Lu recalled that when she was 22 years 
old she went to the mountain and met her husband there. The mountain has 
been a sacred space, even during the Cultural Revolution local people secretly 
made sacrifices and offered at least half a buffalo or ox meat and a few sticks 
of incense, unlike now whent people sacrifice only a chicken or pig 
(interviewed March 2011). For the others, though, who regard it as Guanyin’s 
birthday, they prepared vegetarian food, fruit and candy as offerings. As Rack 
(2005) noted, the ‘sense of locality is unorthodox and heterogeneous’ (p. 128).  
This phenomenon demonstrates that the mountain contains multi-layers 
of historical and cultural meanings imprinted by different groups of people. 
Although the narrative of Zhuang ancestor worship presented by the state 
authorities and scholars does not fully conform to the beliefs and practices of 
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the folk, it is difficult for any group of commoners to directly confront the 
narrative. However, they are not totally passive to the dominant discourse. 
Local villagers seem to realize that Meh nangz/goddess and Jiangjun are 
ignored and undervalued in the formal discourse of Buluotuo Culture. It hence 
provides a niche for them to contest and negotiate for their ritual space. 
According to the local populace in Tianyang, whose memory could not be 
traced beyond their lifetime, whether Meh nangz refers to Muliujia, Guanyin or 
some other female deity remains a contested issue. 
Moreover, a goddess is more meaningful to the folk because her power 
relates to their daily life and family. Many female devotees pray for having a 
baby, for example; Grandma Su (born in 1931) living in Na-liao hamlet told 
me that she went to worship Mehnangz and asked to have a son. She proudly 
told me about her background, saying that she was educated (you wenhua) and 
worked at a government office (Tianyang Food Authority). Her husband had 
two wives and the first wife had only daughters. At that time she really wanted 
to have a son and so went to pray and perform a ritual sacrifice at the cave. The 
goddess was so efficacious (ling) that this woman finally delivered two sons 
for her husband (interviewed on March 2011). 
The ambiguity of ‘meh nangz’ provides a niche for different 
interpretations. One informant told me that since she was young she followed 
in her father’s footsteps to pay homage to the deities:  
I went to worship Guanyin (Goddess of Mercy) and Wang Mu 
(Queen Mother). ….[since Guomindang period] That cave was 
originally the Guanyin Bodhisattva sacred site. After the 
development of Ganzhuang Mountain, the government moved 




After I repeatedly asked her “was there no Muliujia here when you were 
young?”, she replied. “No, there was no Muliujia. This place was not yet 
developed. The Bodhisattva Guanyin was very popular.”  
In addition, when I asked her whether she venerated Buluotuo and 
Muliujia, she said that although she also pays homage to Buluotuo and 
Muliujia, she perceives that the status of Guanyin as a shenxian (celestial being) 
is higher than Muliujia, who is only a shen (god/goddess). She told me that the 
devotees want the authorities to move the statue of Muliujia to a place near the 
statue of Buluotuo at the pavilion and place Guangyin in the cave, but the 
authorities won’t listen to their request. (Interviewed on June 2012) 
Yah gimq Huang is another ritual specialist who came to worship in 
front of the Muniang cave. She is living in Zhongshan village - a city bed of 
Tianyang. In fact, there is another Guanyin temple in Zhongshan, but she 
prefers to come to Mt. Ganzhuang because it has a tradition of “Wupo ten 
worship” there, in which wupo or female ritual specialists and their disciples 
(about 20 persons or more) gather to perform collective worship. They prepare 
sacrificial offerings including lights, incense, tea, tobacco, sugar, fruit, cakes, 
candles, paper clothes, shoes, and other joss paper. These offerings do not have 
meat or fish. After burning the joss paper, they chant the “ten worship” lyrics. 
When I visited her house in the community of Zhongshan, I saw a photo 
of the Eight Immortals and Guanyin coexisting in the room where she performs 
her sacrifice. She told me that the authorities invited her to participate in the 
parade of the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang. As the ritual practices of 
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Buluotuo worship have become the object of ‘tourist gaze’, she proudly 
showed me a DVD of the Festival given to her by the state agency. She 
energetically pointed to the scene when she appeared together with the group 
of elders wearing traditional costume, “this is me”. She has participated in the 
parade every year and also collects DVDs of the Festival. Despite being 
ignored in the formal discourse of Buluotuo Culture, female ritual specialists 
and female devotees have become the main performers on the scene. 
Owing to Buluotuo cultural tourism development, the recent 
improvements in public transportation in Tianyang have facilitated better 
access to Mt. Ganzhuang.78 Devotees may now take daily buses from Tianzhou 
city. These female ritual specialists and female devotees can gather together, 
take a bus and arrive at Mt. Ganzhuang within thirty minutes.  Particularly 
interesting, I learnt that female ritual specialists had asked a video cameraman 
to record their ritual performances or their revitalizations of their local folk 
faith in video format. That is why they decided to display their group unity by 
wearing the same pattern of colourful costume, and they enjoyed being filmed. 
Although their pattern of dress and ritual performance is similar to what they 
perform for the state-sponsored Buluotuo Festival, through these alternate 
practices they are also able to carve a niche of existence for Zhuang in modern 
China, where the expression of ethnic identity is increasingly uttered through 
the state’s rhetoric. 
In sum, local people in Tianyang are increasingly embracing the 
narratives of tourism development and appropriate it as a source of power or a 
                                                          
78In 2007 and 2008 there were buses only during the festival. There was no daily bus to Mt. 
Ganzhuang and I had to hire a local taxi from Tianzhou city.   
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platform to argue for their right to reconstruct their ritual spaces and keep up 
their cultural practices. Moreover, the new technology of video recording and 
editing contributes to the preservation of their goddess worship by recording the 
local style of singing. Their persistent worship of Guanyin and their attempts to 
express their identities in their ritual performances are hence consistent with the 
findings of Anna Tsing regarding the cultural construction of ‘marginality’ itself. 
This case demonstrates that although marginality is not so much imposed as 
negotiated, because of the imbalances of power involved, some “marginal” 
people can still make their own marginality central (Tsing 1993). 
Furthermore, I have found out that parallel to the development of the 
Buluotuo Cultural Tourist site by the state authorities, several sites of worship 
in Tianyang (which were previously destroyed in 1999-2000) were 
reconstructed by local communities with self-raised funds. One finding from 
my research is that all reconstructed sites have placed a statue of a female deity 
or Guanyin, for example at the small temple located between Na-liang and 
Wan-zhi Hamlets and the temples in Zhongshan and Fengma villages. The 
most interesting case is Moma hamlet of Fengma village, which has 
successfully appropriated the Festival at Mt Ganzhuang as a stage to express 
their identity, while at the same time raising money for their temple 
reconstruction, as will be delineated in the following section. 
4.2.2.2 Appropriation of the Buluotuo narrative for local uses 
Moma hamlet is a part of Fengma village in Tianzhou. It is located along 
the Youjiang River, the main transportation route in the past. The name of the 
village came about from its history as Madame Wa’s use of the area as a 
soldier training camp and storage place for provisions.  
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 There is a legend related with Buluotuo and Muliujia circulating in this 
village also. It is said that one day Muliujia went to the mountain to cut 
firewood, she tried to row a boat but the tide was so strong that she was unable 
to cross the Youjiang River, so she went back. Buluotuo helped her to solve the 
problem, he used one hand to hold his crotch and another hand to extend his 
genitals as a bridge for Muliujia to walk across the river. While Muliujia was 
walking to the other side, unfortunately, a big ant crawled up and bit 
Buluotuo’s genitals. Buluotuo startled suddenly and his genitals shrunk. The 
sickle in Muliujia’s hand fell and slashed Buluotuo’s genitals. Muliujia then 
fell down into the very rapid current. Fortunately, Buluotuo quickly recovered 
and endured his pain. He tossed his injured genitals into the river for Muliujia 
to grasp and pulled her from the river.  
Regarding this folk story, Buluotuo seems to be a man who had 
supernatural powers but was not a god, while Muliujia totally lost her magical 
power. There was no ritual space to worship Buluotuo in the village. Instead, 
there was an over 200 year-old archaic temple which was a sacred space of the 
village. According to the legend, boats that were shipping goods often had 
problems and had to stop at that area. People then made sacrifices to the deities 
and constructed the temple at this spot. The complex buildings of Shan Tai 
Gong temple that were elaborately decorated in a beautiful dynastic 
architectural style were destroyed during the wars. Villagers have kept up 
strong faith for their temple, they rebuilt the simple temple in a normal home 
style from 1958. During religious suppression, villagers would silently 
venerate “mother goddess” at their homes by turning to the direction that the 
temple was located. In Fengma village, the memory of those rituals and local 
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traditions was strong enough to re-establish the temple in its archaic style when 
it became possible. 
The state-sponsored Buluotuo Festival ushered in a renewal of 
community celebrations in Tianyang. By having some Buluotuo and Muliujia 
legends, the representatives of Fengma village were also invited to participate 
in the Buluotuo Festival. From my observations, Fengma Village-level cadres 
(e.g. village head, village party secretary) are very active in reviving or 
maintaining traditional values. With support personnel such as school teachers, 
retired cadres living in Nanning, and male and female ritual specialists, 
Fengma village has wisely appropriated the Buluotuo Festival as their cultural 
space in order to unify their villagers.   
In order to attend the parade at Mt Ganzhuang, a school teacher of Moma 
composed a Buluotuo worship song and taught a group of female devotees to 
chant the song at night after they finished their farm work and housework. 
They prepared their costumes for the parade and rehearsed the dragon dance in 
unison. The youth also formed a team to join the Lion Dance Competition at 
Mt Ganzhuang. Participating at the Festival for several years made the villagers 
ensure that the state authorities would permit their “traditional religious 
ceremonies”, in 2007 local people voluntarily contributed their money to 
reconstruct a big new temple in an elaborately archaic style and named it “Lie 
Sheng Guan”.     
The temple is collective village property and run by a temple committee 
which consists of ordinary villagers. After the temple renovation, Fengma 
villagers have experienced a miraculous result of rapid economic growth and 
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success. The year of 2007 was the first year that the village sent teams to 
participate in the Dragon boat race at Baise, and they won the prize. The 
villagers hold the annual temple festival on the tenth day of the tenth lunar 
month. In the beginning there were 200-300 people, the number of participants 
then increased to over 1,000 people and touched a new high in 2010 when more 
than 3,500 people joined the ceremony. 79  This illustrates the harmony and 
cooperation of the Fengma villagers, who have divided their tasks in preparing 
the place, tables and seats, food and drinks in order to host their guests. The 
popularity of the temple festival has also attracted mass media attention. There 
were reporters from Tianyang Television, Baise Television, Youjiang Daily and 
other newspapers who came to broadcast the temple festival.   
In the 2011 Buluotuo Festival, the representatives of Moma hamlet not 
only participated in the parade and opening ceremony, but they also performed 
the traditional “hua lou” ritual at Mt. Ganzhuang. The bumo recited the 
scripture while the people were walking across the flower bridge and passed 
through under a horse. The villagers lined up at both sides of the bridge and 
played musical instruments. The ritual aims to dispel disasters and give 
blessings for well-being, safety and prosperity. At the exit, ritual participants 
may donate small amounts of money. The donation money is to be used for 
temple activities.  
According to my interviews, it was the second year that a troupe of 
Moma representatives performed this traditional Zhuang ritual. The bumo 
Huang who performed the ritual was 32 years old. He was famous among the 
                                                          
79 The temple committees estimate the number of participants from the tables and food they 
provide each year.   
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outsider/merchants who came to buy agricultural products in Tianyang because 
of the miraculous nature of his rituals. He was also invited to Guangdong and 
Hong Kong. On the 1st and the 15th day of every month there are many people 
lining up in front of his house waiting for his ritual services. Some villagers 
gossip that bumo Huang sometimes gains over 7,000 RMB per day, and he has so 
much income that he was able to buy a new apartment at the condominium project 
in the city.  However, he also serves the village by performing the ritual at Mt 
Ganzhuang, and at the temple festival, free of charge. (Interviewed on May 2011) 
Not only bumo, a young female ritual specialist in the community is also 
requested to lead the chanting at Mt Ganzhuang. A Moma spokesman told me 
that there are several female ritual specialists in the village but the cadres 
selected this one to pair with the bumo Huang in order to produce the image of 
young and energetic representatives of the villages. One positive shift in the 
value of Zhuang Buluotuo culture and tradition for tourism development in 
Tianyang is that it has actually become part of the essential cultural expression of 
the local culture. The Moma spokesman told me that the main purpose for 
performing the ritual at Mt Ganzhuang is to promote the cultural place of the 
community. When tourists come to Mt Ganzhuang, they can also visit the temple 
at Moma, and/or enjoy swimming in the Youjiang River in front of the temple.   
When I visited the temple I was impressed by the exhibition room which 
systematically provides information, such as a brief history of the temple, the 
community activities at Mt Ganzhuang, the list of personnel who differently 
contribute to the community, and the awards of the dragon boat racing from 
Baise and Nanning. A retired cadre living in Nanning came back to welcome 
me as an honourable guest from Thailand. They turned on the VDO of their 
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activities at the festival, such as the rehearsal at night, getting on the bus, and 
the parade in the early morning at Mt Ganzhuang. As I informed them that I 
was studying a PhD program, the villagers proudly showed me a VDO of the 
event when a graduated Doctoral student who was born in Moma, returned 
from the USA to visit his hometown. There was also a video cameraman 
recording my visit.  
Since the temple was renovated in 2007, it has become a major socio-
cultural centre of the Moma community. Inside the temple there are several 
deities, but the statues of female deities are placed at the main hall.  Villagers, 
especially women, gather there to make paper offerings and to worship deities. 
Normally, a group of female villagers perform the function of presenting the 
offerings to the deities. Incense is an especially important offering. Despite the 
absence of a priest in the temple, Zhuang female religious devotees seem to 
have their distinctive format of chanting worship songs together. They have 
also formed a group to read sutras and purify their minds and bodies by eating 
vegetarian food. 
 
Figure 22 - Female villagers were chanting in front of female deities. 
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From my observations, the association of women and elders in Fengma 
village have played an active role in the revival of ritual spaces and performing 
rituals and maintenance at this temple. It was quite exciting to learn that female 
elders perform the task of writing petitions for the worshippers. Several elder 
women in the village are literate and can communicate in Putong hua 
(Mandarin).  
In short, the case of Fengma village is an excellent example of 
appropriation of the official place-making discourse for local uses. A 
modernizing China has appeared to have affected the interpretation of the 
Buluotuo festival. Participants from Fengma Village interpret the festival 
through their myths and their political units. Supported by the village’s 
officials, local elites (who are familiar with state discourse) have properly 
appropriated the discourse of Buluotuo Culture as an instrument for creating a 
“harmonious society” in order to assemble their resources and reconstruct their 
own “mnemonic site” and reclaim their “lost” traditions. However, as much 
research has suggested, the revival of traditions and religious practices in the 
reform era often entails considerable innovation and creativity, as it is 
influenced by the reshaping of the political and social order of the Marxist state. 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
By focusing on the Buluotuo Festival at Mt Ganzhuang of Tianyang 
County, the purpose of this chapter is to explain how the official place-making 
discourse of Mt. Ganzhuang as a Buluotuo relic has become a “field of struggle” 
(Bourdieu 1993) that has allowed a wider range of actors to participate in 
negotiating, appropriating, and contesting their ritual spaces, local identities, 
and rights. More specifically, I want to highlight the role of female ritual 
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specialists and female devotees, and the strategic ways in which they negotiate 
with state oppression regarding their religious practices. 
According to Jan Assmann, all festivals are a combination of two 
elements – ‘repetition’ and ‘presentification’ - because it repeats the ceremony 
of the previous year by following the same ritual but also re-presents the 
“cultural memory” of the ritual performer. The festival can thus be regarded as 
“a cultural sphere that combines tradition, awareness of history, myth in action, 
and self-definition, and that – a crucial point - is subject to the vast range of 
historically conditioned changes” (Assmann 2011: 10). I think it is very useful 
to view the Buluotuo Festival as a space where folk beliefs, myth and ritual 
practices in Tianyang are interwoven with community social life.   
As previously described, the state discourse has transformed local cults 
(the pilgrimage and song fair) at Mt. Ganzhuang into the Buluotuo Festival – 
an object to commoditize. One thing that is apparent about the transformation 
at the mountain is the change of statues – an iconic gesture to the deities that 
the local people worship.  In addition, it is a recent phenomenon that the parade, 
dancing lions and dragons, stage performances and folk sport competitions are 
the main activities in the festival that the authorities support. Local authorities 
attempt to regulate the festival and control how the rituals should be 
represented. My research has found that the local people have also adopted 
many ways to contest these regulations, such as to conform to the control 
during the three-day festival but to persist worshipping their statues of deities 
when the site is not monitored by the authorities. Their strategies paradoxically 




More interestingly, many people have interpreted the state’s 
appropriation of their sacred space and local pilgrimage as a legitimization of 
their ritual practices. The presence of elder women, female worshippers and the 
representatives of villages in the parade should not be undervalued as a 
colourful element of the Festival, but it is evidence of their persistence to 
religious faith in a changing China. I agree with Schein that they actively 
engage in producing representations of themselves and they are “not only the 
objects of representation, but are themselves cultural producers” (Schein 2000: 
31).   Singing and chanting in the traditional Zhuang style is a means to recall 
their memories and experiences of enduring the state suppression of folk 
religious practices. They regard the Buluotuo festival as a platform to express 
their ethnic-religious identities and cultural memories. 
 Apparently, from the photos in this chapter, women are the majority of 
religious devotees and ritual performers in the festival. However, there are very 
few studies on the role of female ritual specialists and the social perspective of 
Zhuang women’s experiences. Even though the predominance of women in 
ritual spaces is not unique to the Zhuang, it should be pointed out that, to some 
extent, the role of Zhuang women as ritual performers is quite unique. 
 Scholars of Zhuang studies emphasize that the Zhuang’s predecessors 
had a matriarchal society where women had the superior position. Despite 
being influenced by Chinese culture for over a thousand years, the status of 
Zhuang women is still high, as evidenced by the courtship practices taking 
place in the song markets and the freedom of choice in marriage partners. 
197 
 
Moreover, the Zhuang had a distinctive marriage custom called “bu luo fu jia 
不落夫家”, in which the bride would stay at her parents’ home after the 
wedding and only move to her husband’s house after she became pregnant80 
(Fan 2004). Although Zhuang villagers in Tianyang seem to have adopted 
Chinese-style marriage, in which the newlyweds stay in the household of the 
groom’s parents, a legacy of the old marriage custom can still be seen in the 
tradition of “lugsau”, where the daughter who is married off must go back to 
her parents’ house and bring back offerings to worship her ancestors there (Xu 
2011). 
Nonetheless, although Zhuang women gradually lost their superior 
position when a patriarchal society developed, women have less a subordinate 
role in family and society. As the Zhuang were famous native soldiers in the 
past, men often went to battle for long periods. Zhuang women hence had to 
bear all the field and domestic work. This inevitably made women occupy an 
important position in the family and society. Female deities such as Muliujia, 
Liu Sanjia, Ya Huang (Nong Zhigao’s mother), and Madame Wa occupy 
important positions in Zhuang traditional culture. (Xu 2011)  
Meanwhile, fertility is a critical element in rural society. It is believed 
that a Goddess has efficacious power on issues of family, especially for fertility. 
I found that all reconstructed ritual places in Tianyang have the statue of a 
goddess, which implies that the goddess occupies a very important position in 
Zhuang society. In addition, I found that there are female ritual specialists in 
almost every village I visited during my fieldwork. They silently provide 
                                                          
80 This custom reflects that Zhuang women have a certain degree of power, because after the 
marriage Zhuang women are free to maintain social and sexual relations with the opposite sex 
until they give birth to a child. 
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services in their homes. Folk religion of the Zhuang that is based on oral 
tradition, rather than on written ritual texts, is a women-empowering religion 
that enables female ritual specialists’ standing in the community to remain high. 
These female ritual specialists command considerable respect. They have 
maintained an important role in religious practices, such as worship and giving 
the sacrificial offerings to invite ancestors and deities to dispel disasters, and 
giving blessings for family well-being, successful harvests, and fertility. 
Even when the bumo goes out to conduct a ritual, his wife has to burn 
incense or light a lamp, in the case of conducting a funeral, until he comes back. 
This supporting role of a woman affects the efficacy of the bumo’s ritual. The 
major role of Zhuang women is thus not the result of gender role division that 
Freedman (1978) pointed out, where women are responsible for routine 
offerings made to ancestors at the domestic, family level, while men perform 
rites in the extra-domestic, ancestral hall. Zhuang women are the main ritual 
performers in all ritual spaces and they are actively engaged in claiming their 
ritual places, contributing to the rebuilding of temples, and persisting in 
preserving their traditions. 
Moreover, information technology and the media have played important 
roles in their projects of self-representation. Recently, aspects of Buluotuo 
culture have been fortified into a formal discourse by state authorities and 
academics, who use hegemonic and far-flung channels of mass media to 
convey this discourse. Ritual specialists and commoners have also learnt to use 
this new technology to represent themselves, as shown in both the cases of 




Chapter 5   
In the Name of Buluotuo Myth: Cultural Branding  
As shown in previous chapters, the idea of promoting Buluotuo 
Culture is clearly related to the Zhuang elite‘s political agenda to forge a sense 
of Zhuang zu and to express Zhuang uniqueness for national and international 
visibility. It is a new quest and endeavor in the modernization process of 
traditional Zhuang culture. Politically, Buluotuo as the progenitor of Zhuang 
civilization can be used to increase solidarity and pride among the Zhuang 
people and other related ethnic minority groups in China as well as the Tai-
speaking groups in Southeast Asia. Economically, the Buluotuo festival can 
attract tourists and contribute to the economic development of Baise and 
Tianyang.  
A major turning point in the public recognition of Buloutuo Culture came 
when it was enlisted as an intangible cultural heritage (ICH)81 at the national 
level. The quest for ethnic traditions and cultural heritages of distinctive myths 
and symbols has been fuelled by ―a dominant global discourse on cultural 
heritage‖.  The festival has undergone an unprecedented growth in popularity, 
attracting growing mass media attention, which has led to a tremendous 
increase in participants and tourists. Buluotuo has become a brand image of 
the Tianyang product to be presented to the domestic and international market. 
On the other side of the same coin, registration as an intangible cultural 
heritage became an alternative channel in which local ritual traditions were 
                                                 
81 According to UNESCO, ―intangible cultural heritage‖ means ‗the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills … that transmitted from generation to generation, …, and 
provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity.‘ 
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legitimized. A variety of Buluotuo folk stories are also used as tools by the 
local people in order to negotiate with the authorities for a better share of the 
market. Local places that are connected with historical events and figures in 
local legends and folklores have been reconstructed. The revival of folk 
religious places in Tianyang was encouraged mainly because of the place-
making of Mt Ganzhuang as a Buluotuo cultural relic. As shown in Chapter 4, 
culture produced in tourism has actually become part of the essential cultural 
expression of local identities as some have sought to comply with the official 
discourse and cooperate with the authorities during the festival in order to gain 
a measure of socio-economic advantage. 
A politics of local identity has emerged, with different villages 
challenging the scholars and officials‘ conclusion of Mt Ganzhuang as the site 
of authentic Buluotuo culture. Two sites in the Yufeng and Toutang towns of 
Tianyang, in their relation with Buluotuo and Muliujia myths, have tried to 
compete for the history of Buluotuo worship.  Each claims authenticity as the 
original site.  Interestingly, together with the state-promotion of China-ASEAN 
economic cooperation, some have tried to exploit my presence (as a Thai) in their 
ritual place as one strategy for promoting the site. It is also evident that a 
discourse of ―root-seeking‖ by the Thais is not only appropriated by the 
authorities but also used by commoners. The common people have their own 
ways to maintain what they consider important, as well as their own ethnic 
identity in a modern context. 
Next, this chapter provides a situation for the commodification of the 
Buluuotuo myth and ―Buluotuo Culture‖ and analyzes the construction, 
marketing and development of the Buluotuo brand.  It explores how the 
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festival and Buluotuo myths are used as a platform by new actors for different 
purposes, and the contestations to which these processes give rise. It continues 
by providing the main findings from my fieldwork to demonstrate the ways 
that both individuals and communities, as ―cultural strategists‖, have 
appropriated the state discourse of Buluotuo culture and deployed their 
position in the Buluotuo festival to present their particular versions of 
narratives and memories of their sacred spaces, and thus get recognition from 
state authorities and the public. 
Lastly, this chapter aims to reflect on the complexities of emerging 
projects regarding the display of Zhuang cultural heritage. In the eyes of state 
authorities and Zhuang intellectuals, villagers living near Mt Ganzhuang 
constitute a poor rural population who themselves are incapable of recognizing 
their Zhuang cultural heritage, and thus need transformation under the 
leadership of external cultural elites. A series of projects initiated and planned 
by the Baise and Tianyang governments, enterprises, and scholars have 
affected villagers‘ lives and spaces, but villagers themselves have never been 
consulted.  This has inevitably led to some tensions between the state 
enterprises and villagers. In addition, the idea of a living museum and a 
Zhuang cultural park in the ―Zhuang City‖ project can be seen as a point of 
engagement within Zhuang ethnic dialogues for identifying their own unique 
identity and the promotion of China-ASEAN economic collaboration. 
1.5   Narratives of the original worship site 
Since Buluotuo has become an iconic representative of Zhuang culture, 
it is not surprising that contested narratives of ownership have emerged within 
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tourism discourses.  In this section I will further explore how agency, cross-
cultural interaction, commercialization, and religion all affect tactical and 
structural power in the Buluotuo Cultural tourism project.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the main reason that scholars endorsed 
Tianyang County as an important memorial place of Buluotuo and Muliujia 
was that 14 epics (among the total 28 epics) of the Buluotuo scripture were 
discovered in Tianyang. However, none of them was found in Baiyu town 
where Mt. Ganzhuang is located. As can be seen from Appendix 1, seven 
epics were collected from Yufeng Town (no.6-9, 22, 27) and Kunping (no.29) 
at the north-eastern mountainous part of Tianyang. Four epics (no.3-4, 26, 28) 
were collected from the eastern part of Baise and nine scriptures were 
discovered in the southern part of Bama Yao Autonomous County (hereafter 
Bama).  
It is necessary to know that, geographically, these areas are connected 
through the same river system. Yufeng Town borders Bama and they share a 
single river flowing southeast into the Lingqi River. This area shares a 
common Zhuang dialect (Holm 2004: 30). Villages in the Eastern part of 
Baise are located on a tributary of the Baidong River. All the villages where 
Buluotuo scriptures were found ―are located on the upper reaches of the same 
river system, upstream or downstream from each other‖ and, in the past, ―east-
west packhorse routes used to link these river systems with the major trading 
centre of Bose (Baise) on the upper reaches of the Youjiang.‖ (Holm 2004: 8). 
Not only the ritual scriptures, there are also plenty of Buluotuo folk 
stories circulating in these areas which relate to community-wide rituals of 
worshipping big rocks which are regarded as figures of Buluotuo and 
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Muliujia. For example, the local people of Yufeng pay homage to emerging 
natural rocks such as a phallic figure and female organ figure at the cliff of 
Ting-huai village, and villagers from Baise and Toutang township of Tianyang 
used to gather to worship big rocks on both sides of the Baidong River, which 
has now become a reservoir. (See Map 4) In addition, there are several places 
regarded as Buluotuo rocks and Muliujia‘s breasts in Tiandong County. 
When the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang was promoted by the 
Baise and Tianyang governments, it was no surprise that the villagers of these 
two sites, Tinghuai and Baidong River, argued to reclaim their cultural 
meaning as the original place of Buluotuo worship.  
 
Map 4: Three sites of Buluotuo worship in Tianyang  (Source: Google map) 
5.1.1 The Ting-huai Buluotuo worship site in Yufeng Town   
From documentary research, the attempt of Ting-huai village to contest 
for the original site of Buluotuo worship urged me to explore the site, although 
I had no connection there. Ting-huai village is in Yufeng Town which is 
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predominated by hills. It is quite far from Tianyang city bed. When I and my 
translator visited Ting-huai site for the first time, it took about 2.5-3 hours by 
bus from Tianzhou to Yufeng. After that, we had to rent a motorbike taxi to 
get to Ting-huai village. Although it is not that far from Yufeng market, it is 
quite inaccessible by car because of muddy conditions of the road.   
There is a large signboard with photos introducing ―Ting-huai Buluotuo‖ 
at the main road before entering the gravel road. The photo shows a rock cliff 
with emerging rocks like phallic figures and female organ figures. Local 
people added faces to make them into the iconic figures of Buluotuo and 
Muliujia. When passing by the village, the economic condition of Ting-huai 
villager is not good, as can be seen from many dilapidated brick houses. I saw 
villagers who were busy with their cultivation by using cattle. Agriculture is 
the primary occupation in the village, with very few income-generating 
activities like animal husbandry. 
At the site there is a large billboard above a small storage room giving 
details that criticize the former policy of ritual displacement and emphasize 
the folk persistence to sustain their communal Buluotuo worship (see Figure 
20). There was no one at the site. We had to ask a passerby to whom we 
should talk about the site and he suggested for us to see Uncle Qin - an elder 
brother of bumo who owns some Buluotuo scriptures. Uncle Qin angrily told 
me that the government should recognize Ting-huai Buluotuo worship because 
he himself has witnessed this tradition since he was young. The former natural 
rocks really looked like genitals but were destroyed. We also talked to Aunty 
Huang - a treasurer of the site. She also confirmed that. She recalled that when 
she was young, young girls really felt embarrassed to see the rocks because 
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they resembled male genitals. They usually headed down and quickly passed 
the cliff. Now she has voluntarily been taking care of collecting donations for 
the annual worship festival which is held after the Lunar New Year Festival 
(interviewed on November 2010). 
After visiting the site, we went back to the Yufeng town government 
office to ask for more information about the Ting-huai Buluotuo site. An 
officer suggested for us to contact Huang Zhicai (hereafter Mr Huang) - a 
retired official of the Yufeng cultural center (wenhua guan) who collected 
Buluotuo myths in the 1990s. He ungrudgingly welcomed us and proudly 
presented the Buluotuo legend he had recorded from the elders. 
From Mr Huang‘s hand-written paper, Ting-huai got its name from the 
Buluotuo legend.  ―Huai‖ transliterates from a Zhuang word which means 
―water-buffalo‖. Ting-huai means ―water-buffalo pen‖.   
According to the legend, Buluotuo first raised 99 buffalo in this area. 
These buffalo went out every morning and grazed on their own. However, on 
the 9
th
 day of the 9
th
 lunar month every year, Buluotuo must kill a buffalo to 
perform a ritual. But it was said that 99 buffalo would still be amazingly found 
Figure 23 -  The billboards of Ting-huai Buluotuo 
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in the pen the very next day.  One day, the buffaloes went out of the pen in the 
morning and did not come back even after sunset. This made Buluotuo 
anxious and he went out looking for them.  He could find no buffalo herd but 
came upon a big stone shaped like a buffalo. The day after this discovery, a 
giant rock whose shape resembled male genitalia was said to have suddenly 
appeared on the cliffs in the northwest of Ting-huai village along the road 
leading to Yandong Town of Bama. The villagers began to regard this rock as 
Buluotuo‘s genitals.  
Today, every year, on the 4th day of the first lunar month, thousands of 
villagers living nearby come to worship Buluotuo at this cliff. Local people 
believe that performing Buluotuo worship enables them to increase fertility 
and grant one‘s offspring happiness, peace, and prosperity. Usually, on the 
first and sixteenth day of every lunar month, local people come to this cliff to 
burn incense, especially those who just got married and young couples. 
Previously, it has been narrated that people who passed through this route had 
to close their umbrellas and take off their white clothing.  (Shi 2006: 112-118)  
Due to the Chinese state campaigns against superstitions, this cliff site 
was destroyed in the 1990s. Hearsay has it that the people who destroyed this 
site later became sick and insane. As their ―mnemonic site‖, villagers have 
tried to reconstruct the rock but it has never looked like the original natural 
one.  Attempts to revive traditional religious practices in this town began to 
flourish alongside the arrival of teams of scholars to do research on Buluotuo 
scriptures. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Holm went to see bumo who owns the 
scriptures, and researched more on the ritual context of reciting the texts (see 
Holm 2004). Moreover, in order to promote Buluotuo Culture, Professor 
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Liang Tingwang and Luo Hantian, Zhuang scholars who work in Beijing, and 
a CCTV film crew also came to Ting-huai to interview bumo Qin and record 
how to chant Buluotuo scripture in 2003. Not surprisingly, in 2004, the bumo 
and villagers of Ting-huai were invited to participate in the opening ceremony 
of the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang (Shi 2006: 112-118).  
Influenced by tourism development at the Buluotuo Festival, historical 
memory of Buluotuo in Ting-huai has been activated, recovered and 
reconstructed. The ―Buluotuo-shan Organizing Committee‖ was formed by 
local literati such as primary school teachers and staff of the cultural centre of 
Yufeng town. They prepared a ―Ting-huai Buluotuo Introduction‖ to introduce 
Buluotuo legends in the Yufeng area, claiming that Buluotuo faith has its roots 
in Yufeng since the Buluotuo scriptures were discovered there. The committee 




 day of the first lunar month (after 
Spring Festival), which imitates the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang. As 
well, there have been worship rituals led by daogong and cultural activities 
performed by amateur performance troupes (Shi 2006).  
  I revisited Yufeng and Ting-huai again in February 2011 in order to 
attend the Ting-huai Buluotuo festival. Through previous contacts with Mr 
Huang, I was invited to stay with him and his family (his wife and their 3 year 
old grandson) because there was no guest house or hotel at Yufeng. I went 
there alone because my translator needed to get back in order to celebrate the 
New Year festival at her home. At that time, my Chinese was not so good, I 
could speak but it was difficult to listen to Zhuang villagers who spoke 
Chinese with their accent. As the first international guest staying overnight at 
his house, Mr Huang worried that I might not be able to communicate with the 
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locals and he felt responsible for protecting me from dangers. So he contacted 
a daughter of another family who had gone to study and work in Thailand for 
two years, to be my translator. As she was working in a Tianyang government 
office, she would be coming back home during the New Year holiday. Her 
Thai nickname is ‗Rung‘.  However, during the couple of days before Rung 
arrived home, he would not allow me to go out alone to any place except the 
market area where his wife was selling poultry. 
As a retired official, Mr Huang lived conveniently at home with a 
monthly pension. He also wrote poems and folk songs and advised a group of 
women (including his wife) to form an amateur performance group and 
perform at the Ting-huai Buluotuo Festival. He could talk for hours on his 
cultural activities and showed me several videos of a ―Kuai ban‖ singing 
contest when a 10-year old boy sang his poem and won the second place 
award during the opening ceremony of a big temple at Baile village, in which 
he was an emcee. 
Nonetheless, he is also on a committee who organizes the Ting-huai 
Buluotuo festival and sets the program of staged performances. A group of 
women usually spend time at night to rehearse their performances at the first 
floor of his house. From my observation, this amateur performance group 




Furthermore, Mr Huang expected me to show up as his honorable 
foreign guest at the Ting-huai Buluotuo festival, he thus did not allow me to 
visit Ting-huai village before the festival. When I wanted to visit the temple at 
Baile village by myself, he refused that and contacted the temple committee to 
drive and pick us up.   
The temple at Baile village is located beside the highway to Bama - a 
county being promoted as ―Longevity Village‖ - a famous tourist destination.  
As the old temple was destroyed in the late 1990s (a result of religious 
suppression policies delineated in Chapter 4), villagers voluntarily contributed 
their money and labor to reconstruct the temple in 2009. In the 2010 opening 
ceremony it was renamed ―Changshou Shan‖, which means ‗Longevity 
Mountain‘. The inscription narrates that this temple was constructed in 1995 to 
commemorate Madame Wa. The largest shrine of the temple is Cen Min Miao 
which is supposed to refer to the deified native chieftains of the Cen family 
that ruled over Baise, Tianzhou during the Ming dynasty (as mentioned in 
Chapter 4 section 4.1.1). On the right side of the hill there is a new Buluotuo 
shrine and Guanyin shrine. All statues at the temple were made by a local 
artist except the Buluotuo statue, which was given by Huang Mingbiao of the 
Figure 24 - A group of women rehearse singing and dancing 
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Tianyang Buluotuo Cultural Research Centre (see Figure 22). I was intrigued 
by the presence of the Buluotuo statue and multi-colored banners of the 
Changshou-shan cultural tourism festival, which were decked all along the 
way up to the Buluotuo shrine, as they were clearly aimed at welcoming 
ASEAN investments in the region (see Figure 26). Moreover, the committees 
informed me that the temple would hold the Spring festival celebration on the 
4th day on the first lunar month, which make me regret that I may not be able 
to attend because it is the same day as the Ting-huai Buluotuo Festival.  
Figure 26 - The multi-colour banners of Changshou-shan tourism festival 
welcoming ASEAN investments  
Figure 25 -  The statues of deities made by local artist and the Buluotuo statue 
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 Due to Mr. Huang‘s attempt to control where I should go and who I 
should talk to, I faced an uneasy situation in doing ethnography research. The 
emerging problem for me was how to handle such attitudes of Mr. Huang, 
who had become an important actor in my fieldwork. I then asked for 
assistance from my friend Lu Xiaoqin to join me in Yufeng after lunar New 
Year. 
Lu Xiaoqin (hereafter Xiaoqin) is a lecturer at Guangxi University for 
Nationalities and an expert working for the Guangxi Intangible Cultural 
Heritage Research Center, when Mr Huang got her name card he seemed to be 
very satisfied. This was something that could be added to his reputation, being 
that there were many honorable guests visiting his house. But he later became 
dissatisfied because he could no longer control us by making us follow the 
itinerary that he had set for us. 
When Xiaoqin came, we were 
able to look around the Yufeng area. 
Rung took us to see a small temple near 
the Yufeng primary school. This shrine 
belongs to a subgroup of the Yufeng 
village. Inside the shrine there was no 
statue of a deity, we met a group of 
elders who were preparing their joss 
paper and offerings. At the temple there 
is a small roof covering one big rock wrapped with a red cloth to symbolize 
Buluotuo (see Figure 27). The elders told us that they also went to worship 
Buluotuo at Ting-huai, but since they have constructed their own temple, it 
Figure 27- Buluotuo rock at a small temple 
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would be more convenient to venerate Buluotuo here. 
On the next day we went to attend the Ting-huai Buluotuo Festival, but 
we refused Mr Huang‘s plan to treat us as honorable guests. My friend 
explained to him that in order to do ethnography research we just wanted to 
observe, participate and take photos of the activities during the festival, which 
disappointed him.  The first day‘s program was comprised of two main 
activities: a Buluotuo and Muliujia worship ceremony, and a song fair. In the 
morning two bumo from Ting-huai recited Buluotuo scriptures in front of the 
cliff while villagers from several hamlets performed their sacrifices and 
chanted worship songs (see Figure 28). 
Like festivals elsewhere, women were a majority of the worshippers, 
while men contributed by writing the names of donors and playing musical 
instruments during the rituals. More worshippers from other villages gradually 
came to burn incense and offer sacrifices throughout that time. Some went 
further and consulted a female ritual specialist (wupo) sitting at the left corner 
of the platform, put some money in a rice basket, and waited for her to foretell 
the outcome (see Figure 29). Some went to pay homage to the statue of a 
goddess holding a child placed at the left side of the foothill, while a few 
festival-goers climbed up to the hilltop to see the view and take photos. In 





    The festival organizer also hired famous Zhuang folk singers to 
perform antiphonal singing to entertain the audience. From my observations, 
most of the participants came by walking or riding motorbikes. Very few came 
by car. Many women took their children and brought their own food and small 
chairs to chat with friends and listen to the singers (see Figure 30). There were 
also young people who came back home from other provinces where they 
study or work. The festival was a social space where they were able to meet 
old friends and relatives from other villages. Some elderly from afar who love 
to attend song fairs prepared to stay overnight at the site and perform 
antiphonal singing until dawn. The organizer provided free food but not 
lodging for the participants. In the case of younger people, though they may 
Figure 28 - Bumo and worshippers performing Buluotuo worship at Ting-huai 
Figure 29 - Worshippers and a female ritual specialist  
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have watched, they rarely participated in the traditional song fair. A few 
itinerant traders also came to sell toys, snacks and desserts. The festive 
atmosphere was full of vigour. We roughly estimated that the number of 
participants was up to a thousand.   
No local officials in Yufeng and Tianyang showed up at the Ting-huai 
festival. The only outsiders were just myself and Xiaoqin. Mr Huang tried to 
convince villagers to set up special food and a table for us but we decided 
against it and joined a table with other villagers. We talked to several elders 
and they expressed their hope for more support from the Tianyang government 
because their tradition of worshipping Buluotuo had been carrying on for a 
long time. Most of the worshippers we spoke with were enthusiastic about 
developing their ritual place and had been trying to raise funds to construct a 
small temple on the hill top. In my view, the villagers' attendance and 
participation on the first day of the festival is largely traditional and obligatory, 
not a display for tourism.  
 
Figure 30 - The festive atmosphere at Ting-huai 
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As the program of the second day of the Ting-huai festival started quite 
late, we decided to visit Changshou-shan in the early morning. Rung‘s father 
drove for us and left us there.  We looked around the temple but there were no 
more banners about ASEAN like I saw when I first visited the temple. The 
area was decorated with new red banners and a stage under a Banyan tree. But 
the performance had not yet begun. When we wanted to go to Ting-huai Rung 
could find no motorbikes for us to ride to Ting-huai, even though there were 
many motorcycles in the parking area. Indeed, the Baile Temple is not that far 
from Ting-huai village, but we waited there for almost two hours until Rung 
contacted some friends to pick us up.  
When we arrived at Ting-huai, the performances had already begun (see 
Figure 31). We apologised, saying that we could not find a motorbike taxi. Mr 
Huang seemed to be dissatisfied and ignored us. Some performers were 
curious about the performances and a number of the audience at Changshou-
shan. We became aware of a conflict between two groups of performers when 
Rung told us later the reason why she could not find a motorbike at 
Changshou-shan. Previously, these women were in the same group of amateur 
performers but they had had some disputes and split into two groups who now 
competed against each other.   
Figure 31 - The performances at Ting-huai Bulutuo worship site 
216 
 
Nevertheless, holding the performances on the same day reflected 
incongruities between the two sites that competed with each other for the 
attention of festival-goers and officials. In the eyes of local officials, when 
comparing to Changshou-shan, Ting-huai site is more impoverished and 
villagers themselves are incapable of developing their ritual space to serve 
tourism. Ting-huai villagers‘ demand for the Tianyang government to provide 
some financial support to reconstruct their site and infrastructure 
developments have been neglected. From my interviews, the bumo and 
villagers feel disappointed and betrayed. Several informants in Ting-huai 
recalled how a group from Tianyang city came to ask them to collaborate and 
participate in the Buluotuo Festival at Mt. Ganzhuang, and promised them that 
they would later return their contributions to the Ting-huai Buluotuo site, but 
they did not keep their promise. 
After we came back there was a news (on Febuary 9, 2011) headline that 
read ―More than ten thousand people of Tianyang county, together with Thai 
friends, pay respect to Buluotuo‖ and it reported in detail that ―over 30 Thais 
participated in this activity‖ and ―dozens of priests recited the Buluotuo 
scriptures‖.  
In recent years, the people of Yufeng town‘s Ting-huai village 
have spontaneously raised funds to restore the original site of Ting-
huai Buluotuo that was previously destroyed. Simultaneously, 
under the warm-hearted sponsorship of Thai friends travelling 
in China, the annual Spring Festival cultural activity of 
worshipping Buluotuo at the ruins of Buluotuo in Ting-huai has 
garnered strong support from all walks of life. … 
…in total more than ten thousand people… came to visit, 
together with experts from the Faculty of Humanities of Guangxi 
University for Nationalities and Dr Lu Xiaoqin from the 
Guangxi intangible cultural heritage research center, as well as 
over 30 Thai friends… (Emphasis added) (Lu Jie. 2011, Feb 9). 
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When Xiaoqin saw this news that put her name and position in detail, 
she knew immediately that Mr Huang was the source of the fraudulent 
information.  She was upset and tried to contact the web editor to complain 
about the exaggerated number of participants and Thai friends. She also asked 
the web editor to delete this news from the website. However, this news was 
already publicized in the Tianyang newspaper and other media.  
The exaggeration of that number should not be overlooked. Mr Huang‘s 
intention was doubtful because, as a retired state officer, he was well 
acquainted with propaganda. In his opinion, it could have been a strategy to 
draw public attention to the significance of the Ting-huai Buluuotuo site 
because, in his view, ‗over 30 Thai friends‘ and ‗ten thousand people‘ went to 
visit. However, this strategy of propagandizing lies and half-truths could have 
contradictory results and discredit the credibility of Yufeng. Rung told us that 
even local people disapproved of such a big lie. 
5.1.2 The Baidong River Buluotuo worship site  
From a policeman I met in Yufeng, I heard about another site of 
Buluotuo worship in Toutang town of Tianyang. When I went back to 
Tianzhou I asked my key informant, who worked as a state officer in Toutang 
for ten years, about Buluotuo worship. He pondered for a while and recalled 
that there was one ritual place where villagers persisted to go for sacrifices, 
but he had never heard about Buluotuo worship in Toutang before. After re-
checking with the policeman, he told me the directions of how to get there. 
The site is located in Bai Sha Village of Toutang Town. It took 
about 30 minutes from Tianzhou city by bus, but I had to take a motorbike taxi 
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to reach the place. At the motorbike parking area, there is a small house where 
an old woman was selling incense and some drinks. The motorbike rider asked 
the elder in Zhuang dialect and then told me that I have to take a boat to cross 
the reservoir, so he assisted me to call a boatman.  At that time, I was the only 
one who visited the site. The elder said people usually go there during lunar 
New Year and on the first and fifteenth day of every month.  
    
 After crossing the river, the boatman pointed the direction and waited 
for me. I had to climb up the mountain following a small trail to the worship 
site. Along the way there was still some leftover incense sticks and 
firecrackers. The first shrine I saw was a big rock tied up with a red robe. 
There was a big incense burner and wooden table for placing the worshippers‘ 
offerings. There was also a donation box that included a brief explanation of 
Buluotuo. Going further uphill was another shrine to Muliujia which was also 
a big rock (see Figure 32). From these two shrines I could see beautiful 
scenery of the river and reservoir. I met no one uphill and it took about an hour 
to find the way back to the boat. Since it was late in the afternoon I had no 
Figure 32- Buluotuo and Muliujia Shrines at Baidong River Reservoir 
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time to visit a nearby village to learn more about the folk stories and 
background of the shrines. 
     Later, when I went to interview Qin Jianzhen, who had collected 
Buluotuo scriptures from Baise, I unexpectedly had the chance to learn more 
about Buluotuo worship at Baidong River Reservoir. As abovementioned, 
villages in the Eastern part of Baise are located on a tributary of the Baidong 
River. When we went to interview bumo living at Bailan Township in the 
mountainous area of Baise, we heard villagers tell Mr. Qin about the conflict 
between two communities at Baidong River. They said that formerly they 
usually went to worship Buluotuo at Baidong River (see Map 4). But after two 
communities had a conflict, they did not want to go there anymore.  
The person who gave me the details about Buluotuo worship at 
Baidong River was Mr. Li (64 years old) - a video cameraman who was 
interested in religious activities. He went to record video when villagers 
performed the kaiguang ritual (act of formal consecration) at the Buluotuo 
shrine of Baidong River reservoir in 2006. He also edited and produced VCDs 
for villagers and gave me a copy of the VCD. Because of his close relationship 
with villagers, he contacted the Zhi-luo villagers for me. 
From informal interviews, the sudden promotion of the Buluotuo 
cultural tourism festival by the authorities and scholars made Mr. Li and 
villagers raise the question of authenticity of Buluotuo Festival at Mt. 
Ganzhuang, as they had witnessed the worship tradition at Baidong River 
since they were young. In 2006, villagers from Zhi-luo and Na-ye hamlets 
mutually collected money and donations from commoners and businessmen to 
build the Buluotuo and Muliujia shrines on Buluotuo Mountain. They wanted 
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to compete with Mt Ganzhuang for being the original place of Buluotuo 
worship, and to develop it as a tourist destination. As a part of their fight, they 
prepared a brochure to publicize the site.  
According to a brochure made by the villagers, Buluotuo Mountain is 
12 km from the city. Folk legend says that after creating mankind and all 
things, Buluotuo was a boatman living on one bank of the Baidong River. 
When villagers of Zhi luo village went to the market, they had to go through 
Baidong River and would take his boat across the river. He was generous and 
had miraculous powers. Whenever there was flooding, he helped people cross 
over the flood to the other side by extending his arm as a bridge. One day his 
wife Muliujia went to collect vegetables at the opposite mountain. There was 
heavy rain that caused a sudden flash flood flowing from the mountain.  As 
usual, he extended his arm and his wife walked across the river. Suddenly, 
though, an ant bit his arm. Buluotuo spontaneously drew back his hand and 
Muliujia fell into the very rapid current of water. She then became a big rock 
in Baidong River. Later, Buluotuo missed her very much so he turned into a 
large rock on the mountain at a spot where he could see his wife and all the 
creatures and things he had created, in order to protect his descendants, to live 
safely and peacefully.  The mountain has been called Buluotuo Mountain from 
the past till now. 
The committees had a plan to hold a song fair on the 8th of the 3rd lunar 
month, which is the same date as the state-led Buluotuo Festival, in order to 
raise more donations to construct the ladder in June 2007, but the plan was 




When Mr. Li told the villagers that I would like to visit Zhi-lou hamlet, 
three women waited there to welcome me and my translator, and brought us to 
take a ferry to the site. The reservoir was built in 1958. Baidong River 
Reservoir has clear water with ravishingly beautiful scenery and a majestic 
mountain. Along the way that we were climbing, mango orchards were 
bearing abundant fruit. The three women sometimes took a rest and sang 
Zhuang songs. They told us that there were plenty of folk stories about 
Buluotuo, but because the elder who was the story teller had already passed 
away, now they could not remember what exactly the stories said. From their 
memory, Buluotuo had seven brothers. They became big rocks and flew to 
several places, such as Yufeng and Debao.  
Ms. Li (57 years old) stated that: 
Here is Buluotuo’s place of origin. It was Ma Biao who moved it 
(Buluotuo‘s place of origin) to his own hometown, Baiyu. It was 
only after the move that people went there to worship. Baiyu was 
originally the (site of) ruins of Madam Wa, the real Buluotuo is 
here. … 
The real Buluotuo is here, the people in Baiyu also believe (in 
Buluotuo); however, all the events are only held there (Mt 
Ganzhuang). Hence, we do not have any money for development. 
Every year, on the first and fifteenth day (of the first lunar month), 
the people from Baiyu came here to worship as well. In the past, 
this place was more backward. Only the old people came here to 
worship during the Lunar New Year and on other festivals. Later, 
we gradually gained the economic means to organize some 
activities. Presently, we are more well-known. The geomancer and 
daogong say that, on the left of Buluotuo Mountain is a (river that 
looks like a) dragon and on its right is a (river that looks like a) 
snake. (Emphasis added) (Interviewed on June 2012) 
When we took the ferry back to the parking area, we learned that the old 
woman selling incense there (whom I met during my first visit) was a ritual 
specialist. She showed us the room where she performed Buluotuo sacrifice 
rituals for devotees. She emphasized that she is bumo not wupo (spirit 
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medium), and this site is the authentic Buluotuo worship site.  
Villagers complain that the local government ignores this original place 
of Buluotuo worship and deceives the public. They think the local government 
developed Mt.Ganzhuang in Baiyu town because it is the hometown of Ma 
Biao, who is a deputy secretary of the GZAR party committee; chairman of 
the Guangxi People's Government and secretary of the Nanning City 
Committee.  
As previously mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, local Zhuang religious 
traditions were excised from the annals of official historiography and labeled 
as a sign of backwardness. Even though they wanted to assert their own 
authenticity, they had no written evidence to support it. They knew that 
scholars had authenticated Mt Ganzhuang as a Buluotuo cultural relic. They 
then referred to an American scholar‘s comment. In 2007, two Americans 
came to observe the Buluotuo festival. After looking around Mt Ganzhuang, 
they said to the Cultural Center personnel, ―I heard that there is a river passing 
by Buluotuo Mountain; why do I not see it (the river)?‖. As Scott suggested, 
gossip is a powerful weapon of the weak. 
To conclude, the cases of the Ting-huai and Baidong River Reservoir 
Buluotuo worship sites illustrate how villagers negotiate in a ―politics of ritual 
displacement‖ by appropriating and embracing the official discourse of  the 
Buluotuo cultural festival as exemplary subjects in order to express their own 
local identities. While members of the old people‘s associations (laorenhui) 
are actively involved in the revival of religious practices and reconstruction of 
their ritual places in an effort to retrieve memories of the community prior to 
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its destruction, younger people are concerned more with economic 
development. Buluotuo myths associated with topography can be used by the 
local people to negotiate with authorities for more recognition and a better 
share of the market.  
Their struggles, however, involve a plurality of actors and multiplicity 
of practices which sometimes lead to internal conflicts. A lack of good leaders, 
proper strategy and unity among the local people in Yufeng and in the Baidong 
River area thus made their negotiations unsuccessful. In the authorities‘ view, 
the folk worship of natural giant rocks at Ting-huai and Baidong River 
Reservoir does not conform to the discourse of a ―socialist spiritual 
civilization‖. Moreover, Buluotuo Culture at Mt Ganzhuang is legitimated by 
the process of ―academizing the gods‖ 82  and recognized by the central 
government as a Zuang intangible cultural heritage on a national level. 
Therefore, their contestation to claim the original place of Buluuotuo worship 
has been ignored by the authorities. 
Significantly, villagers‘ attempts to promote their ritual sites as tourism 
destinations can be seen as the result of state policy for boosting the local 
economy. The pressure of village enterprise competition has forced the 
different villages to compete with each other to promote their reconstructed 
sacred sites aiming to gain material benefit from tourism, as can be seen from 
the competition between the Ting-huai Buluotuo site and Changshou-shan of 
Baile village.  I asked Huang Mingbiao (head of Buluotuo Cultural Research 
Center) why he gave the Buluotuo statue to Changshou-shan, which is not an 
                                                 
82  The term is used by Wang Mingming (2006, 2008), which means ‗lending scholarly 
credentials to claims of antiquity or cultural significance of the deity worship or ritual practice 
in order to be recognized by the state as ―intangible cultural heritage‖ (Chau 2011: 7). 
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historical place of Buluotuo worship.  He answered that, unlike Baile villagers, 
Ting-huai villagers are poor and have no economic capability to construct a 
shrine for a Buluotuo statue. His center obtains just a small annual budget for 
research and could not provide any financial support to the Ting-huai 
Buluotuo site. The statue was kept in a store-room, and it would be more 
useful to give it away to a proper place. However, some key informants at 
Baile village later told me that they were cheated by the officials who 
informed them about the possibility for ASEAN investment if they constructed 
the Buluotuo shrine. Local people then contributed their money to construct it, 
but there were no ASEAN investors visiting the site. This probably was the 
reason why the banners about ASEAN were removed during the Spring 
Festival. 
My ethnography reveals that the villagers and commoners have also 
embraced the official discourse of Buluotuo culture as a means to enlarge 
China-ASEAN economic collaboration.  However, they do not always 
passively accept the discourse and have their own way to use it in the service 
of their own interests. As I will argue below, Buluotuo culture emerged as a 
field of scholastic knowledge, but the scholars nevertheless have little control 
over how local officials, businessmen and villagers have interpreted its 
meaning and use it as commercial market value.  
5.2 ‘Buluotuo’ as Cultural Branding  
Regarding the guiding principles for an intangible cultural heritage that 
―protection as priority, rescue as primacy, rational utilization, and inheritance 
for development‖, the authorities and enterprises can utilize and add initiatives 
for this festival, and at the same time social memory of Buluotuo is re-created 
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through the annual worshipping activities which have become an integral part 
of the festival. The state-sponsored Buluotuo Festival has hence created 
opportunities for an increasing number of actors to assert more 
commercialized interpretations of Buluotuo. Cultural heritage preservation is 
viewed by many Chinese scholars, officials, and villagers themselves as 
powerful tools of modernization and development.  
In the past, most Zhuang villagers in Tianyang primarily engaged in 
wet-rice agriculture, supplementing with other crops such as mango, tomato, 
and sugar crane, etc. They were classified as poor people. Within the last 
several years, however, other sources of non-agricultural income have been 
growing because the local government has launched many projects to increase 
villagers‘ income, especially tourism development. Tianyang in recent decades 
has seen a rapid development in the tourist industry, such as hotels, countless 
small guesthouses, accommodations, restaurants, shops and supermarkets. It is 
today easily accessible by highway from Nanning and Baise (Nanning-Baise 
Highway). The term ‗Buluotuo Culture‘ is relatively new but in recent years it 
has become very influential. Local governments promote Mt Ganzhuang as a 
relic of Zhuang apical ancestors. The Buluotuo image can be an object to be 
commoditized. The state-sponsored Buluotuo Festival has hence created 
opportunities for an increasing number of actors to assert more 
commercialized interpretations of Buluotuo, as will be delineated in the 
ensuing section.  
5.2.1 Brand Positioning: Agricultural Industry 
This section provides several examples to illustrate how state-owned 
enterprises have reinterpreted Buluotuo myths to serve the recent development 
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of the agricultural industry in Tianyang. The name of Buluotuo has become a 
brand image of Tianyang and it is used for several kinds of products related to 
agriculture. 
Buluotuo Folk Custom Tourism Holiday Village  
In 2008, I and my translator went to Tianyang without any official 
invitation. It was difficult to reserve a hotel in Tianyang during the festival. 
My deputy director, who attended a seminar in Nanning, then contacted Prof. 
Nong Lifu, Director of Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and asked for help. 
He called the officers who organized the accommodation for an academic 
conference and I was treated to join in with a group of Vietnamese scholars, 
we stayed at a big new hotel called ―Buluotuo Folk Custom Tourism Holiday 
Village‖.  This hotel is quite far from the city but it is close to the Tianyang 
Agricultural Park. As I had no official invitation, I could not attend the 
academic conference. The officer then recommended that we visit Na-sheng, a 
new village near the hotel which was developed to provide a homestay for 
tourists. From my interviews, villagers were persuaded by the government to 
build a new house as a guest house. The officers brought them to visit similar 
projects in other places. Villagers were allowed a bank loan without interest to 
build a standardized guesthouse designed by the state (see Figure 33). The 
owner would provide a room with food for their guests. The rate was 50-160 
RMB per room per night. Most guests were people who came to visit the 




We talked to an 84-year-old elder wearing the Maoist style blue shirt 
and cap. Grandpa told us that formerly, the villagers living in this area were 
very poor when he was young. Because of drought, famine and arduous living 
condition, he applied to be a soldier so that he could earn some money to 
support his family. As a soldier grandpa rarely was at home, but he still 
remembered that despite being poor, in the past villagers still went to worship 
―Bao‖ (Buluotuo) on the 19th of the second lunar month. After my interviews 
with this elder, Philip, my translator (21 years old) who was born in Tianyang, 
told me that he and his parents (who are senior cadres) had never heard about 
Buluotuo throughout their life in Tianyang and Baise. He also admitted that he 
thought it was a story made up by the local government.  
In addition, what I saw at the 2008 Buluotuo Festival was different 
from the 2007 Festival; there were many booths selling and promoting new 
products such as condominiums, mobile phones, drinking water, and canned 
soft drinks, which are commodities for the new life style of a modern city. It 
seems to me that the authorities and enterprises put more emphasis on 
Figure 33 - The style of guest house at Na-sheng new village 
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commoditization and making revenue than celebrating their Zhuang cultural 
heritage. Cultural value is transformed into a commercial value. The name of 
Buluotuo was not only used as the name of a hotel, but also as a brand of rice. 
People passing by on the highway to Tianyang would see large billboards 
advertising Buluotuo fragrant rice. 
Buluotuo Fragrant Rice 
Wet rice based agriculture is a defining aspect of civilization and an 
important cultural marker of the Zhuang. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
content of scripture ―Mo rouh hoenz haeux‖ (calling rice  soul) tells the story 
of the origins of grains and teaches people how to properly cultivate them, 
Buluotuo culture is linked with the wet-rice agricultural civilization or ‗Na 
culture‘. The authorities hence registered the name of Buluotuo as a brand of 
special fragrant rice produced by Tianyang Golden Harvest Rice Industry Co., 
Ltd. (田阳县金穗米业有限责任公司)- a state holding enterprise, which means the 
biggest stock is from the local government. The image of Mt Ganzhuang Arch 
is also used in the packaging. Moreover, as can be seen in the brochure, 
Premier Wen Jiabao also visited the manufacturer and the products are 
packaged as gifts for the honorable officials who visit Tianyang (Figure 34). 
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                           Figure 34 - A Brochure of Buluotuo Rice 
Dried Fruit Products 
In 2011, Sister Yang (a folk singer) took me to visit the factory she 
works for. Not so far from her factory, we saw another big modern factory 
with a billboard presenting a lady in Zhuang costume. It advertised a company 
that produces dried fruit as a special product of Baise. Sister Yang then 
suggested for me to visit this factory. She went to talk to security and 
introduced me as a foreign guest from Thailand who would like to interview a 
manager. Surprisingly, an office manager offered us a chance to visit the 
factory.  
This company is the branch of a manufacturer in Liuzhou. Since 
Tianyang is famous for producing mangos, tomatoes, and other fruits, the 
entrepreneur expanded to establish this factory to produce dried fruit products 
in 2009. The images of Buluotuo and Muliujia are printed on the packaging 
according the type of fruit, such as a Muliujia image which is used on the 
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Figure 36 - The hand-made symbolic figure of Zhuang harmonious culture 
boxes of dried pineapples and papayas, and a Buluotuo image used for 
tomatoes and mangos (see Figure 35). In addition to dried fruit, the company 
produces more products such as sticky rice whisky in a package of a hand-
made doll serving as a symbolic figure of Zhuang harmonious culture (see 
Figure 36). The company made these products according to the order of local 
authorities as souvenirs for their guests.   
The office manager is a native of Tianyang. Although she is a Han, she 
can fluently speak the local Tianyang Zhuang dialect. Formerly, she worked as 
a tour guide for 3 years in Guilin. When this company was established in 
Tianyang, it was a good opportunity for her to come back and work in her 
Figure 35 - The Billboard and the packages of dried fruits 
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hometown. The manufacturer buys raw material from local farmers and hires 
local people to work in the factory. The company also set up a booth at the 
China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning. In her view, the development of Buluotuo 
cultural tourism has attracted investment from outside and contributed to 
boosting Tianyang‘s economy. 
When I saw the package of the rice whisky, which resembled a small 
souvenir of the old Buddhist temple in Tianyang, I was curious about its 
source. The manager then told me that her company co-operated with a monk 
of the old Buddhist temple in designing the packaging of the products. The 
figure of a human holding a Globe was a hand-made embroidered handicraft 
of the Zhuang elder. As this monk initiated the project to help poor people 
living in remote areas, the company supported his project and bought 
handicrafts which represent Zhuang cultural characteristics. This is a mutually 
beneficial collaboration. 
In short, the state-enterprises‘ initiation of Buluotuo brand in tourism-
related industries implies a project of ―improvement‖ and of building ―quality‖ 
among the impoverished rural people in Tianyang, which is consistent with the 
scholastic discourse of Buluotuo as the Zhuang ancestor who ―conquered the 
tough natural conditions and strong social forces with the Zhuang people who 
had become a civilized ethnic group‖ (as mentioned in 3.2.1). 
Nevertheless, modern circumstances of promoting the Zhuang cultural 
heritage as powerful tools of development enable more actors to assert their 
roles and participate in producing new meanings of Buluotuo. 
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5.2.2 The Rise of New Actors 
 In the 2011 festival, I witnessed the endeavour of several new actors to 
appropriate the festival as their space to present the Zhuang traditions that 
were once denounced from Tianyang social and cultural landscapes, for 
example, the case of Moma hamlet that performed the traditional ―hua lou‖ 
ritual as mentioned in Chapter 4. This section further provides another 
interesting case of a monk who deployed his position in the Buluotuo festival 
to present the Old Buddhist Temple which is irrelevant to Buluotuo. 
A Monk of the Old Buddhist Temple 
As formerly mentioned, the Zhuang have developed their own unique 
belief system by borrowing Chinese religious elements, mixing and blending 
with local traditions and customs. They venerated many gods and deities of 
Taoism and Buddhism, but they have no centralized religious organization or 
doctrine. Acording to Chinese sources, the Zhuang rarely changed to fully 
follow Buddhist doctrine.  
In February 2011 I conducted my fieldwork at Naliang hamlet of 
Longhe village where I saw the written sign of Gu fo si (古佛寺) on an old 
Buddhist temple. I and my assistant went there by walking through tomato 
fields. At the temple there was a man painting decorations on a beam.  When 
he heard that I came from Thailand, he went to inform the abbot, Shi Qing 
Cheng (hereafter Sifu), who enthusiastically welcomed us to look around the 
temple. The buildings were not completely finished, but inside there were 
several statues of Buddhist deities. The board in front of the main hall gave us 
some brief information about the temple reconstruction:  
Old Buddhist temple was built in the late Ming Dynasty, gained 
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golden years in Qing Dynasty, but destroyed by the Cultural 
Revolution. Since the implementation of religious policy, the local 
devotees increased but it was lack of activity center. Hence, devotees 
eagerly wanted a temple. In 2007, Nong Yu Liang and some other 
laypersons promised to rebuild old Buddhist temple, and main hall 
and a hostel on the left were built. In May 2009, with the support 
from the local government, old Buddhist temple was officially 
approved as a Buddhist activity place. This is the luck of Buddhism! 
The luck of all sentient beings!  
  
In order to recover the scale and serendipity of old Buddhist temple, 
this temple decided to build an extension hall and hostel on the both 
sides. Hope all the laymen and laywomen contribute to this 
rebuilding of Buddhist temple. (Tan Lee Ooi translated) 
We were ushered into a room where many Dhamma books and VCDs 
were stored. On the wall there were photos of Sifu and several groups of 
disciples. Speaking in a calm manner, Sifu said to me that he heard about 
Buddhism in Thailand and he would like to visit and learn more about the 
monastic life of monks in Thailand if it was possible for me to invite him. I 
told him that I could not invite him at that time, as I had come to Tianyang to 
do research on Buluotuo culture and would be staying in Guangxi for six 
months on a one-entry visa. Sifu (who is young and energetic) showed us a 
catalogue of the products he partook in designing the concept and packaging 
of for a businessman. The products, for example packages of 12 kinds of 
fragrant incense, candles, and rice, were produced and presented at the 2010 
Buluotuo festival at Mt. Ganzhuang (see Figure 37).  
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Figure 37 - The catalogue of products 
Moreover, Sifu asked me whether I could help him promote traditional 
Zhuang embroidered shoes to a larger market. As a form of philanthropy he 
does not only collect donations, food and second-hand clothing to give to the 
poor Zhuang living in remote areas, but has also initiated a project for 
elevating their income. He has provided raw materials for making traditional 
Zhuang embroidered shoes, clothes, and fragrant souvenirs to poor and needy 
people, and bought their products so that they can earn extra income. Now he 
has a number of these products in stock and would like to sell them (see 
Figure 38 - right).  He also told me that he presented them at the China-
ASEAN Expo and a businessman from the Philippines was interested in 
ordering a thousand pairs of shoes but he could not provide them on time 
because they are hand-made. I was deeply impressed by his creativity and 
good intentions to preserve Zhuang handicrafts.   
Sifu is a native Zhuang of Tianyang. He was born into a very poor 
family. During childhood he often followed his grandma to the temple and 
became interested in Buddhism. He decided to live a monastic life and moved 
to study Dharma at a temple in Yunnan. After that he went to stay in Hong 
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Kong. Although living a comfortable life in Hong Kong, Sifu strongly 
intended to contribute to his hometown. He came back to Tianyang several 
times because he was invited to perform kaiguang ceremonies to officiate and 
consecrate the statues when villagers reconstructed their ritual places. The 
villagers at Baidong River reservoir also know him because Sifu performed a 
kaiguang ceremony for their site and he also brought a large group of disciples 
to release fish into the river. 
To rebuild this old Buddhist temple laypersons must submit an 
application to the Tianyang religious bureau. The temple got official 
permission in 2009 and he permanently moved in to be the only clergy of this 
temple. When he first arrived, there was only one old building. He has since 
built two new halls with an office building on the second floor and a small 
dormitory for elderly women who take turns taking care of cooking, planting 
vegetables, and making paper offerings (see Figure 38 - left). 
In new socioeconomic contexts, the temple can survive only through 
the voluntary support of active devotees and it has to rely on donations, the 
Figure 38 - Sifu and the elders (left); embroidered shoes and fragrant embroidery 
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sale of paraphernalia, and the provision of ritual services for income. The man 
who painted the temple wall is a retired cadre. There were several male 
disciples who serve to drive a car for Sifu. From my observations, the temple‘s 
activities do not gain much financial support from surrounding villagers. 
Almost all the villagers voluntarily contribute in term of labor. The main 
source of donations may derive from cadres, businessmen and urbanites from 
Nanning, Guangzhou and Hong Kong.  
In the state’s view, Buddhism has positive aspects because it provides 
philanthropy, ensures the psychological stability of the masses, and helps to 
promote an orderly and harmonious society, which can fit with the New 
Socialist Countryside program. Sifu has gained respect and become more 
famous in Tianyang because of his active cooperation with local authorities 
and enterprises to create more products using the Buluotuo brand image, as 
abovementioned. His creative ideas conform to the state discourse of linking 
Zhuang national identity with economic development and modernization.  
During the 2007-2009 festivals I observed that there were a few booths 
with Buddhist monks wearing grey robes selling rosaries and other talismans, 
but they were not getting much respect and attention from local officers and 
festival-goers. However, in 2010 Sifu properly appropriated the discourse of 
Buuotuo as the Zhuang apical ancestor and the creator of their wet-rice 
agricultural civilization to include value-added culture to several kinds of 
products, and wisely appropriated the Buluuotuo Festival as a place to present 
the existence of an old Buddhist temple.  
I did not witness how Sifu played a role in the 2010 festival. However, 
in the 2011 festival I witnessed a major change in terms of representation that 
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affects the symbolic content of the Zugong temple. When climbing up to the 
zugong temple, I saw several red prayer flags, newly tied to the trees in front 
of the temple. At the front door there were tables displaying a variety of 
charms, auspicious objects and talismans. There were several women assisting 
in selling them. Inside the hall at the left corner there was a booth to sell 
candles and auspicious souvenirs. Things were arranged neatly and in order 
under the supervision of Sifu. I talked to a seller, Mrs.Wu (62 years old), she 
said a group of elders voluntarily took turns to serve the old Buddhist temple. 
The money earned from selling would be used for the temple‘s construction 
and other activities. They had already performed their selling services with 
deep faith for two years. 
One thing that struck my eye was a blind woman sitting as a beggar 
near the door. I recalled that this woman had a beautiful voice and she led 
worshippers in singing worship songs in Zhuang style inside this hall in the 
2009 festival. After chanting, local worshippers would then continue talking 
with her and give her some money, when they listened to her harsh conditions 
of living she was sometimes crying and they tried to sooth her. It was full of a 
friendly and sympathetic atmosphere among the Zhuang women. However, the 
activities in the hall in 2011 were set in order and she could do nothing, just sit 
quietly and press her hands together in a sign of asking for donations. No one 
talked to her and some gave some money into a small cup in front of her. The 
orderliness in some ways blocked the chance for this beggar to show her 
singing ability.  
After that, I revisited the temple several times but I never met Sifu 
again. He was very busy with religious activities outside the temple. But I 
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witnessed the rapid development of the temple during a short period. The 
construction of new halls was finished and there are several new beautiful 
statues of deities such as Maitreya Buddha and a thousand-hand Guanyin. This 
means that Sifu was successful in raising funds and the temple has become 
more well-known.  
To conclude, by cooperation with hegemonic discourse, Sifu became a 
recognized social actor in Tianyang and has played a vital role in the Buluotuo 
Festival since 2010. This case is an interesting instance that reveals the role of 
a return expatriate who is familiar with state discourse and has experienced 
broader society (inter-regionally and internationally), his action has then 
impressed the authorities, enterprises, and Han and Zhuang urbanites. 
Bumo Nong and his set of Buluotuo scriptures 
Registered as an ICH, there is also a requirement from the State 
Council to standardize the protection of the ICH. According to this policy, 
local governments are required to implement procedures for their protection 
and give priority to preservation over further development. The Tianyang 
government thus established the Tianyang Buluotuo Cultural Research Centre 
and appointed Huang Mingbiao to be the head of the center. Due to encounters 
with and suspicions from Han scholars and commoners, Huang Mingbiao put 
efforts toward discovering more Buluotuo scriptures in Tianyang in order to 
convince the public that Tianyang is the center of Buluotuo culture. He 
complained to me that in the past all Buluotuo scriptures collected from 
Tianyang were sent directly to Nanning. There was no evidence remaining in 
the Tianyang library and museum. Utilizing local connections, he finally 
discovered that bumo of the Nong clan had preserved a set of Buluotuo 
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scriptures in a remote mountainous area of Pohong Town. After several 
negotiations, he got permission to make a copy of the scriptures and send them 
to Mr Zhang (the honorary president of the Zhuang Studies Association, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3) in Nanning. 
In the 2011 festival, the cultural staff hence invited a young bumo 
Nong and his followers to partake in the parade and Buluotuo worship 
ceremony. Costumes were provided for the group, and in addition, large 
models of discovered scripture, the 1991 and 2004 editions of Buluotuo 
Scriptures – in Annotated Translation, were displayed in the parade to 
publicize the existence of ancient Zhuang scriptures that survived from the 
socialist state‘s eradication campaigns (see Figure 39 and 40). 
Figure 39 - Models of the 1991 and 2004 Buluotuo scriptures' annotated 
                   translation 
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             Figure 40 - A model of bumo Nong's scripture 
Zhuang intellectuals who desired to preserve Buluotuo culture lived 
primarily in Nanning and even in Beijing, while the officials and residents of 
Tianyang were more concerned with poverty alleviation and therefore did not 
concern themselves much over the value of their culture. Very few local 
people knew about the preservation and publication of Buluotuo scriptures. 
Local cultural staffs in Tianyang could not access the publication of Buluotuo 
scriptures because these books were not in the local library. Some scholars 
complained about the high price of the eight-volume 2004 edition of Buluotuo 
scriptures, which costs 3,000 RMB. This amount of money is higher than the 
salary of local cultural staff. Even Huang Mingbiao told me that he had only 
one volume which related to the scriptures from Tianyang. Therefore, 
representing the publications in the parade contributed to an increase in local 
people‘s awareness about the academic research and to reinforce the 
importance of Buluotuo scriptures. 
The discovery of bumo Nong‘s scriptures epitomizes the distrust and 
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tensions between bumo, local officials and the central officials in Nanning. 
Bumo of the Nong clan concealed the remnants of transmitted scriptures and 
scrolls for generations and distrusted local officials who could seize them, they 
thus presented them only a few Buluotuo scriptures. Meanwhile, local officials 
were unwilling to give the scriptures to Nanning, but they did not know much 
about Buluotuo scriptures that had been collected in the past because the 
cultural staff who collected the scriptures had already passed away. At the 
same time, an expert in Nanning also distrusted the local officials‘ ability of 
old scriptures preservation and wanted to deal directly with bumo Nong.  
Even though bumo Nong owns the Buluotuo scriptures that is relevant 
to Buluotuo culture, he did not play a vital role in the festival like Sifu. In the 
eyes of state authorities, bumo Nong is uneducated, disabled and too difficult 
to deal with. He did not passively fulfill his role according to the officials‘ 
demand, but play along with them. Interestingly, after presenting his old 
scriptures in the festival he became well-known among local people and he 
was often requested to perform rituals.    
5.3 Making Place: Visualizing the Myth to create Memory 
―Intangible Cultural Heritage‖ is new concept in 2004 when the PRC 
ratified UNESCO convention. The PRC has her own discursive and 
institutional norms of cultural heritage protection: ―protection as priority, 
rescue as primacy, rational utilization, and inheritance for development‖. The 
items that are officially designated as ICH at a national level have become 
unique tourist resources. The State Council requires local governments to 
implement procedures for protection and gives special funding to them for 
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heritage protection.  
Since registered as ICH in 2006, Buluotuo culture is regarded as a 
powerful tourist resource by local governments and state-owned enterprise. 
Baise and Tianyang governments has made a great effort to package worship 
traditional practices and song fair, combining with folk sport, lion dance and 
artistic dance performed by local arts organization to display onstage at Mt 
Ganzhuang and city square. Despite the unprecedented growth in popularity of 
the Buluotuo festival, income derived from the three-day festival is not 
sufficient to cover the investment. In 2010, which was the end of the 11th Five-
year plan83, local governments, enterprises and their related departments held 
several meetings to discuss how to accelerate the development of the Mt. 
Ganzhuang Buluotuo cultural tourism area in order to attract more tourists 
throughout the year. Twelve experts were invited as consultants to frame the 
program. 
As the co-host of academic seminars in 2010, Mr. Zhang - president of 
Zhuang Studies Association not only played a privileged role that influenced 
the academic direction of research on Buluotuo, but he also encouraged local 
governments to reconstruct local memory of Buluotuo by visualizing the myth 
in three-dimensional way. He suggested that: 
… the tourism development of Buluotuo culture is undoubtedly 
dependent on the reproduction of Buluotuo cultural creams in a 
vivid and iconic way. That needs not only the in-depth and 
systematic research of Buluotuo culture of scholars, but also the 
participation of artists such as painters, sculptors, and musicians. 
Only then can creams of Buluotuo culture be reproduced in a vivid 
                                                 
83  According to this Plan, ‗construction of socialist economy, socialist politics, socialist 




and three-dimensional way. (Emphasis added) (English version of 
Zhang Shengzhen‘s speech given on April 22, 2010) 
Mr. Zhang‘s suggestions on Buluotuo cultural reconstruction appeared to 
be gradually implemented. In 2010, a new song ‗Xungen wenzu buluotuo‘ was 
shown and broadcast on the program ―Zhongguo minge‖ of CCTV channel 2. 
The hotels run by Ganzhuang Mountain Tourism also had wall paintings of 
Buluotuo myths. In March 2011 three-dimensional sculptures telling the story 
of Buluotuo myth were built at the city square. There were also billboards 
along main streets to promote the Mt. Ganzhuang Buluotuo Cultural Relic.  
 The 2011 
The following section shows that a series of projects initiated and 
planned by the Baise and Tianyang governments, enterprises, and scholars are 
the outcomes of the interconnections between the scholarly productions of 
Buluotuo myth and the wider constructions of wet-rice agricultural civilization 
as a distinctive source of ―Tai‖ identity. These projects have affected villagers‘ 
Figure 41 - Sculpture, Painting and Billboards in Tianyang 
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lives and spaces, but villagers themselves have never been consulted.  This has 
inevitably led to some tensions between the state enterprises and villagers.  
5.3.1 Mt. Ganzhuang Buluotuo cultural tourism area: the contradictions 
Based on the main theme of Mt. Ganzhuang as ‗a sacred land of the 
Zhuang‘, the cultural positions of the scenic spot are humanities ancestor 
worship, rice culture exhibition garden, and the Zhuang culture research base. 
According to the plan, the Mt. Ganzhuang Buluotuo cultural tourism area is 
divided into six parks: ―paddy field ecological cultural area‖ (稻作生态文化
区), ―commercial cultural activities area‖ (商贸文体活动区), ―root finding 
and ancestor worship area‖ (寻根祭祖朝圣区), ―cultural heritage preservation 
area‖ (文化遗址保护区), ―Zhuang's descendant statue garden‖ (壮之骄子雕
塑园), ―Zhuang's mystique cultural garden‖  (壮族神秘文化园). Each park has 
different content and a different function, but they are interrelated together. 
(Luo H.2011) 
Academic research contends that Buluotuo scriptures are vivid records 
illustrating that the Zhuang are one of world's oldest rice-cultivated ethnic 
groups and that rice culture that has been handed down for thousands of years.  
This characteristic is regarded as one of the most distinctive characteristics of 
the Zhuang nationality. Several Zhuang intellectuals implemented efforts to 
lift the status of Buluotuo as high as Huang Di and Yan Di, by accrediting that  
…in terms of mythology, that Huang Di is the agricultural god of 
millet growing in Yellow River Valley, Yan Di [is the god] of rice 
farming in Yangtze River Valley, and Buluotuo [is the god] of rice 
farming in Zhujiang River Valley of South China. These three 
major agricultural civilizations have become the main stream of 
China‘s agriculture. (quoted from abstract of Qin, N. 2008) 
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The assumption that Buluotuo is the god of rice farming led to a plan 
to restructure the nearby villages, which had derived major sources of income 
from growing other crops such as mango and sugar crane, to exhibit rice-
cultivating area. The authorities have a top-down policy to include Na-Liao 
hamlet in the project as a ―paddy field ecological cultural area‖ due to its 
proximity to Mt. Ganzhuang.  
According to the survey, Na-Liao hamlet, with a total Zhuang 
population of 64 households and 256 people, is mainly based on agriculture, 
including planting rice, corn, sugar cane, mangoes, oranges, tomatoes, green 
beans and peanuts, sweet potatoes, watermelons and other crops. The houses 
in this village are not yet transformed into modern style. Villagers still 
preserve Zhuang ethnic customs and etiquette. The consultant team suggested 
that, with a little transformation, Na-Liao hamlet would be able to become a 
place to display Zhuang rice culture. According to the plan, this rice ecological 
and cultural zone is a living museum presenting the villages, their residents 
and their everyday lives. Villagers continue to live in their houses and continue 
to carry out agricultural activities. (Luo, H. 2011) 
On the contrary, Na-guan hamlet will be transformed into a 
―commercial cultural activities area‖. The Tianyang construction Bureau, 
Urban and Rural Planning and Design Institute are responsible for planning 
and design. They proposed a new layout of the village‘s plan and the design of 
residential buildings and surroundings.  The authorities and enterprises built 
infrastructure to improve the living conditions84 and make the street layout 
                                                 
84 The Tianyang news in 2011 reported that the Tianyang County government and Baiyu town 
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tidier. According to the original intention of the designer, Na-guan hamlet, 
located on the left side of the main entrance plaza of Mt Ganzhuang, should be 
renovated as a display area of a commercial cultural market, providing tourists 
a set of craft goods, local food, drink and snacks, where visitors from afar can 
stay overnight and spend time sight-seeing, shopping, and eating. All 
residential buildings in the village should have similar internal and external 
decorations. 
Villagers were persuaded to build new houses along the street and add 
more architectural elements of Zhuang culture. However, villagers agreed to 
build only similar external decorations because each family had to build new 
houses from their own budget. Some built a two-floor house and some built a 
three-floor house. The government provided a 12,000-15,000 RMB-subsidy 
for each house to make similar external decorations according to the design. 
(Interviewed on June 2012) (See Figure 42) 
 
Figure 42 - The transformation of Na-guan hamlet 
                                                                                                                                
Party committee invested over 22 millions yuan to complete infrastructure in order to 
construct an ecological agricultural town (www.dsecurity.info/9813.html). 
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Nonetheless, the authorities have a plan to display Zhuang traditional 
handicrafts such as bamboo and rattan weaving, Zhuang brocade weaving, 
embroidered ball production and pottery in the cultural activities area in an 
attempt to construct a tourism-oriented exotic landscape for visitors.  
However, my interlocutors in Na-liao and Na-guan hamlets in 2011 -2012 
did not know this top-down plan of the authorities. The tension between 
villagers and the enterprise occurred when a large stage was built in front of 
the Earth-god shrine, which is a communal sacred space of three hamlets near 
Mt. Ganzhuang. The villagers strongly objected to the authorities‘ attempt to 
move the Earth-god shrine. Some complained that:  
The government wanted to build a Lion Dance stage in front of it. How 
can this be possible? How can they be jumping in front of the Earth-
god shrine? So the government moved the Earth-god shrine a little 
further away by building a new and bigger one at the back. Those 
elderlies all said that this would destroy the (good) geomancy 
(fengshui) (of the place), and that it is a must to move the Lion Dance 
stage (to another location). Moreover, the Earth-god shrine has been 
there for generations, why should it be moved? But it is useless (to say 





Figure 43 - The Lion Dance stage in front of the Earth-god shrine 
In the 2008-2009 festival I observed, there had been an International 
Dragon Dance and Lion Dance competition taking place at a platform near the 
main pavilion. Moreover, since Tianyang Zhuang lion dance skills have been 
listed as a national intangible cultural heritage, lion dance competition 
becomes a major activity in order to promote the festival on an international 
level. The enterprise constructed the stage for an international lion dance 
competition on the right side of the arch which was in front of the Earth God 
shrine at the northeast corner under a big banyan tree (see Figure 43). Aiming 
to ―carry forward traditional Chinese culture, and deepen the friendship 
between China and ASEAN countries‖, dragon and lion dance teams from 
other provinces, ASEAN countries, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were 
invited to join the International Lion Dance Competition at Mt. Ganzhuang 
(Guangxipress 2012, March 29).  
The construction of the stage illustrates how the authorities and enterprise 
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developed the site without respect to Zhuang custom, because Zhuang people 
have always had a taboo against singing folk songs and dancing in front of 
temples, which is regarded as blasphemous behavior. Moreover, when the 
villagers complained about it, the authorities decided to relocate the Earth-god 
shrine, which inevitably produced a very intense contradiction. Scholars 
suggested that ―the relocation of Earth-god shrine should also be made by the 
masses themselves‖ (Luo 2011). However, an accident that occurred during 
the competition in 2012 fuelled a rumor among the villagers about the curse of 
blasphemy. Though the authorities financed the construction of the new shrine, 
no one dared to move it. Some villagers said  
(People from) our two villages do not wish to move (it). Who dares to 
move (it)? Moving it would bring about bad luck (or misfortune). (I) 
heard that previously someone moved the incense burner and later, 
died. (Interviewed on June 2012) 
Besides, the growth of agricultural income among farmers made the 
villagers complain about insufficient compensation and called for more 
compensation for their land use. Many villagers also complained about the fact 
that they were not allowed to set up stalls unless they paid a fee during the 
festival. Mrs. Huang complained that: 
The government acquired our land, and said that they would give us 
¥800 per mu85, but for three years they have not given us anything. As 
for my family, we just received ¥500. (I) heard that it had been 
deducted by the (people) above. Moreover, what can we do with ¥800 
nowadays? After expiration (of the contract) this year, it is chaotic. 
Some people leased their farms to companies. We farmers depend on 
our farms for a living, giving (us) that little bit of allowance, how is it 
enough for our use?  (Interviewed on June 2012) 
From my interview, Mr Wei, a manager of the Buluotuo Folk Culture 
                                                 
85 ‗Mu‘ is a land measurement in Chinese, 16 mu is equal to 1 hectare. 
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Travel Company, told me that his company had contacted someone to rent the 
200-mu of land along the foothill, land which had belonged to the villagers for 
30 years. According to the agreement in 2008, the company paid a rent of 500 
RMB per one mu of land per year. Recently, villagers negotiated to increase 
land compensation to 1,500 RMB per one mu per year, which was 
unacceptable. ―We will pay rent based on market conditions. The rent will be 
adjusted every three years. It can be negotiated up to 200 RMB.‖ he said. Now 
villagers still plant some crops on their land. In case there is a group of tourists 
who want to see bull-fighting, the company will inform villagers in advance to 
clear that area for a bull-fighting show. He stated that ―in order to develop 
tourist places, we plan to purchase these lands eventually. But now it is quite 
expensive to buy it.‖  
Mr. Wei informed me that the main source of the company income 
derives from charging the 600-yuan-fee per booth from vendors for selling 
food, drinks, and other products, and car parking fees during the three-day 
festival. There were not so many tourists visiting the site during non-festival 
periods, the income from selling entrance tickets was low. At the time of my 
interview, the company planned to further develop infrastructure and facilities 
and then submit the application to the China National Tourism Administration 
to designate Mt. Ganzhuang as an AAAA international scenic spot86 so that the 
company can charge a higher price for a ticket and advertise to attract more 
tourists87 (interviewed on 31 May 2011).  
                                                 
86 In China, tourist sites are classified according to rank from A (the lowest level), AA, AAA, 
AAAA and AAAAA (the highest level) (Nyiri 2006). 
87 When I asked about an average income from the festival, Mr. Wei refused to answer, 
however, the news reported that the 2012 Buluotuo Festival achieved 3,800 million yuan 
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Oral traditions related to Buluotuo circulated limitedly among a few 
members of the elderly who have passed away. Moreover, as shown 
previously in sections 4.2.2 and 5.1, there were a variety of Buluotuo and 
Muliujia myths, which varied according to locality. Not everyone at the local 
level imagined Buluotuo in the same way. The ‗lost‘ memory in Tianyang 
caused suspicions and pejorative attitudes among commoners in Tianyang and 
some Han scholars regarding the state-promoted Buluotuo Cultural Tourism 
development at Mt. Ganzhuang. Some native Tianyang born after the 1950s 
may have heard about Buluotuo and Muliujia myths when they were young, 
but thought they were just folk tales:  
 ―Actually, those of our generation do not really believe in all 
these, just that they are said to be true, just like folk tales. 
However, presently, they make mythical characters become 
real. Lies frequently repeated would become truths.‖ 
(Emphasis added, interviewed Mr Li (64 years old) on June 2011) 
There were controversial debates among the scholars who are most 
influential in the creation of an overarching identity of the Zhuang. Scholars88 
were finding it difficult to make the authorities support the preservation of 
Zhuang traditional culture unless it would affect economic development. 
Meanwhile, Zhuang villagers were rather more adopted and adapted to 
modern Chinese cultural elements than to maintaining their traditions that pose 
challenges to the preservation of a Zhuang intangible cultural heritage created 
by Zhuang intellectuals.  
Interestingly, some retired Zhuang scholars turned out to be consultants 
                                                                                                                                
revenues from a total of 40 million domestic and international visitors (Guangxipress, 5 April 
2012).  
88 Some scholars personally told me that central authorities would not be happy to see an 
increased number of Zhuang worshippers. 
252 
 
for the enterprises‘ investment projects. Through the celebration of heritage, 
some Zhuang intellectuals have viewed that the visualization of the past and 
the myth would re-create social memory of the endangered Zhuang culture 
and hope that it will contribute to create the younger generations‘ awareness 
on Zhuang heritage. They then advised the entrepreneurs to utilize their 
arduous research on Zhuang culture and history in the project of ―Zhuang 
City‖.  
5.3.2 Zhuang City   
Due to the rapid development of urbanized construction and real estate, 
Guangxi has undergone enormous change. However, the architectural style of 
most construction projects is modern, lacking in distinctive local 
characteristics and Zhuang national culture. Regarding the 11th Five Year Plan, 
the Regional Party committee proposed the objective of constructing a ‗culture 
of Guangxi‘. This policy encouraged real estate developers to use the 
historical and cultural character of the Zhuang to create a landmark of Zhuang 
cultural landscape.  
From the website Rauz.net (2010, September 27), ―Zhuang City‘ is a 
property development project invested by the Guangxi Bagui Investment 
Group. In order to promote the culture of Guangxi, the ―Zhuang City‖ project 
follows the ""Minzu + International + residential + commercial + Culture + 
Tourism" national and international, tradition and innovation, culture and 




Figure 44 - The image of Zhuang City 
―Zhuang City‖ is located to the west of the Tianyang train station, 
covering an area of 401 mu, with a total construction area of about 600,000 
square meters with a total investment of 1 billion RMB.89 According to the 
plan, the project includes ―6 +1, 11+1 multi-buildings, subtropical style 
garden, 3-4 layers folk Commercial Street, Zhuang culture stage, Zhuang 
Cultural Square, Zhuang style four-star hotel, Zhuang specialty clubs, 
swimming pools, kindergartens, and etc‖. It claims that the architectural style 
of construction derives from combining and integrating the art and architecture 
in Southeast Asia. Local identity in terms of common culture and shared 
historical features is reaffirmed and appropriated to be a cultural resource of 
the project. 
When the project is completed, it will combine with the recent 
Buluotuo cultural site and become the first Zhuang Habitat that includes a 
luxury residential area, commercial area, living museum of Zhuang culture, 
                                                 
89 Website of Guangxi Bagui Investment Group (广西八桂投资集团有限公司) 
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and centre of academic exchanges to show Zhuang cultural heritage to the 
world. "Zhuang city" encompasses high economic value, cultural value, 
historical value and aesthetic value. It advertises that home buyers and 
entrepreneurs will have one place to live and work in ―the vast new world of 
unlimited business opportunities‖. 
 
Figure 45 - A Billboard of Zhuang City 
During my fieldwork, the large area set aside to construct ―Zhuang 
City‖ was enclosed by a zinc fence. Passersby could see only the large image 
of a map representing that Zhuang City would be the cultural centre of the 
Zhuang in China and other Tais in Southeast Asian countries and India (see 
Figure 45). Moreover, Pan laoshi personally told me that there will be a 
museum to exhibit cultural materials from other Southeast Asia countries. It 
reveals that the target customers of this project are outside businessmen and 
international investors who want to live in a noble residence when they come 
to do business in Tianyang. 
The business opportunities related to agricultural products are 
burgeoning. I witnessed businessmen from other parts of China setting up 
weighing machines along the road to buy tomatoes from villagers. From only 
a one-hour observation, they bought more than ten thousand RMB worth. 
These businessmen would stay in Tianyang for several days to buy at least a 
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full container of agricultural products and bring them to sell in other cities.  
 In 2011, the Baise government announced the launching of the ―China 
- ASEAN (Tianyang) International Modern Agriculture Logistics Park‖ 
project. With a total planning area of about 3,000 acres and a total investment 
of 30 billion RMB, the project plans to build a trading floor, cargo handling 
areas, cold storage, warehousing, large parking lots, agricultural logistics and 
distribution centers, inspection and quarantine centers, electronic clearing 
house and ancillary services facilities. It is expected to become China's largest 
agricultural distribution center in the south (Xu, 2011, October 30).  
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
We have seen in this chapter how Buluotuo myth and local traditions 
of Buluoutuo worship are appropriated at various levels—from nation-state to 
province, county and local community—in the struggles for legitimacy to 
express Zhuang identity. The items that are officially designated as ICH at a 
national level have become unique tourist resources. The project of Buluotuo 
Culture development is a state-sponsored project. In term of agencies and their 
power relations, both scholars and local government must rely on the Central 
government and CCP policies. Although these two agents have their own 
agenda, they have to communicate with the CCP by using acceptable 
language. The discourse of promoting Buluotuo Culture thus oscillates 
between Zhuang national identity, religious devotion, and even commercial 
spectacle.  
For Zhuang ritual specialists and local villagers who still speak Zhuang 
language in their everyday life, worshipping the gods and goddess by singing 
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mountain songs are essential to their self-image. In consistent with Davis‘s 
(2005) argument, while many of them participate in cultural display staged by 
the state and the tourism enterprises, they also revive traditional customs and 
practice indigenous religions behind the direct gaze of the state and tourists. 
All instances in this chapter clearly point to the fact that various actors 
participate and negotiate in commoditization of Buluotuo culture for their own 
interest. In sum, the promotion of Buluotuo cultural festival offered a ―field‖ 
for individual innovation, collective experimentation, and probably plenty of 
failures in the struggle for the right to speak and to be recognized.  
The system of the promotion of tourism intervenes in the definition of 
the values of Buluotuo culture. The state, the tourism sector, and Zhuang 
intellectuals all engage in selecting and shifting aspects of Zhuang ethnic 
culture to produce ‗‗authentic‘‘ cultural images of Mt. Ganzhuang Buluotuo 
cultural tourism area. Within the frame of reference of Chinese ICH 
preservation, their idea of ‗baohu‘ cultural heritage connoted more of a 
development and improvement, not preservation. The authorities and experts 
thus planned to tear down the old buildings and reconstructing the landscape 
according to a contemporary ideal that was thought to be attractive to tourists 
and ―more representative‖ of Zhuang culture. Local governments regard 
Buluotuo culture with the notions of intangible cultural heritage as a cultural 
resource that promises future prosperity of Tianyang. From a state point of 
view, it is also an opportunity to intervene in the process of cultural change 
and improve the lives of these poor villagers into a modern, clean, and sanitary 
housing development. However, villagers themselves were never consulted 
beforehand and this kind of top-down plan tends to cause tensions between 
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villagers and state enterprise because the transformation in some ways 
alienates local communities from their own cultural resources. 
Accordingly, the transitional period in China has fostered a dramatic 
intersection of global-national-local forces, which allow not only the Zhuang 
actors but also outsiders and international actors to participate in the Zhuang 
cultural tourism development. Seen in this light, Zhuang ethnic consciousness 
has been stimulated by these new economic policies. The claims of 
connections between the Zhaung and other Tai-speaking groups in Southeast 
Asia have developed into a dialogue with state policies and a ―new politics of 
difference‖ in the post-Mao era (Gladney 1994). The identity of the Zhuang 
now seems destined to become a true transnational conversation that locals 





Quest for the Self  
 
The preceding chapters have attempted to trace the formation of 
“Zhuang zu” in the PRC and the rise of Zhuang ethnic consciousness among the 
elites and intellectuals. These intellectuals started researching myths, folklores, 
folksongs, and artistic aspects of religious performances with the aim of 
bringing to light the foundations of their cultural identity. However, all 
cultural/ethnic identities were subject to pressures from the Chinese socialist 
state during the radical Maoist years. Zhuang elites and intellectuals recognized 
the wide range of assimilative forces at work on their culture and they often saw 
the growing consequences of assimilation through language loss and cultural 
dilution in the post-Mao era. 
Despite facing significant pressure from the Chinese state and society to 
assimilate culturally and linguistically, the Zhuang have never exhibited its 
quest for self-determination and independence in contrast to the situation in 
Xinjiang and Tibet. Nonetheless, research shows that ethnic capital in elite 
recruitment in the PRC acts in favour of the minority groups that have strong 
ethnic identities. Although Guangxi and Ningxia contain significant numbers of 
Zhuang and Hui population, their performance in elite recruitment is poor 
compared to other autonomous regions (Zang 1998). The Zhuang elites bear a 
stigma of being sinicized and undistinguishable from the Han in terms of 
distinctive physical appearance. Furthermore, in practice, the power to govern 
ethnic autonomous prefectures rests with the party secretary appointed by the 
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CCP. The local ethnic Chairman of the region's government is regarded as its 
nominal head.  
As previously delineated in 3.2.2, after a long period of cultural decline, 
the cultural awareness of the Zhuang was heightened by foreign professional 
archaeologists, ethnologists, and linguists from Thailand and other countries. 
The “root seeking” movement of Thai academics in the 1980-1990s had arisen 
from a perception that the academics felt Thai traditional culture to be under 
threat from modernization and Westernization while other isolated Tai-speaking 
groups in the socialist states like China, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam had been 
better able to preserve traditional values. Under the circumstances of rapid 
economic growth of Thailand at that time, a series of academic projects were 
launched to study Tai peoples linked by language and cultural traditions 
The international conferences of linguistic, ethnological, archaeological, 
and historical research dealing with broader groups of people speaking 
languages of the Tai family allow public discussion about the theories of the 
place of “Tai origin” before the borders of modern nation-states were formed, 
most of which pointed to several areas in southern China and northern Vietnam. 
This provided the Zhuang with a more positive attitude toward their own group 
because it was in line with their argument about the root of the Zhuang. As there 
is no evidence of a surviving legend about large-scale migration in past times 
from distant places, they argue that the Zhuang are descendants of Baiyue—the 
indigenous people of southern China. The linguistic and archaeological 
evidence suggest that the Yue developed centralized societies, characterized by 
well-developed bronze casting techniques, and wet-rice cultivation (Higham 
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1996), which give new meaning to Zhuang culture and the way to express their 
identity as a “Tai sibling” at the national and international level. 
In the late 1990s, however, this new positive perception of Zhuang 
identity was limited to Zhuang intellectuals. Grassroots activity has increased 
to restore the transborder connections to the Tay and Nung90 in Vietnam when 
good relations between China and Vietnam were restored. Through increased 
cross-border trade relations, Tai speaking groups on the Sino-Vietnam border 
have dramatically increased cross-border relationships and a pan-ethnic identity 
has been created. There was an attempt to restore Nong Zhigao’s history, the 
Zhuang hero who founded the independent Great South Country. In 1996-1997, 
a local group of Nong Zhigao’s descendants and their supporters from Jingxi 
County took the initiative to revive interest in the rebel’s life and deeds. The 
vice-director of the Center for Zhuang Studies in Nanning had been invited to 
authenticate the discovery of the cave believed to be Nong Zhigao’s dwelling 
and storehouse at the time he founded his first kingdom. A modern stele was 
then erected on this site. A large group of provincial officials and leading 
academics from Guangxi reportedly attended the commemoration ceremony. 
This successfully brought Nong Zhigao into the public eyes, but the 
commemoration festival was unable to be promoted as Zhuang cultural heritage. 
Some high-level political figures avoided involvement because they concerned 
over its “separatist” implications (Anderson 2007: 171). In other words, their 
                                                 
90 The names “Tay,” “Nung” and “Zhuang” have been officially used since the founding of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China. The Nung group in 
Vietnam was formed from a group of Chinese Zhuang migrants who came to Viet Nam 300 




desire and activities to promote a collective, cross-national identity must adhere 
to the hegemonic discourse of a “unified, multi-ethnic nation” of the PRC. 
Meanwhile, modern socio-economic circumstances such as the Regional 
Free Trade Area have become more influential. In official discourse, the slow 
economic development in minorities’ areas has also raised a big issue. The 
Chinese government reportedly has set up a state-level research group devoted 
to a comprehensive development plan in cooperation with ASEAN and 
Southeast Asian countries. In 2005, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
became an official member of the GMS (Great Mekong Sub-region). 
Geographically, Guangxi belongs to the upper Zhujiang (Pearl River) basin, a 
less developed region. Most of the major cities in Guangxi are accessible via 
river navigation from the Zhujiang Delta. Therefore, Guangxi identifies itself as 
a bridge between the Southern China economic region and ASEAN. 
Within this context, linguistic and culture commonalities with other Tai-
speaking peoples outside China, especially with people in Thailand, have been 
endorsed as an alternative strategy to represent themselves in the “politics of 
identity”. These were attempts to enhance Zhuang pride as a macro-level 
movement interconnected with international level socio-economic cooperation. 
The two associated phenomena have a significant impact on the Zhuang 
scholars’ drive to redefine their self-image. It is worth noting that this scholarly 
perception has penetrated into the wider public, not limited in academic 
discourse as earlier.  
From my ethnographic research, the Zhuang commoners are moving 
towards recognition of much more extensive relations with the Thai than in the 
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past. China’s expanding market and internationalized economy made it possible 
for Zhuang intellectuals to free themselves from economic dependence on the 
state. The Zhuang who graduated from universities can find good employment 
in non-government sectors. In addition to Mandarin language proficiency, 
foreign language proficiency became essential for good employment and a 
successful career. In the context of China-ASEAN Economic Cooperation 
promotion, the numbers of institutes teaching Thai language in Guangxi are 
increasing and the numbers of students learning Thai language in 2011 were up 
to 5,000 people. 
Recently, information technology and the media have played important 
roles in the self-representation of the Zhuang. As more and more people in 
China gained access to the Internet, they have also created a range of online 
communities. Various minzu have established such cyberspace networks such 
as the community associated with Website Rauz.net. Although the Chinese 
name of the site is Zhuang zu zai xian (Zhuang nationality online), visitors 
quickly learn that the objective of the site is “to facilitate the transmission and 
development of the culture of the Rau people.” According to the site, “Rau” is 
a general designation not only for the Zhuang and Buyi nationalities in South 
China, but also for the Tay and Nung minorities in Vietnam (Shin 2005: 204).  
 From my interviews, this web site (www.Rauz.net.cn) is founded in 
2001 by Liao Hanbo, a native of Debao County of Baise. After graduating from 
the Xi'an International Studies University and majoring in Japanese, he worked 
as a translator and tourist guide in Guangzhou. Young and educated, he had the 
ability to communicate in several languages including Zhuang, Han, Cantonese, 
Japanese and English. He also began to learn Thai language by himself and 
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searched for the linguistic and cultural connections of the Zhuang and other Taic 
groups through various channels of media. When the term “Buluotuo Culture” 
emerged and was recognized as Zhuang intangible cultural heritage, the 
Rauz.net has also stressed the significance of Buluotuo. Through its forum, a 
lot of young Zhuang and academics discussed issues of cultural heritage of the 
Zhuang, making the site one of the largest and most influential Zhuang cultural 
portals. Realizing that the website was been watched by the government, the 
website managers therefore posted the announcement that they are opposed to 
“any conspiracy or action that uses any minzu issue as an excuse to break up the 
motherland.” (Shin 2006: 204). 
Accordingly, the young Zhuang working in the cities have begun to 
develop a virtual community, sharing the common interests of music. They 
formed a band and composed songs in Zhuang language (using De-Jing dialect 
of Southern Zhuang). In 2004, they also produced the first modern pop music 
album in Zhuang language titled “Beih Nongx” (which is similar to Phi Nong 
in Thai), consisting of 15 songs. All of the songs in this album are original works 
composed by native Zhuang music lovers. It explains that: 
In Zhuang, the word “beih” literally means elder brothers and sisters, 
while “nongx” means younger siblings. Its meaning can be further 
extended to one’s relatives and fellow members of one’s ethnicity. 
Naming this album as “beih nongx” expresses the meaning of all 
Zhuang brothers and sisters as well as the wish to revitalize the Zhuang 
music culture. (A booklet of CD) 
On the cover, there are four languages: Zhuang, Chinese, English, and 
Thai (see Figure 46).  One song in this album is “Bouslaoxdauz”, the lyrics say: 
Remember the Zhuang people’s supreme god, Bouslaoxdauz’s kindness 
Because he created the universe and reconciles crises. 
Never forget the Flower Goddess, Yahua 
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She transforms flowers into souls and protects children. 
Sing ancient ballads about the flood surging forth, 
Brother and Sister Calabash recreated humankind. 
The Zhuang people in the world are all Beinongx (emphasis added) 
Let us commemorate Bouslaoxdauz 
Worship Mehloggyab, 
Worship our ancestors with fragrance and candles. 
 
All children and grandchildren pay their respects, 
Pray for more blessings from our ancestors. 
Villages have been connected together generation after generation, 
The descendant’s success will be famous forever. 
 
Figure 46 - The cover of "Beih Nongx" album 
From the objective of the web site and lyrics “the Zhuang people in the 
world are all Beinongx”, it clearly shows their desire to promote a collective 
and cross-national ‘pan-Zhuang identity’91. Since 2005-2009, this group led by 
                                                 
91 Associate Professor Bruce Lockhart suggested this term when I submitted my proposal. I 
think it is useful term to define the view of the Zhuang in the PRC that see themselves as a 
center or origin of other Taic groups. 
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Liao Hanbo, performed live concerts at in Debao, Jingxi, and once in Tianyang. 
These narratives via modern media have contributed to the construction of the 
Zhuang identity in the larger public sphere. Guangxi Zhuang Studies 
Association appreciated Liao Hanbo’s outstanding ability and his keen interest 
in Zhuang language and culture; thus, they invited him to join in 2007 as Deputy 
Secretary-General of Guangxi Zhuang Studies Association. In 2009, as 
suggested by Professor Fan Honggui, he went to Thailand to work at the center 
of Thai-China cultural and educational exchanges in Khon Kaen province.  
While there he was responsible for the construction of “Thai-China Culture 
Cooperation Institute”, and was in charge of setting up the “Zhuang-Thai 
Cultural Exchanges Center” and “Southern China and Indochina National 
Database” (Liao’s CV). 
Interestingly, before he came to Thailand, he realized that his 
movements were being monitored by the government. He was questioned by 
the GZAR Public Security Bureau. This case reflects that although the Chinese 
State officially promoted international exchange among the Zhuang and other 
Tai-speaking groups outside China, the state is always cautious that external 
cultural and ethnic ties may affect ethnic minority groups’ relationships with the 
state they inhabit. External cultural ties can lead to more politically organized 
pan-ethnic mobility as happened in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Han, 
E. 2010). Similarly, the Vietnamese government is cautious about the Zhuang 
enthusiastic to research cultural commonalities with ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam. When a delegation of GASS scholars officially went to Vietnam to 
study the ethnic culture in 2011, the Vietnamese government did not allow them 
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to visit the ethnic villages and escorted them around the Vietnam Ethnology 
Museum and provided them with books on ethnic minority groups.  
In the context of promoting China-ASEAN, Zhuang Studies got more 
financial support from the government. Scholars on Zhuang studies have had 
more opportunities to go abroad to attend international conferences and do 
research in Southeast Asian countries. Professor Zhao Minglong was the first 
Zhuang scholar who visited Ahom of India and he presented his survey at the 
4th China-ASEAN Think Tanks Strategic Dialogue Forum.  In the 2011 
conference on Buluotuo Culture, I noticed the conference was on a much larger 
scale that previous conferences. Scholars “from seven ethnic groups, including 
Dai, Dong, Buyi, Li, Maonan, Mulao and Shui” and 16 invited scholars “from 
five countries including Tay, Nguoi Nung from Vietnam, Lao Lum from Laos, 
Shan from Myanmar, Thai from Thailand and Ahom from India” participated. 
The number of Chinese participants was more than 350 people. It was the first 
time that the Zhuang Studies Association contacted Tai Ahom and Shan 
scholars. I was asked by Professor Qin (Vice president of Zhuang Studies 
Association) to collect research on Tai Ahom in English and Thai languages. 
Seen in this light, it was a new era in which Zhuang Studies was riding on a tide 
of Chinese economic power92 in order to expand their territorial research area, 
following in the footsteps of international Tai Studies. 
The project of Buluotuo Cultural Tourism development is a state-
sponsored project. While scrutinizing the strategies of Zhuang intellectuals and 
                                                 
92 In October 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized in the 8th China-ASEAN Business and 
Investment Summit that: “We should take advantage of the “China-ASEAN year of friendly 
exchanges” to continue with the cooperation on culture, education, tourism and youth and try 
to achieve the target of 15 million person-times of personnel exchanges by 2015.” 
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local state agencies in promoting Buluotuo culture as a Zhuang intangible 
heritage, we must focus on the power relations and conditions that allow some 
groups to claim positions to speak. The central government of the CCP is the 
highest position. Although scholars and local governments have their own 
different agenda, they have to communicate with the CCP by using acceptable 
rhetoric. They hence proclaimed the agenda of the strategy is to accelerate the 
economic and social development of Tianyang and to promote cultural and 
economic ties between China-ASEAN. To conclude, Buluotuo myth “debates” 
are culturally organized and structured to reclaim their “lost” traditions due to 
leftist mistakes during the Cultural Revolution. It is a new quest and endeavor 
in the modernization process of traditional Zhuang culture. These contemporary 
interaction, mixed with new situations and evolving ethnic identities, offer a 
terrain that the Zhuang intellectuals are able to negotiate with the Chinese state 
and play role in constructing and representing their own identities in national 
and international level. 
Besides, the strategic position of Guangxi as a base for China-ASEAN 
economic cooperation encourages not only Zhuang elites and scholars, but also 
commoners to exercise transnational mobility and to articulate the imaginary of 
Zhuang common culture with other Tai-speaking groups in Southeast Asia. By 
the time of writing, several scholars came to Northeastern Thailand to research 
Thai folk culture and religious beliefs. Lu Xiaoqin is researching Molam songs 
of northeastern Thai in order to compare with the Zhuang songs. Liao Hanbo is 
now studying in the master degree program in linguistics at Chiang Mai. Anti-
Chinese sentiment that emerged in Vietnam due to the South China Sea conflict, 
obstructed Zhuang researchers from studying Tay and Nung people in Vietnam. 
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On the other hand, more Thai academics and students also got support from 
Chinese government and Confucius Institutes in Thailand to conduct research 
in Guangxi. These factors enable the Zhuang commoners to have more 
extensive relations with Thailand than other countries. 
A long history of ethno-linguistic connections between the Zhuang and 
the Tais are meaningful to Zhuang people in varying respects. Local people, 
whose families and kin were cut off when the China-Vietnam border was 
demarcated, began to cross the border to search for their kin. Liao Hanbo told 
me that his unknown relatives living in Vietnam travelled to Debao and 
searched for his family by bringing t old photos of his grandfather. I also heard 
about several cases about women from the Vietnamese side illegally married 
with villagers in Guangxi and had to return to Vietnam.   
In addition to the revival of kinship ties when I traveled to several 
villages nearby the Sino-Vietnam border pass, I witnessed that the female ritual 
specialist in the village was invited to perform rituals in another village located 
in Vietnam. Another senior male ritual specialist also told me that he had many 
followers in Vietnam and he was often invited to perform rituals there. In his 
funeral at Longzhou, more than ten disciples came to perform rituals and several 
of them came from Vietnam. These ritual specialists serve local communities as 
a fortuneteller, advisor, and healer. As Davis (2005) pointed out, the ethnic 
minorities who lack political rights or equal economic opportunities during 
rapid development have created the “back stage” by reviving and reinventing a 
transborder network of their own. In the case of the Zhuang ritual specialists 
who have struggled with state suppressions, they have informally created and 
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maintained their network across national boundaries through rituals. 93   
However, their transborder network is limited along the Sino-Vietnam border 
area, unlike the transborder network of other ethnic groups who are Theravada 
Buddhists that have created an “imagined community,” by means of sharing 
Buddhist scripts and rituals of merit making and being ordained as novices in 
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand.   
The bounding of new regional identities has affected the lives of border 
people on a vast scale. The young generation uses the Internet to create a virtual 
community to present what it means to be Zhuang in the modern period. The 
website Rau.net and the album of “Beix nong” are prominent instances of 
Zhuang commoners exercising transnational mobility and articulating an 
imaginary Zhuang common culture with other Tai-speaking groups in Southeast 
Asia. A linguistic commonality enables this young generation to learn Thai by 
themselves through Thai movies, TV series, and songs that can be easily 
accessed on the internet.  
Accordingly, they have created a range of online communities with Thai 
friends and have begun to assert Zhuang identities with reference to a linguistic 
and cultural link with Thais in Thailand. Some individuals can publicly present 
new alternative narratives about their ethnic identity within their online 
communities. There are several informants who were previously unable to write 
Zhuangwen (Romanized Zhuang language) and they began studying written 
Zhuangwen and learn about Zhuang song in attempt to communicate in chat 
                                                 
93 Nguyen Thi Yen a Vietnamese scholar, who has researched the comparative aspects of 
religious beliefs among The Tay and Nung and The Zhuang reported that “Vestiges of the Tay 
and Nung cult of Creator are found in the cult of Mother Hoa, or Mother Luc Giap [Muliujia] 
of the Zhuang.” 
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room. Many of them also learned Thai by themselves and share Thai songs and 
its meaning in their chat rooms.  
The most interesting case I met is a young Zhuang who graduated from 
Xinjiang Minzu University. He experienced the extreme ethno-nationalist 
sentiment of the Uygur in Xinjiang and felt ashamed that as a Zhuang he did not 
know Zhuangwen and Zhuang culture. He adopted the anti-Han sentiment and 
strong ethno-nationalism. After that, he searched online and found Rau.net 
website where he began to learn Zhuangwen and communicated within forums. 
After working for a few years, he saved money and traveled by himself to Tai-
speaking communities in Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. I met this 
young man in Chiang Mai and he expressed his pride that he was able to 
communicate with other Tai-speaking communities by speaking Zhuang. He 
also spent about one month studying Thai language and then went on travelling. 
The latest news was that he went to Laos and married a minority woman and 
has lived in Laos.  
As Keyes (1995: 137) contends, “the recognition of kinship among Tai-
speaking peoples is a product not of objective linguistic or ethnolinguistic 
characteristics, but of ethnic and national processes activated first by the 
creation of modern nation-states and then by the recent intensified flows of 
people, goods, and information across the boundaries of nation-states.” My 
study suggests that some Zhuang individuals today are achieving a new public 
voice and are actively participating in the construction of their own ethnic 
identity by appropriating the recent intensified flows of people and information 
across the boundaries of nation-states. These new individual voices cannot be 
viewed simply as contesting to state-dominated representation; they are 
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peacefully engaged in a cultural dialogue with Han China (Baranovitch 2001). 
Seen in this light, my ethnographic findings demonstrate that Zhuang ethnic 
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Phạm, Q. P. (2009). Hero and deity: Tran Hung Dao and the resurgence of 
popular religion in Vietnam. Silkworm Books. 
Phromsuthirak, Maneepin. (2004). Place Naming of the Thais and the 
Zhuangs. Silpakorn University International Journal, Vol. 4 (Number 1-
2), 38-49. 
Picard, M. (1997). Cultural tourism, nation-building and regional culture: The 
making of a Balinese identity. In M. Picard and R. E. Wood (Eds.). 
Tourism, ethnicity, and the state in Asian and Pacific societies. 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 181-214. 
Pieke, Frank N. (2005). The politics of rural land use planning. In Peter Ho 
(Ed.).  Developmental Dilemmas: Land Reform and Institutional Change 
in China. London; New York: Routledge, 89-120.  
Postiglione, G. A. (2013). China’s National Minority Education: Culture, 
Schooling, and Development. New York: Falmer Press. 
Potter, S. Heins, and Potter, Jack M. (1997). China's Peasants: The 
Anthropology of a Revolution. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Proschan, F. 2001. Peoples of the Gourd: Imagined Ethnicities in Highland 
Southeast Asia. The Journal of Asian Studies, 60, 999-1032.   
Putterman, L. (1993). Continuity and Change in China’s Rural Development : 
Collective and Reform Eras in Perspective: Collective and Reform Eras 
in Perspective. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Rack, M. (2005). Ethnic distinctions, local meanings: negotiating cultural 
identities in China. Pluto Press. 
Robinson, William I.  (1998). Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, 
Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies. Sociological 
Forum, 13(4), 561–594. 
Rosaldo, Renato, ed. (2003). Cultural Citizenship in Island Southeast Asia: 
Nation and Belonging in the Hinterlands. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.   
285 
 
Rudelson, J. J., & Rudelson, J. B.-A. (1997). Oasis Identities: Uyghur 
Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road. Columbia University Press. 
Sahliyeh, E. (1993). Ethnicity and State-Building: The Case of the Palestinians 
in the Middle East. In Judith D. Toland (Ed.), Ethnicity and the State.  
New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 177-9. 
Sautman, B. (1999). Expanding Access to Higher Education for China’s 
National Minorities: Policies of Preferential Admissions. In Postiglione, 
G. A. (Ed.). China’s National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, 
and Development. New York: Falmer Press. 
Schafer, E. H. (1967). The Vermilion Bird: T’ang Images of the South. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Schein, L. (1997). Gender and internal orientalism in China. Modern China. 
[H.W. Wilson - SSA], 23, 69. 
Schein, L. (2000). Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China’s 
Cultural Politics. Duke University Press. 
Schipper, M., Ye, S., & Yin, H. (Eds.). (2011). China’s Creation and Origin 
Myths: Cross-cultural Explorations in Oral and Written Traditions. Brill.  
Schram, Stuart (2002) Mao Tse-Tung's Thought from 1949–1976. In Merle 
Goldman and Leo Ou-Fan Lee (Eds.). An Intellectual History of Modern 
China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (1999). Seeing like a state: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (2009). The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of 
Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J. L. (2007). For Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors: The Chinese Tradition of 
Paper Offerings. Hong Kong University Press. 
Shih, C. (2003). Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to 
the State. Routledge. 
Shih, C. (2008). Autonomy, Ethnicity, and Poverty in Southwestern China: 
The State Turned Upside Down. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Shin, L. K. (2006). The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion 
on the Ming Borderlands. Cambridge University Press. 
Siu, H. F. (1993). Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South 
China. Daedalus, 122(2), 19–43. doi:10.2307/20027166 
Sleeboom-Faulkner, M. (2007). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS): shaping the reforms, academia and China (1977-2003). Leiden; 
Boston: Brill.  
286 
 
Smith, Anthony D. (1999). Myths and memories of the nation. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Solinger, Dorothy J. (2006). Interviewing Chinese People: from high-level 
officials to the unemployed. In Maria Heimer and Stig Thogersen (Eds.). 
Doing Fieldwork in China. Copenhagen: NIAS, 166-167. 
Stites, Regie (1999), "Writing Cultural Boundaries: National Minority 
Language Policy, Literacy Planning and Bilingual Education," In Gerard 
A. Postiglione (Ed.), China 's national minority education. New York: 
Falmer Press, 95-130.  
Su, X., & Teo, P. (2009). The Politics of Heritage Tourism in China: A View 
from Lijiang. Routledge. 
Su, Y. and Kahrl, F. (2011).“Right to Power? Democratic Decision-Making 
and Natural Resource Management in Rural China: A Case Study from 
Yunnan Province”, In Vaddhanaphuti, Chayan and Jirattikorn, Amporn 
(eds). Spatial politics and economic development in the Mekong Sub-
region : a collection of papers from the international conference 'Critical 
Transitions in the Mekong Sub-region. Chiang Mai: Regional Center for 
Social Science and Sustainable Development. 
Sutton, Donald S. (1995). Consuming Counterrevolution: The Ritual and 
Culture of Cannibalism in Wuxuan, Guangxi, China, May to July 1968. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 37:136-172.   
Tai, C. P. (2005). Literacy practices and functions of the zhuang character 
writing system. (Order No. 0667847, University of Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong)). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/305363428?accountid=13876. 
(prod.academic_MSTAR_305363428). 
Tapper, R. (1989). Ethnic identities and social categories in Iran and 
Afghanistan. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald & M. Chapman (Eds.), History 
and ethnicity. London: Routledge, 232-46. 
Thomas, Kelly A. (2001). Falun Gong: An Analysis of China's National 
Security Concerns. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association, 10(2), 
471-496. 
Toland, J. D. (Ed.). (1993). Ethnicity and the state. New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Took, J. (2005). A Native Chieftaincy in Southwest China: Franchising a Tai 
Chieftaincy under the Tusi System of Late Imperial China. Leiden: Brill. 
Tsing, Anna L. (1993). In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an 
Out-of-the-way Place. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Turner, J. A. (2010). Cultural Performances in the Guangxi Tourism 
Commons: A Study of Music, Place, and Ethnicity in Southern China. 
287 
 
PhD. Dissertation submitted to Department of Folklore and 
Ethnomusicology, Indiana University. 
Turton, Andrew, ed. (2000). Civility and Savagery: Social Identity in Tai 
States. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.   
U, Eddy. (2010). “Third Sister Liu and the Making of the Intellectual in 
Socialist China.” The Journal of Asian Studies, No. 69: 57–83. 
Veena Das and Deborah Poole. 2004. Anthropology in the Margins of the 
state. Santa Fe: School of American Research. 
Vertovec, S. (1991). Inventing Religious Tradition: Yagnas and Hindu 
Renewal in Trinidad. In Geertz, A. W., & Jensen, J. S. (eds).   Religion, 
Tradition, and Renewal. Aarhus Universitetsforlag. 
Walder, Andrew G. and Yang Su (2003). The Cultural Revolution in the 
Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact. China Quarterly, 173 
(March), 74–99. 
Walker, A. (2009). Tai Lands and Thailand: Community and State in 
Southeast Asia. Asian Studies Association of Australia. 
Wang, F., Wang, G., Hartmann, J., & Luo, W. (2012). Sinification of Zhuang 
place names in Guangxi, China: a GIS-based spatial analysis approach. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(2), 317–333. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00471.x 
Wang, Fei-Ling (2005). Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China's 
Hukou System. Stanford University Press. 
Wang, Mingfu and Johnson, Eric (2008). Zhuang Cultural and Linguistic 
Heritage. The Nationalities Publishing House of Yunnan.  
Wellens, K. (2010). Religious Revival in the Tibetan Borderlands: The Premi 
of Southwest China. University of Washington Press. 
Wen, J. J. (2001). Tourism and China’s Development: Policies, Regional 
Economic Growth and Ecotourism. River Edge, NJ: World Scientific 
Pub.  
Wiens, Herold J. (1954, 1967). Han Chinese Expansion in South China. 
Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press.  
Wilkerson, James. (2007). Negotiating local tradition with Taoism: Female 
ritual specialists in the Zhuang religion. Religion, 37, 150-163. 
Wood, R. E. (1997). Tourism and the State: Ethnic Options and Constructions 
of Otherness. In M. Picard and R. E. Wood (Eds.).  Tourism, Ethnicity, 




Wu L., et al. (2008). Study on security and protection of original ecotourism 
resources in the mountain areas of western Guangxi. Ecological 
Economy, 4, 41-48. 
Wu, David Yen-ho. (1991). The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese 
Identities. Daedalus, 120, 159-179.  
Xu, G., Wang, W., Bae, C. J., Huang, S., & Mo, Z. (2012). Spatial distribution 
of Paleolithic sites in Bose Basin, Guangxi, China. Quaternary 
International, 281, 10–13. doi:10.1016/j.quaint.2012.02.019  
Yang Zhong (2008). Dissecting Chinese county Governmental Authorities. In 
Yongnian, Z., & Fewsmith, J. (Eds.). China’s Opening Society: The Non-
State Sector and Governance. Routledge. 
Yang, Bin. (2009). Central State, Local Governments, Ethnic Groups and the 
Minzu Identification in Yunnan (1950s-1980s). Modern Asian Studies, 
43, 741-775.   
Yang, F. (2005) Between secularist ideology and desecularizing reality: the 
birth and growth of religious research in communist China. In Yang, F. 
and Tamney, Joseph B.(Eds.). State, market, and religions in Chinese 
societies. Leiden; Boston: Brill.  
Yang, F. (2012). Religion in China: survival and revival under communist 
rule. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Yang, M. M.-H. (2007) Ritual Economy and Rural Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics. In David Held & Henrietta Moore (Eds.). Cultural 
Politics in a Global Age: Uncertainty, Solidarity and Innovation. Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, University of California Press.  
Yang, M. M.-H. (2008). Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and 
State Formation. University of California Press. 
Yeung, Y., & Shen, J. (2008). The Pan-Pearl River Delta: An Emerging 
Regional Economy in a Globalizing China. Chinese University Press. 
Yu, H. (2010). Identity and Schooling among the Naxi: Becoming Chinese 
with Naxi Identity. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 
Zang, Xiaowei (1998) “Ethnic Representation in the Current Chinese 
Leadership” The China Quarterly, No. 153 (March), 107-127. 
Zarrow, P. (2012). After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the 
Chinese State, 1885-1924. Stanford University Press. 
Zhang, Hong & Zhang, Ling. (2010). Protection and Innovation of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage – Buluotuo Festival. Paper presented at the fourth 
annual meeting of the UK Centre for Events Management, 14–16 July, 
(accessed January 2012). 
Zhang, Tong, and Schwartz, B. (2003). Confucius and the Cultural 
Revolution: A Study in Collective Memory. In Olick, J.K. (Ed). States of 
289 
 
Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National 
Retrospection.  Duke University Press. 
Zhang, Y. (1997). From “Minority Film” to “Minority Discourse”: Questions 
of Nationhood and Ethnicity in Chinese Cinema. Cinema Journal, 36(3), 
73–90. 
Zhao Litao & Fu Rong. (2010). China's hukou reform: the Guangdong and 
Shanghai cases. Courtney. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National 
University of Singapore. 
Zhao, Gang. (2006). Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise 
of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century. 
Modern China, 32, 3-30. 
Zhao, Shiyu. (2002). Town and Country Representation as Seen in Temple 
Fairs, in Town and Country in China: Identity and Perception. NY: 
Palgrave. 
Zheng Yi; T. P. Sym. (1996). Scarlet memorial: tales of cannibalism in 
modern China. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Zheng, Q. (2010). China’s Ethnic Groups and Religions (1st ed.). Cengage 
Learning Asia. 
Zheng, Xiaoyun. (2007). A new probe into the origin of the Tai ethnic group 
and the establishment of a Tai culture zone. Tai culture, 20, 46-51.   
Zhou, M., & Sun, H. (2004). Language Policy in the People’s Republic of 
China: Theory and Practice Since 1949. Springer.Lanham, Md.: 
Lexington Books. 
Zhou, Minglang. (2003). Multilingualism in China: the politics of writing 
reforms for minority languages, 1949-2002. Berlin; New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter. 
Zhou, Yanxian and Lu (translators). (2010). Liao Songs of Pingguo Zhuang: 
Song of March. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press. 
In Thai 
Department of Fine Arts. (1999). Phraratchaphongsawadan Chabap 
Phraratchahatthalekha (The Royal Chronicle: Royal Autograph 
Edition) Bangkok. 
Li Fuchen (ed.) (1996). Chao Zhuang [The Zhuang people]. Chiang Mai: 
Suriwong Book Center. 
Nong Guanpin (author), Chantaronanont, Pornphan (translator). (1992). 
Wannakam pheunban khong zhuang doy sangkhep. In Qin, shengmin et 




Natjamnong, Thongthaem. (translate into Thai) (n.d.). Tamnan karn sanglok 




Shoocongdej, Rasmi (2012). Chattiphanwittaya Borankhadi kab ngan 
khonkhwa reung khontai     [Ethno-archaeology and researches on Tai 
people]. A paper presented at the conference" 100 Years of Professor 
Chin Yudee- the Father of Archaeology in Thailand" on 30 May 2012. 
Wongthes, Sujit (1984). Khon Thai Mai Dai Ma Cak Nai? [The Thai did not 
come from anywhere?]. Silpawatthanatham Special Issue. 
Wongthes, Sujit (1994). Khon Thai yuu thii nii [The Thais were always here in 
Southeast Asia]. Silpawatthanatham & Silpakorn University. 
Vallibhotama, Srisakara & Wongthes, Pranee (1993). Zhuang: Phinong 
phaothai kaokaethiisud [Zhuang: The oldest Tai sibling]. Ruankaew 
Publishing house. 
In Chinese 
Chen Jialiu (2008). Fajue minzuwenhua ziyuan dazao minzuwenhua dasheng 
[To create a province with rich ethnic culture by exploring the ethnic 
culture resource]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 706-716. 
Chen Jisheng (2008). Shilun zhongguo minzu xue de bagui xuepai [On Bagui 
School of Chinese Ethnology]. Guangxi Social Sciences, 7th–11th Issues. 
Fan Honggui and Gu Youshi, eds. (1989). Zhuangzu lungao [Draft Articles on 
the Zhuang]. Nanning: Guangxi renmin Chubanshe. 
Fan Honggui (2007). Tonggen sheng de mínzu: Zhuang tai ge zu yuanyuan yu 
wenhua [Ethnic Groups of the Same Root: the Zhuang-Tai Ethnic Origin 
and Culture]. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe (c2000), 2007. 
Fan Honggui (2004/ 2006). Huanan yu dongnanya xiangguan minzu [The 
Connections of Ethnic Groups in South China and Southeast Asia]. 
Beijing: Minzu chubanshe. 
Hao Tingting. (2008). Lun zhuangzu de fadejingshen-yizhuangzumejing、
chuanyangge、minjian gushi wei zhongxin [A discussion to legal 
principle and morality of the Zhuang: In terms of Mo Scriptures of the 
Zhuang, Songs of Eulogizing, and Zhuang folk stories]. Nanning: 
Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 506-523. 
Huang mingbiao (collect & arrange) (2004). Buluotuo yu ganzhuanghan 
chuanshuo gushi [Folk stories of Buluotuo and Mt.Ganzhuang]. Nanning: 
Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 
He Jianwu et al. (2009). Guangxi zhuangzu fei wuzhi wenhua yichan baohu 
xing luyou kaifa yanjiu -Yi baise buluotuo wenhua weili [Guangxi 
Zhuang protection of intangible cultural heritage tourism development ─ 
a case study of Buluotuo culture at Baise].  Guangxi Social Sciences, 4. 
291 
 
He Ying (2008). Buluotuo minsu wenhua de tedian yu tese jingjikaifa 
[Features and characteristics of the economic development of folk culture 
Buluotuo]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 675-684. 
Jiang Mingzhi (2008). ‘Buluotuo’ yu zhuangzu wenhua jingshen [Buluotuo: 
Zhuang ethnic culture and spirit]. Guangxi minzu daxue xuebao, 30(2). 
Li Ping (2008). Tianyang tese gexu jianshe yu buluotuo wenhua de baohu 
chuancheng [Tianyang Song Fair construction and Protection of 
Buluotuo cultural heritage]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 696-
705. 
Liang Tingwang and Liao Mingjun (2005). Buluotuo: Baiyue liaoren de shizu 
tuteng [Buluotuo:  ancestor totem of Baiyue Liao people]. Foreign 
Languages Press. 
Liao Hanbo. (2009, October 20). Zhuang yu xin yinyue yu lijie bei nong gehui 
jianjie [Introduction of new music in Zhuang language with the previous 
Bei Nong song] Retrieved from www.Rauz.net.cn 
Liu Daxian (2009). Ganzhuangshan Buluotuo de shenhua suzao he wenhua 
chuangyì [Myth Molding and Cultural Creativity of Buluoto in Mt. 
Ganzhuang]. Zhongguo wenxue renleixue yanjiuhui [Chinese Institute of 
Literary Anthropology]. Vol.1, 231-244. 
Liu Zhijun (2009). Feiwuzhi wenhuayichan baohu de renleixue toushi [On the 
Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage: An Anthropological 
Perspective]. Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social 
Sciences).  
Lu Xiaoqin & Liao Minjun (2012). Buluotuo. (Unpublished file). 
Luo Hantian (2011). Ganzhuangshan Buluotuo wenhua Luyou jingqu: cehua 
fang'an wenben [Mt Ganzhuang Buluotuo Cultural Tourism Scenic Spot: 
A record of the Party policy planning].   
Meng Yuanyao (2010). Shengsheng bu xi de chuancheng: Xiao yu zhuangzu 
xingxiao ge zhi yanjiu [Endless Inheritance: filial piety and Zhuang Song 
Research]. Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House. 
Mou Zhongjian (2005) Cong zong jiao xue kan zhuang zu bu luo tuo xin yang 
[The buluotuo faith of the Zhuang from the view of religion studies]. 
Study of Ethnics in Guangxi, 2(80), 82-90. 
Pan Chunjian (1998). “Hua” tuteng xinyang yu muliujia shenhua [“Flowers” 
totemic beliefs and Muliujia myth]. Journal of Guangxi University 
(Philosophy and Social Sciences) vol. 20:1.  
Pan Minwen (2008). Shitan ganzhuangshan wenhua luyou zhibaozhuang [A 
rustic opinion on cultural tourism packing design of Mt. Ganzhuang]. 
Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 725-729. 
Pan Qixu (1991). Zhuangzu gexu yanjiu [Research on the Song Markets of the 
Zhuang]. Nanning: Guangxi Renmin chubanshe. 
Pan Qixu (2010). Zhuangzu gewei yanjiu [Research on the song-markets of the 




Pan Qixu (2011). Chongshang wu wo gongcun yu hexie you xu shi zhongguo 
zhuangzu buluotuo wenhua de jingsui [Respect for orderly and harmonious 
co-existence is the essence of Buluotuo culture of the Zhuang in China] 
Paper presented in the conference “Ancestor Worship in Contemporary 
Society, with a Case Study of the Worship of Hùng Kings in Vietnam” in 
Việt Trì City, Phú Thọ Province. 
Qin Deqing (2008). Ouluozuyi-zhuangdongzuqun de wenhuazhenghe yu 
renwenchongjian [Ou Luo ethnic - cultural integration Zhuang -Dong 
groups and Humanistic Reconstruction]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu 
chubanshe, 568-582. 
Qin, Deqing. (2006). Zhuangzu wenhua de chuantongtezheng yu 
xiandaijiangou [Traditional features and modern construction of Zhuang 
Cultures] Guangxi Renmin chubanshe. 
Qin Naichang (ed.) (2004).Buluotuo xunzhong - Guangxi Tianyangxian 
ganzhuangshan buluotuo wenhua kaocha yu yanjiu [Tracing out 
Buluotuo: An investigation and research of Buluoto culture around Mt. 
Ganzhuang in Tianyang County, Guangxi] Nanning: Guangxi minzu 
chubansha. 
Qin Nai chang  and Qin Cai luan (Eds.) (2008). Zhuang xue di si ci xue shu 
yan tao hui lun wen ji [The Fourth Zhuang study Symposium 
Proceedings]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe. 
Qin Naichang (2008). Buluotuo：zhujiang liu yu yuan zhu minzu de renwen 
shizu [Buluotuo: A humanity ancestor of Indigenous Peoples in Pearl 
River Basin]. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 114-152. 
Qin Naichang (2008). “Mojing Buluotuo” yu huanan zhujiang liuyu de dao 
zuo nongye -“mo jing bu luotuo” yu dao zuo nongye shi yanjiu zhi yi 
[Mo Scriptures Buluotuo and Rice Farming in South China Zhujiang 
River Valley- On Mo Scripture Buluotuo and History of Rice Farming]. 
Journal of Baise University, 21(4), 1-15. 
Qin Shengmin (ed) (2003). Zhuang tai minzu chuantong wenhua bijiao yanjiu 
[Comprehensive Comparative Study of Zhuang- Thai traditional culture]. 
Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe. 
Rong Benzhen;Huang Xiaojuan;Zhang Shuyun. (2010). A Review of Sixty 
Years of Guangxi Literary Theory and Criticism (1). Southern Cultural 
Forum, 1(4), 95-97. 
Rong Benzhen, Huang Xiaojuan, Zhang Shuyun. (2010). Review of Sixty 
Years of Guangxi Literary Theory and Criticism (2). Southern Cultural 
Forum, 1(6), 84-99. 
Shi Guoqing (2006). Guangx zhuangzu minzu minjian xinyang de huifu he 
chongjian—yi tianyang xian buluotuo xinyang yanjiu wei li [the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Guangxi Zhuang ethnic folk beliefs - 
A Case Study of Tianyang Buluotuo faith]. PhD thesis, Central 
University for Nationalities. 
293 
 
Shi Guoqing (2008). Zhuangzu buluotuo xinyang yanjiu: Yi guangxi tianyang 
xian wei ge'an [The Zhuang Buluotuo Belief Research: A Case Study of 
Tianyang County, Guangxi]. Beijing Shi: Zong jiao wenhua chu ban she.  
Tianyang xianzhi [Gazetteer of Tianyang County]. (1999). 
Wang Chunfeng and Huang Guoxing (2008). Tianyang ganzhuangshan 
buluotuoxinyang de zongjiao luyou jiazhi [Religious tourism Value of 
Buluotuo Belief at Ganzhuang Mountain Tianyang]. Nanning: Guangxi 
minzu chubanshe, 685-695.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Wang Mingfu (2003). Yunnan Maguanxian Ah E xinzhai jisi Buluotuo 
shenshu diaocha [A research of worship ceremony of Buluotuo sacred tree at 
A Er Xinzhai village, Maguang County, Yunnan]. Journal of Wenshan 
Teachers College, 1. 
Wei Suwen (2011). Qiannian Liubo – Zhongguo Buluotuo wenhua [Thousand 
Years of Flow – Buluotuo Culture in China]. Heilongjiang renmin 
chubanshe. 
Wei Suwen (2003). Minjian gushi xinlixue [The Psychology in Folk Stories]. 
Zhongguoshehui chubanshe. 
Wei Suwen,, eds.(2007).  Qiannian Liuyun – Zhongguo Zhuangzu Gexu 
[Thousand Years of Transmission - Song Fair of the Zhuang Nationality]. 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe. 
Xu Songshi (1947). Dongnanya minzu de zhongguo xieyuan [The Blood Ties 
of the People of Southeast Asia with China]. Hong Kong: Dongnanya 
yanjiuxin. 
Xu, Xiaoming (2011). Zhuangzu zuxian chongbai de texìng ji jiazhi [Features 
and Value of Zhuang ancestor worship]. Paper presented in the 
conference “Ancestor Worship in Contemporary Society, with a Case 
Study of the Worship of Hùng Kings in Vietnam” in Việt Trì City, Phú 
Thọ Province.  
Xu Zhuanfang (2008).Tianyang ganzhuangshan minzu wenhua ziyuan kaifa 
liyong yanjiu——jujiao qizhong de minzu jingshen hongyang he peiyu 
[Tianyang Ganzhuang mountain resources development and utilization of 
national culture - which focused forward and cultivate the national spirit]. 
Master Thesis, Guangxi University for Nationalities. 
Yang Shuzhe (2007). Shigong. Yishi. Xinyang --Zhuangzu Minjian 
Shigongjiao Yanjiu [Shigong, ceremonies, Faith - the studies on Zhuang 
folk shigong faith]. Guangxi renmin chubanshe. 
Yang Shuzhe and Wu Iinchang (2008). Kaifa minzu wenhua luyou yu tigao 
zhuangzu minzu xinlisuzhi [Development of ethnic cultural tourism and 
improvement of the psychological quality of Zhuang nationality]. 
Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 717-724. 
Zhang Shengzhen, ed.-in-chief (1991). Buluotuo jingshi yìzhu [The Buluotuo 




Zhang Shengzhen (2006). Wo yu zhuangxue yanjiu ershinian [I and Twenty 
years of Zhuang studies research]. Guangxi Ethnic Studies. 2 (84), 
Retrieved on Nov 27, 2010 from http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=171723485 
Zhang Shengzhen, ed.-in-chief (2004). Zhuangzu mojīng buluotuo yingyin 
yizhu [Buluotuo Mo Scripture of the Zhuang - photocopy Annotation]. 
Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanse. 
Zhou Guomao. (1995). Mojiao yu mo wenhua [Moism and Mo Culture]. 
Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanse.  
Zhou Yanxian and Lu Lianzhi, eds. (2012). Pingguo Zhuangzu Liaoge [Liao 
Songs of Pinguo Zhuang]. Nanning: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe. 
 
News and Clips from Internet Sources 
(2001-11-12). West China boosts tourism featuring ethnic culture. Retrieved 
from www.peopledaily.com.cn  
(2011-11-25). Wedding Customs of Ethnic Minorities in Guangxi. Retrieved 
from http://www.visitourchina.com/blog/detail-182.html 
(2014-07-07) Guangxi tianyang "zhuang cheng" biaozhi xing jianzhu sheji 
[Guangxi Tianyang "Zhuang city" Landmark Buildings Design]. 
Retrieved from  
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_b38b02470102uwzu.html 
(N.D.) Development of Tianyang Ganzhuang Mountain Buluotuo Tourism 
Area. Retrieved from http://www.gxtyly.com/ty-
show.asp?Type=17&ID=7235 
(N.D.). Guangxi Bagui Company profile. Guangxi ba gui touzi jituan youxian 
gongsi Retrieved from     
http://www.gxrc.com/webpage/Company.aspx?EnterpriseID=24651   
(N.D.). The Tianyang Buluotuo mango style park. Retrieved from 
http://www.mychinatravelguide.com/city-guide/04/baise-the-tianyang-
buluotuo-mango-style-garden-25530.html 
AOP Group. (2012, Feb. 9). Tianyang hundred in town: the characteristic 
ecological town construction. Retrieved from 
http://www.dsecurity.info/9813.html 
China news agency. (2010, March 29). China-ASEAN lion dance team in 





China.org. (2003, December 31). Basic Facts about the 155 Ethnic 
Autonomous Areas in China. Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/e-
white/20050301/index.htm 
China.org. (2006, May 25). Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage in 
China. Retrieved from http://china.org.cn/e-news/news060525-3.htm 
Chinese Civilization Channel 2. (2010, October 11). Xungen wenzu buluotuo/ 
Zhuangzu xin minge [Apical Ancestor Buluotuo: new folksong of Zhuang 
Nationality].  Retrieved from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxdjzvUyIHk 
Dailynews.co.th (2012-11-21) Chinese Leaders visited Thailand. Retrieved 
from http://www.dailynews.co.th/royal/168180. 
Guangxi Broadcasting Network. (2008, Jan 2). Bose: listed Tianyang peasant 
income. Retrieved from 
http://www.sourcejuice.com/1126066/2008/01/02/Bose-listed-Tianyang-
peasant-income/ 
Guangxi Daily.(2008, May 13). Ministry of Agriculture and practical training 
base in rural areas settled in Tianyang. Retrieved from 
http://www.sourcejuice.com/1126149/2008/05/13/Ministry-Agriculture-
practical-training-base-rural-areas-settled/ 
Guangxipress (2012, April 5). Bright scene of the 2012 Buluotuo Folk Culture 
Tourism Festival. Retrieved from http://www.guangxipress.info/bright-
scene-of-the-the-2012-buluotuo-folk-culture-tourism-festival/ 
Guangxipress (2012,) China-ASEAN lion dance team in Guangxi the 
Tianyang “hegemony”. Retrieved from 
http://www.guangxipress.info/china-asean-lion-dance-team-in-guangxi-
the-tianyang-hegemony/ 
Gxny.gov.cn. (N.D.). Superiority of Guangxi Location. Retrieved from 
http://www.gxny.gov.cn/eng/GX/Location.html 
Li, Jinhui. (2002, September 11). Living Place of Zhuang Ancestor Found. 
Retrieved from http://china.org.cn/english/2002/Sep/42607.htm 
Lin Li (2007, February 23). One mln ancient ethnic books collected to rescue 
ethnic cultures. Retrieved from http://english.gov.cn/2007-
02/23/content_532571.htm 
Lu Jie. (2011, Feb 9). More than ten thousand people of Tianyang, together 
with Thai friends, pay respect to Buluotuo. Retrieved from 
http://www.bsyjrb.com 




Pan, L. (editor). (2007, February 24). Gov't to support ethnic areas' 
development. Retrieved from http://english.gov.cn/2007-
02/24/content_532704.htm 
Sina.com. News clip of policing daogong in Tianyang. Retrieved from 
http://video.sina.com.cn/v/b/25297654-1623825317.html 
Sinica.edu. (N.D.) Madame Wa . Retrieved from 
http://ethno.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/en/southwest/main_ZH-10.html 
Wen Jiabao. (2011, October 21). The 8th China-ASEAN Business & 
Investment Summit Opens Wen Jiabao Delivers a Speech. Retrieved 
from http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/TourChina/t870380.htm 
Worldbank. (N.D.).SWPRP. Retrieved from 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/reducingpoverty/docs/newpdfs/case-
summ-china-SouthWest.pdf 
Xinhua News Agency. (2002, October 9). Origin of China’s Largest Ethnic 
Minority Found. Retrieved from 
http://china.org.cn/english/2002/Oct/45200.htm 
Xinhuanet (2002, October 9). Relics, songs tell story of ethnic minority. 
Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-
10/09/content_589554.htm 
Xu, Shundong. (2011, October 30). Bose set off a new upsurge in the fourth 
quarter of construction completed 32 projects open.  Retrieved from 
http://www.sourcejuice.com/1483913/2011/10/30/Bose-new-upsurge-
fourth-quarter- 
Youth.cn. (2006, February 22). “Intangible heritage of Ethnic Minorities in 




List of the Buluotuo scriptures from the Zhuangzu mojīng buluotuo yingyin yizhu 
(Buluotuo Mo Jing of the Zhuang - photocopy Annotation) published in 2004 
No Year Location Owner Collectors Scripture’s Title 
and Its Translation 
1 
 
1977 Suolue Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 






 ( 布洛陀禳解经) 
2 1983 Donglan County, 
Hechi City 
Qin mao de Qin jian ping 《占杀牛祭祖宗》 
 ( 杀牛祭祖经) 
3 1985 Bailan Township, 
Baise City 
Deng fu yao Qin jian zhen 
 
( 解冤经) 
4 1985 Bailan Township, 
Baise City 
Deng fu yao Qin jian zhen 《本麼叭》 
( 禳解经) 
5 1986 Yufeng Township, 
Tianyang County 
Huang heng gui Huang zi yi 《麼汉皇祖王一科》 
( 天鹅王祖王经) 
6 1986 Yufeng Township, 
Tianyang County 
Huang heng gui Huang zi yi 《麼兵甲一科》 
( 兵、甲法事合一仪
式经) 
7 1986 Yufeng Township, 
Tianyang County 
Qin xuan ji Huang zi yi 
 
 ( 王曹血塘经) 
8 1986 Yufeng Township, 
Tianyang County  
Huang xing de Huang zi yi 
  
 ( 诵彩虹经) 
9 1986 Yufeng Township, 
Tianyang County 
Huang xing de 
 
Huang zi yi 
 ( 布洛陀神案禳解仪
式经) 
10 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Luo zi xiang Huang zi yi 《汉皇一科》 
( 天鹅王经) 
11 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Luo zi xiang Huang zi yi 《九狼叺》 
( 禳解经第九章) 
12 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Li zheng ye Huang zi yi 《麼王曹科》 
( 地狱鬼王曹经) 
13 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Li zheng ye Huang zi yi 《麼请布洛陀》 
( 请布洛陀经) 
14 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Wang shi ba Huang zi yi 《麼叭科儀》 
( 禳解仪式经) 
15 1986 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Mo yu qing Huang zi yi 
 
( 禳解全经) 
16 1986 Napo County Police station of 
Napo County 
Pan qi xu,  
Zhang si ping,   




17 1986 Po-e Township, 
Donglan County, 
Hechi City 
Qin Naishou Qin jian ping 《呼社布洛陀》 
 ( 呼请布洛陀经) 
18 1987 Po-e Township, 
Donglan County, 
Hechi City 
Qin Jiao Xing Qin jian ping 
 
( 送鬼经) 
19 1987 Si he Township, 
Donglan County, 
Hechi City 












21 1987 Yiwei Township, 
Tiandong County 
Wei guang pu Huang zi yi 《闹混懷一科》 
( 招水牛魂经) 
22 1987 Yufeng Town, 
Tianyang County 
Huang xuan zu Tang yun bin 
 
( 收谷魂仪式经) 
23 1987 Yandong Township, 
Bama Yao 
Autonomous County 
Wang xuan bao Tang yun bin 
 





Qin dao zhang N.A. 《六造叭》 
( 禳解经第六章) 
25 1991 Xichou County, 
Wenshan Prefecture 
Yunnan 
Wang an yuan Wang ming fu 《麼荷泰》 
( 超度经) 
26 1995 Longchuan Town, 
Youjiang District of 
Baise City 
Huang shen you Qin jian zhen 
  
(禳解双棺经) 
27 2000  Yufeng Town, 
Tianyang County 
Huang xuan zu Tang yun bin 《雜麼一共卷一科》 
( 多经合一经卷) 
28 2001 Bailan Township, 
Baise City  




N.A.  Kunping Township, 
Tianyang County 
Huang yuefei Tang Yunbin, 
Huang Guiqiu 
(禳解凶兆仪式经) 
 
